FURTHER FRENCH REACTION TO IRAQ ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000665 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2015 TAGS: PREL IZ FR SUBJECT: FURTHER FRENCH REACTION TO IRAQ ELECTIONS REF: A. PARIS 656 ¶B. PARIS 601 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary and comment: During a brief February 2 discussion with us on Iraq's recent elections, the Presidency's new Middle East advisor stressed two points: 1) the need to ensure Sunni inclusion in the political process, which remains precarious, and 2) the need to help the new Iraqi authorities -- a departure from typical French talking points on Iraq. On the latter point, the Middle East advisor stressed that the GoF understood that that President Bush wanted France to do more on Iraq, and reiterated GoF readiness to help Iraq both through police training and other means, such as training civil administration. End summary and comment. ¶2. (C) During a February 2 introductory call on Presidential Technical Advisor for Middle East/Americas Dominique Boche which focused largely on Syria/Lebanon (ref a),we also sought further GoF reaction to Iraq's successful January 30 elections. Boche, referring to the January 31 telephone conversation between President Bush and Chirac, observed that the GoF was delighted by the election results, which represented a failure for terrorists. At the same time, Boche expressed concern over potential dangers ahead. In the GoF view, the low turnout of Sunni Arabs represented a potential danger and destabilizing factor not only for Iraq, but for the rest of the region. The GoF viewed low Sunni turnout as the combined result of boycotts and intimidation, and the possible consequence was that Iraq's election might deepen cleavages between Iraq's communities. In order to avoid this outcome, the GoF hoped that this new phase of Iraq's transition would involve a relaunch of national dialogue so "no one who rejects violence" was excluded from the process. Boche conceded that it was up to the new Iraqi government to decide what form such overtures might take, but one possibility might be some form of national reconciliation conference. It was essential, in the GoF view, that drafting of the constitution take place in a similar inclusive spirit, with Sunnis part of the process. Poloff responded by stressing our strong support for an inclusive political process, and noted that all of Iraq's major political groups had endorsed this concept. Boche accepted the point, but added that we needed to ensure that Iraq did not become an Islamic republic; he agreed that statements by Iraq's leading Shi'a parties against such an eventuality and in support of secular government were reassuring. ¶3. (C) In addition to ensuring greater inclusion in the political process for Sunnis, Boche said that helping the new Iraqi authorities was a second necessity, in the GoF view. On this point, Boche affirmed that the GoF understood that President Bush wanted France to do more on Iraq, and expected the U.S. to press this issue during high-level encounters later this month. Chirac had sought to emphasize to President Bush French readiness, not only to help Iraq via police training, but through other means, such as training civil administration. On the training proposal, Boche stressed that the GoF offer had been long-standing and was not a new development; what was needed now was responsiveness from the Iraqi side, which hopefully would be more forthcoming in the aftermath of IIG President Yawer's successful December visit to Paris. ¶4. (C) Comment: While concern over Sunni inclusion is a long-standing French concern, emphasizing the need to help the Iraqi government is a new French talking point on Iraq. While we don't want to overstate the significance of one official's comments, we see Boche's remarks as encouraging and hopefully indicative of a more forward-looking French approach on Iraq, in advance of key meetings with U.S. officials. At the same time, we note that past, open-ended French statements of willingness to help Iraq have gone largely unimplemented. End comment. ¶5. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. Leach