Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PARIS548
2005-01-28 18:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

GOF TO WELCOME IRAQI ELECTIONS AS IMPORTANT STEP

Tags:  PREL IZ FR 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000548 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2015
TAGS: PREL IZ FR
SUBJECT: GOF TO WELCOME IRAQI ELECTIONS AS IMPORTANT STEP

REF: A. STATE 12757

B. STATE 12610

C. PARIS 426

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000548 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2015 TAGS: PREL IZ FR SUBJECT: GOF TO WELCOME IRAQI ELECTIONS AS IMPORTANT STEP REF: A. STATE 12757 ¶B. STATE 12610 ¶C. PARIS 426 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The GoF is likely to welcome the January 30 Iraqi elections as an important step, but not with the same adjectives as Washington. French officials, while expressing concern over the conditions under which elections are taking place, stress that it is not in the GoF's interest to criticize the election results. End summary. ¶2. (C) We raised ref (a) talking points on Iraqi elections and urged the GoF to issue a strong public statement welcoming the elections with MFA Political Director Stanislas Laboulaye January 26, and January 27 with MFA DAS-equivalent for Iraq/Iran/Arabian Gulf Affairs Antoine Sivan, who offered the more detailed response. Sivan, while cautioning that it was premature to pronounce on the elections before they took place, suggested that the GoF would welcome the January 30 election as an important step in Iraq's political transition. The GoF response, according to Sivan, would also likely stress that further steps were needed to make Iraq's political process more inclusive, particularly to bring on board Sunnis who reject violence. ¶3. (C) Sivan echoed the U.S. view that the elections would be imperfect and suggested a high level of GoF disquiet over the "deplorable" context of violence in which voting would take place. He appeared doubtful on prospects for Sunni participation and for high voter turnout in Baghdad, due to security threats. At the same time, he affirmed that it was not in the GoF's interest to criticize the election results, and that one could not judge the credibility of the election by the participation rate alone. The GoF would be mindful of the Iraqi public response to the elections, and would seek to convey to Iraqis a message of confidence on this new stage of the political process. In terms of GoF engagement with the new Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG),Sivan said the French police offer to train up to 1500 Iraqi police remained on the table, and the GoF hoped the new government would respond soon at least by sending a team to Paris to discuss needs and requirements. In terms of other GoF assistance, Sivan said the GoF was ready to expand Paris-based exchange programs, such as a recent electoral training program for Iraqi political party representatives (ref c). At the same time, any assistance which involved sending French personnel into Iraq was out of the question, as long as security conditions remained difficult. ¶4. (C) Summing up, Sivan said the GoF would welcome the Iraqi elections, but without describing it as a "historic" occasion. Poloff pressed Sivan on this point, asking him how he could not view Iraq's election as historic given Iraq's long history of oppression and the absence of similar free elections in other Arab nations. Sivan conceded that this election would mark the first time the Iraqi public exercised voting rights, but said the GoF would view the result as historic only once a Iraq successfully completed the political process laid out in 1546, which would produce a sovereign, independent and permanent government and the withdrawal of foreign troops. On the latter point, poloff pointed out that Iraq's government is already sovereign and independent, and that the expiration of the MNF-1 mandate by year-end is renewable, like all UN-authorized missions. Sivan conceded the latter point, but reiterated a preference for a troop withdrawal by year-end. ¶5. (C) Comment: While we stressed that the U.S. favors no candidates and that election results are impossible to predict, Sivan and other MFA officials have appeared eager to solicit U.S. views on whom we see as front-runner parties and individuals in the January 30 ballot, and how long it might take before a new government is formed (i.e. whether elements of a new government will be apparent prior to the President's February 21-22 visit to Brussels). UK embassy contacts have reported similar interest from the GoF and told us they see the GoF as hoping for "anyone but Allawi" as PM. Our UK contacts see the French as especially keen on IIG Finance Minister Adel Abdel al-Mehdi, who served as SCIRI representative in France prior to the fall of Saddam and whose family resides in France. GoF interest in who will lead the ITG suggests that the GoF is prepared to engage with the new government, hopefully to a greater degree than it did with the outgoing IIG. End comment. ¶6. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. Leach

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