GOF CAUTIOUSLY SUPPORTIVE IN PUBLIC, PRIVATELY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 005926 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2015 TAGS: PREL IZ FR SUBJECT: GOF CAUTIOUSLY SUPPORTIVE IN PUBLIC, PRIVATELY PESSIMISTIC ON IRAQI CONSTITUTION REF: A. SECSTATE 158420 ¶B. STATE 158149 ¶C. PARIS 5220 Classified By: Deputy Political Minister-Counselor Bruce Turner, reason s 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary and comment: The initial GoF public reaction to presentation of the Iraqi constitution has been low-key and stressed GoF support for the Iraqi political process (vice the constitution itself),and the need for Iraqi authorities to build support for the document from all of Iraq's political communities. Working-level MFA officials conceded that the draft text contained important human rights advances, but expressed worry that Sunni dissatisfaction with the document spelled further trouble for Iraq's political process and territorial unity. One MFA official went so far as to describe the draft constitution as a "demi-fiasco," claiming that the Sunni community, despite efforts to increase its input, remained alienated from the final result, which he described as a Shia-Kurdish compromise. At the same time, MFA officials refuted press reports that the GoF is considering withdrawing its ambassador in Iraq due to security concerns, and downplayed a conference idea publicly floated by FM Douste-Blazy, claiming this was not yet a concrete GoF initiative. End summary and comment. ¶2. (C) We delivered ref a talking points urging support for the Iraqi constitution to MFA contacts August 29, and discussed the issue in more detail with MFA DAS-equivalent for Iraq/Arabian Gulf Affairs Antoine Sivan and Iraq desk officers David Cvach and Bernard Chappedelaine August 30. Cvach expressed appreciation for the timeliness of the information we provided, particularly the fact sheet on the constitution. He explained that the initial GoF response to the constitution, issued by the MFA spokesman on August 29, was intended to reaffirm the GoF's full support for the political process, while not taking a position on the substance of the constitutional text itself. (Note: The August 29 MFA statement took note of completion of the constitution and described it as a "milestone towards effective restoration of Iraqi sovereignty.. " Full text is in para 8. End note.) While Cvach conceded that the constitution contained impressive human rights advances, particularly in the area of individual liberties, he concluded that the GoF remained concerned over lack of support for the text among Iraq's Sunni community; this had the potential to deepen Iraq's sectarian divide to the detriment of the political process and Iraqi territorial unity. Cvach added that on other contentious issues, such as the distribution of revenues from natural resources, the vagueness of the draft text language could complicate its eventual implementation. ¶3. (C) MFA DAS-equivalent Sivan was more negative in assessing the draft constitution, describing it as a "demi-fiasco," due to the lack of buy-in from Iraq's Sunni Arab community. Sivan complained that, despite the best efforts to widen Sunni participation in the constitutional drafting committee, the final text was largely a Shi'a-Kurdish compromise which did nothing to reduce the Sunni sense of alienation. Sivan described his remarks as personal, but added that the reactions which he had heard from Iraqi contacts and the French embassy in Baghdad largely confirmed his view. Poloff reiterated that the failure of some Sunni negotiators to support the document was not equivalent to rejection by the entire Sunni community, but Sivan remained unswayed. Cvach asked about reported comments from the U.S. ambassador in Iraq suggesting that there was still room for edits in the draft constitutional text, noting that the GoF would welcome further changes to the draft text, if they translated into additional Sunni support. ¶4. (C) Poloff stressed the urgent need for GoF assistance to the Iraq's independent electoral commission (IECI),given the GoF's support for Iraq's political process. Chappedelaine said that French support for IECI was being channeled via pledged EU contributions towards all three phases of Iraq's electoral process: the January ballot, October referendum and December elections for a permanent government. On other French assistance programs, Cvach added that the first class of 40 Iraqi police officers and magistrates had completed training in France in August, under the EU "JUSTLEX" program; two more tranches of a similar size would undergo training in France in coming months. Cvach reported no movement, however, in the long-stalled French bilateral offer to train Iraqi gendarmes outside Iraq, noting that the GoF was still waiting for Iraqi follow-up after the visit of an Iraqi MOI delegation to France in July (ref c). Chappedelaine added that the French embassy in Baghdad would revisit the bilateral training offer with Iraqi authorities starting next week, but was not optimistic that there would be movement before permanent elections at the end of this year. He added that the Iraqi preference remained for training inside Iraq, which crossed French red-lines against sending military personnel to Iraq. ¶5. (C) Asked about press reports suggesting that France might temporarily withdraw its ambassador from Baghdad due to security threats, Cvach responded that Ambassador Bajolet, now in Paris for the annual ambassadors' conference, would return to Iraq at the end of the week. He stressed that the GoF had made no decision to reduce its staff in Baghdad, which consisted of five diplomats (two handling cooperation issues) and about 30 security officers. Cvach added that the GOF remained ready to assume the risks of maintaining its staff in Iraq, for whom vehicle movements represented the most dangerous security risk. He said that the French embassy staff had been consolidated in two residential complexes, in addition to the ambassador's residence and chancery. ¶6. (C) Cvach and Chappedelaine also downplayed August 30 remarks made by FM Douste-Blazy to the ambassadors' conference (septel),in which he floated the idea of a conference, similar to the Sharm al-Sheikh gathering, which could affirm a "perspective" towards a foreign troop withdrawal and accompany the political process. Cvach stressed that Douste-Blazy had added the conference reference to the speech himself, without the input of the regional directorate, and noted that he and his colleagues would be seeking clarification from the minister's office. He claimed that there was no concrete GoF proposal for a conference, and added that language on a "perspective" for a foreign troop withdrawal had long been part of French rhetoric on Iraq and did not constitute a call for a troop withdrawal date. ¶7. (C) Comment: Though pessimism among MFA officials on the constitution is at once disappointing and not surprising, at least this negativity is not being reflected in GoF public statements, which for now have been limited to the August 29 MFA statement. We will continue to seek details on the possible conference proposal, and determine whether it is a serious initiative on the part of FM Douste-Blazy. End comment. ¶8. (U) Text of August 29 MFA statement on presentation of the Iraqi constitution: Begin text. France has taken note of the completion of the draft Iraqi constitution. This is another milestone towards the effective restoration of Iraq's sovereignty which is part of the political transition process begun in accordance with resolution 1546. It is now up to all Iraqis to vote on the text in the referendum that will be held on October 15, 2005. France also applauds the efforts of the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative and the United SIPDIS Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq. It calls on the Iraqi authorities to continue and intensify their efforts in the context of a real national dialogue so as to develop the bases of a consensus on the country's future around this text and in all components of Iraqi society. It renews its urgent appeals to all Iraqis to turn away from violence and mobilize to ensure the establishment of their new institutions in the best possible conditions. End text. STAPLETON