FRANCE: GOF READY TO ADVANCE SELECTEE EMERGENCY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004466 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/WE-SBALL, JLEVIN, EB/TRA: ARADETSKY, DS-JHAWLEY DHS FOR TSA-INTL AFFAIRS-DTIEDGE AND AVIATION OPS FBI HQ FOR COUNTERRORISM DIVISION BRUSSELS ALSO FOR TSA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2015 TAGS: EAIR PTER FR SUBJECT: FRANCE: GOF READY TO ADVANCE SELECTEE EMERGENCY AMENDMENT IMPLEMENTATION REF: A) 04 PARIS 9137 B) 04 PARIS 7092 C) 04 PARIS 4556 D) 04 PARIS 1016 Classified By: CHARGE ALEX WOLFF FOR REASONS 1.4 (A) AND (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a June 22 meeting with GOF officials, Emboffs received assurances that the GOF would work to resolve the remaining issues in Selectee Emergency Amendment (EA) implementation. After a review of prior progress and outstanding issues on the range of aviation EAs, the Embassy agreed to present a formal proposal in writing for action by the GOF. The GOF also indicated that it was aware of upcoming EAs on overflight and Secure Flight, and was attempting to prepare in advance for them. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs, Transportation Security Administration Representative, and Econoff met with officials from the General Secretariat for National Defense (SGDN) June 22 to discuss EA implementation. Prefect Bernard Boub, SGDN Director of Protection and State Security, Colonel Henri Schlienger, SGDN Aviation Security, and Captain Jean-Louis Vichot, Assistant Director of European and Strategic Affairs participated for the French. ¶3. (C) Emboffs began by reviewing the progress made on implementation of No-Fly and Master Crew List EAs (reftels), noting that since the GOF agreed to begin implementing them in December 2004 occasional no-fly notification problems have occurred and needed to be avoided. The USG understood the French insistence on dealing with aviation security matters on a government to government basis, and believed that the modifications in procedures for implementing the EAs that we had agreed to previously met the needs of both governments. ¶4. (C) Emboffs noted that Air France appears to be attempting to follow No-Fly procedures closely, and that errors are possibly due to airline inexperience with the system. The more serious issue was systematic lack of notification on possible Selectee List matches, which we understood was being held back due to lack of instruction from the GOF. Air France was successfully implementing the EA in the US, and was technically capable of doing so in France. We believed we had a written committment dating from last year from the GOF to do this. ¶5. (C) Prefect Boub underlined that the GOF was committed to implementation of the No-Fly and Selectee EAs, and wanted to do all it could to avoid airplane diversions, which were costly and potentially embarrassing. He promised to consult with Air France about potential issues with Selectee EA implementation. On No-Fly, he understood that the problem in the most recent diversion was the way Air France's software evaluated names for possible matches; Air France had modified it to bring it closer to the U.S. system. ¶6. (C) TSA Rep pointed out technical issues with the Master Crew list which the GOF furnishes to the USG on CD-ROM every six months. Formatting incompatibilities and incomplete data fields prevented its effective use in the U.S. data base. A more effective approach would be direct transmission of APIS-formatted data electronically to DHS. TSA Rep offered to arrange for technical assistance to help Air France personnel resolve these issues if needed. Prefect Boub promised to consult with Air France about this, and appeared inclined to accept the offer. ¶7. (C) Boub noted that to implement the Selectee List EA it would be necessary to present the issue to the new government for a decision, and agreed that the best way to begin would be for the Embassy to draft a letter from the Charge to MFA Cabinet Director Pierre Vimont outlining what we proposed--the same procedure we used to successfully implement the No-Fly EA. He also remarked on French concerns about the quality of information on both the No-Fly and Selectee lists, and said that the French privacy authority, the National Commission for Computerization and Liberty (CNIL) had been "very negative" about the lists. Judicial problems in France remained a possibility. ¶8. (C) On a more positive note, Boub said the GOF was aware of potential EAs on overflights and advance transmission of PNR data (Secure Flight). On the latter the French were working to be able to respond quickly if and when it is issued, but would like prior consultation. They also suggested further cooperation in adopting agreed-upon measures for designated flights of interest (Ref D),and on maintaining a vigorous program of airport inspections. COMMENT: GOF officials have previously raised with Embassy and TSA officials their interest in drawing up joint "flight of interest" criteria and procedures, similar to what they understand has been done in the US-UK context. Post would appreciate Washington guidance on how to respond. END COMMENT ¶9. (C) COMMENT: The meeting indicated French willingness to work with us to implement fully our agreement on the No-Fly, Selectee and Master Crew List EAs. Embassy Paris intends to propose the same procedure we have adopted for the No-Fly EA: Air France will notify the Air and Border Police (PAF) of potential matches, and the PAF will inform the Legatt. This approach stands the best chance of quick adoption. Given the GOF's choice to deal with aviation security on a government to government basis, we will need to continue to consult with them both formally and informally on the implementation of these and future EAs. Post urges Washington Agencies to use prior consultation with European partners before implementing new EAs on overflights and Secure Flight. END COMMENT WOLFF