FRANCE AND WEST AFRICA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000439

SIPDIS

EUCOM FOR POLAD SNELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV BN UV CV GA GH GV PU IV LI ML MR NG NI SG SL TO XY FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE AND WEST AFRICA

REF: A. 04 PARIS 9167

B. 04 PARIS 9146

C. 04 PARIS 9145

D. 04 PARIS 9133

E. 04 PARIS 9130

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: This is the last of a series of messages
(reftels) briefly summarizing French relations with African
nations. For the last two years, France's Africa policy has,
of necessity, been focused on the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire.
Two years after France hosted the Linas-Marcoussis and Kleber
Center meetings designed to resolve the crisis, France is
pessimistic and unable to exert direct political influence on
the Ivoirian actors. Relations with neighboring states have
been influenced by the Ivoirian crisis, with the French
seeking to establish better relations with Guinea, knowing
that a crisis there would seriously strain their diplomatic
and military resources. In Burkina Faso, France has urged
the GoBF not to interfere in Cote d'Ivoire. In Ghana and
Nigeria, France seeks to engage Presidents Kufuour and
Obasanjo in the search for an end to the crisis. President
Chirac's upcoming trip to Senegal, however, is likely to
focus on the bilateral relationship. END SUMMARY.

COTE D'IVOIRE


2. (C) Two years after the signature of the Linas-Marcoussis
accords, Cote d'Ivoire continues to consume the time of
French Africa policy makers, but France's ability to
influence events politically has substantially declined.
Among the reasons for the loss of French influence are:

- Apparent mutual distrust, even dislike, between Presidents
Chirac and Gbagbo;
- The departure from the MFA of Dominique de Villepin who,
although having very poor relations with Gbagbo and his
circle, was inclined to engage on African issues to an extent
his successor, Michel Barnier is not;
- The November 2004 bombing of a French military position at
Bouake and the subsequent killing by French forces of
Ivoirian demonstrators in Abidjan.


3. (C) Unable to exert significant influence on the parties
directly, the French are now obliged to work through the AU
and the UNSC to try to move the process towards the goal of
elections which the French hope will produce a President with
an uncontested mandate. We anticipate that, in addition to
supporting South African President Mbeki's AU-mandated
mediation efforts, France will seek to strengthen the mandate
and increase the force level for UNOCI, placing an increasing
burden on the UN to achieve the objective of credible
elections. Meanwhile, the 4,462 French troops currently
deployed in "Operation Licorne" are criticized by both
Gbagbo's circle and the opposition for favoring each other,
and they and civilian French nationals remaining in Cote
d'Ivoire are potential targets for the Young Patriots or
other street gangs. The MFA currently estimates that there
are 7,000 French citizens in Cote d'Ivoire, 6,000 of whom
have both Ivoirian and French nationality.


4. (C) In this environment, there is occasional media
speculation that France might be tempted to rid itself of the
turbulent Gbagbo by any means available. Our interlocutors
tell us that the days when France could remove a head of
state are in the past, and our judgment is that France would
not risk an operation to remove Gbagbo. The more pressing
question, in our view, is whether France will maintain its
military presence as a back up to UNOCI until elections take
place. For now, we are told that Licorne will remain
deployed at current levels until the elections. However,
that could change should the crisis deteriorate further to an
extent that elections become impossible, or if (and here we
defer to Embassy Abidjan on the possibility) Gbagbo were to
demand that Licorne be withdrawn. Clearly, the consequences
for the remaining French nationals of a withdrawal of French
forces would be serious. The same is true for France's
credibility throughout Africa. Such a decision will not be
taken lightly, but with the French media and some
parliamentarians increasingly questioning the utility of
France's (costly) military presence, we believe that the
possibility that Chirac might decide to bring the troops home
cannot be discounted.

GUINEA, SIERRA LEONE, AND LIBERIA


5. (C) France experienced decades of difficult relations with
Guinea, dating back to Sekou Toure's 1958 rejection of a
proposed "Communaute Francaise," leading to a French embargo.
Relations hardly improved after Toure's death in 1984 and
Lansana Conte's accession to power. However, in 2004, Michel
de Bonnecorse, President Chirac's advisor on African affairs
met with Conte in an effort to turn the page. MFA officials
tell us that with crises elsewhere in the region, France
cannot sustain a Guinea policy based on waiting for the
ailing Conte to die. They have been impressed by the caliber
of Guinean ministers and France is seeking to assist Guinea
in its dealings with the IFIs.


6. (C) Almost all of our dialogue with the GoF on Sierra
Leone has been in connection with our unsuccessful efforts to
solicit a French contribution for the running of the Sierra
Leone Special Court. France has no particular interests in
Sierra Leone beyond seeking a regional solution to the crises
in the Mano River Union states which would address the
capacity of armed groups to cross borders freely.


7. (C) Liberia has almost dropped off the French agenda since
July 2002, when Michel Dupuch retired as Chirac's African
affairs advisor. Dupuch, who was French Ambassador in Cote
d'Ivoire for fourteen years, was reportedly close to Charles
Taylor and was undoubtedly behind accusations made by the
presidency in the spring of 2002 (not coordinated with the
MFA) about USG support for the LURD. Press reports also
linked Dupuch with the activities of French companies in
Liberia's timber industry. As with Sierra Leone, France's
political interest in Liberia is entirely based on its need
to find a solution for its problems in Cote d'Ivoire.

BURKINA FASO, MALI, AND NIGER


8. (C) Following the onset of the current crisis in Cote
d'Ivoire in September 2002, French officials told us
privately that they had no doubt that the GoBF was supporting
the rebels (now New Forces). They told us that the reason
France would not make this public was not because it would
require France to defend Cote d'Ivoire in accordance with a
bilateral defense treaty, but because to do so would subject
the Burkinabe population in Cote d'Ivoire to reprisals. The
MFA assures us that Chirac and Villepin told President
Compaore to cease his support for those seeking to overthrow
Gbagbo. However, they view Compaore's role in Cote d'Ivoire
as a step back in his efforts to rehabilitate himself after
years of arms transfers through Burkina Faso from Libya,
destined for Charles Taylor's Liberia.


9. (C) President Chirac visited Mali and Niger in October
2003, where he was portrayed as a champion of the developing
world and feted by those who approved of France's opposition
to military operations in Iraq. The visit, like France's
relations with Mali and Niger generally, was focused on
economic and developmental issues such as cotton prices and
potable water.

GHANA, TOGO, BENIN, AND NIGERIA


10. (C) Ghanaian President Kufuor is one of the few
anglophone African heads of state (with Obasanjo and Mbeki)
who receives regular high-level French attention. His role
when ECOWAS chair and his engagement on Cote d'Ivoire are
obvious reasons, but we sense that the French genuinely
admire Kufuor. France's relationship with Togo is perhaps
better described as Chirac's relationship with Gnassingbe
Eyadema. In this relationship, we see the MFA as impotent in
view of the decades-long friendship between the two
presidents. Eyadema's revisions of the Togolese
constitution, rigging of elections, and human rights abuses
are all glossed over as France seeks to persuade its European
partners to resume assistance to Togo. France's relations
with Benin are uncontroversial and largely focused on
cooperation issues, most recently the holding of the latest
French military training program in Benin in 2004.


11. (C) French interests in Nigeria are principally economic.
Chirac's political exchanges with President Obasanjo are
focused on Cote d'Ivoire or whatever other crisis is current
in Africa. France is anxious to see Nigeria comply with the
ICJ ruling on the Bakassi peninsula but avoids engaging
Nigeria directly in order not to be seen as partisan in favor
of Cameroon.

MAURITANIA, SENEGAL, GAMBIA, GUINEA-BISSAU, AND CAPE VERDE


12. (C) France's relations with Mauritania have improved
since the 1999 "Ould Dah" affair, concerning the arrest of a
Mauritanian soldier which led to Nouakchott demanding the
suspension of French military cooperation. After the French
and Mauritanian Foreign Ministers met in Paris in April 2001
and in Nouakchott in June 2001, the MFA described relations
as "warming." Following the June 8, 2003 coup attempt, FM de
Villepin visited Nouakchott on June 17 to express French
solidarity with President Taya and to declare relations as
"excellent." After another coup attempt, which forced Taya
to cancel his participation in the commemoration of the 60th
anniversary of allied landings in France, the MFA stated that
change should be achieved through the ballot box, and not by
force.


13. (C) While the Presidency, at Taya's request, agreed in
2003 to treat Mauritania as a Maghreb state, French relations
with Mauritania continue to be handled at the MFA by the
Africa directorate. However, MFA activity in recent years
has been essentially limited to reacting to the coup attempts
and Mauritanian accusations of Burkinabe interference. A
senior MFA official, in September 2004 told us that the
Mauritanian claims were hard to believe, ascribing the
accusations to internal Mauritanian politics.


14. (C) Senegal remains important for France, not only
politically and economically, but also because France
maintains approximately 1100 troops in Senegal. France has
also provided transportation and other support for Senegalese
forces participating in the MONUC mission in the DRC. French
officials have repeatedly insisted to us that Senegalese
President Wade's close ties to the United States are welcomed
in Paris as a sign of Senegal's political maturity. They
acknowledge, however, that Wade feels that France is
punishing him for his tilt to the U.S. The French see Wade
as mildly paranoid in this regard, and MFA officials have
often expressed their frustrations with Wade for his frequent
absences from Senegal and his tendency to raise a multitude
of arcane topics with President Chirac during his visits to
France. MFA officials have also expressed concern to us
about Wade's "authoritarian" tendencies, particularly
following the expulsion of a RFI journalist and the beating
of an opposition figure in October 2003.


15. (C) After Wade reportedly complained about Chirac's
decision to visit Mali and Niger without stopping in Dakar in
November 2003, Chirac promised to visit Senegal, a trip which
will occur next week. During his two-day visit, Chirac will
undoubtedly reiterate French praise for the conclusion of the
peace accord signed between the GoS and the Casamance rebel
group, the MFDC, on December 30, 2004 as part of his effort
to assure Wade that France remains Senegal's most reliable
partner. While Cote d'Ivoire will be on the agenda, it is
unlikely that Chirac will ask Wade to re-engage. The French
are currently supporting the mediation efforts of South
African President Mbeki and, in any event, see Wade as being
too prone to irritate his regional peers.


16. (C) The lack of French attention to Gambia is perhaps
demonstrated by the MFA website's reference to President
Jammeh's 1998 visit to Paris as an indication of French
support for the democratic process in the Gambia. France
maintains a modest assistance program, but no discernible
political interest.


17. (C) The French Embassy in Bissau was destroyed in May
1999 by soldiers loyal to Ansumane Mane, causing France to
withdraw its diplomats and end assistance programs. With the
return of civilian administration, France resumed assistance.
However, the MFA viewed President Kumba Yala's management of
the country as "erratic" and expressed no surprise or
condemnation of the mutiny which ended his rule in September

2003.


18. (C) France's relations with Cape Verde are negligible.
France's junior minister for cooperation visited Praia in
1997 and Prime Minister Neves visited Paris in November 2003
when he was received only at the level of the cooperation
minister.


19. (U) Abidjan minimize considered.
Leach