CHIRAC GAMBLES AGAIN, ALLYING HIS PROTEGE AND HIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 003813 SIPDIS DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD, DRL/IL, INR/EUC AND EB DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2015 TAGS: PGOV ELAB EU FR PINR SOCI ECON SUBJECT: CHIRAC GAMBLES AGAIN, ALLYING HIS PROTEGE AND HIS RIVAL IN NEW GOVERNMENT REF: PARIS 3722 Classified By: Charge d'affairs Alex Wolff for reason 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In choosing former Foreign and Interior Minister and long-time collaborator Dominique de Villepin to head his new government, and center-right rival Nicolas Sarkozy to be its number two, President Chirac is attempting to unite the main factions that divide France's center-right in response to the resounding rejection of his policy in the May 29 referendum. The haughty and flamboyant Villepin epitomizes France's technocratic elite; he embodies the nationalist, Gaullist tradition committed to the state-centered, French social model. The entrepreneurial and dynamic Sarkozy, who will remain president of Chirac's Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) party, is more of a self-made-man, projecting the possibility of more egalitarian, opportunity-centered success in a market-driven society. The new government's priority will be tackling France's high unemployment. It remains to be seen how well the Villepin-Sarkozy duo (with Chirac standing over them to referee) will fare. The difficulties the new government faces -- daunting social and economic problems, clashing visions for social and economic policy, a largely hostile public and a particularly uncompromising political opposition -- may prove true the adage that politics makes strange bedfellows. END SUMMARY. REACTING QUICKLY TO TAKE BACK THE INITIATIVE -------------- ¶2. (SBU) President Chirac has reacted quickly to May 29's massive referendum loss (reftel). In a carefully scripted and crisply executed set of moves on May 31, Chirac accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, named Interior Minister Dominique de Villepin his successor, and -- to the surprise of France's jaded chattering classes -- convinced UMP president and long-time rival Nicolas Sarkozy to join the new government as Minister of State (effectively the number two position in the government) and Villepin's successor at the Ministry of Interior. In a brief ceremony on the afternoon of May 31, Raffarin turned over the Prime Minister's Office ("Matignon") to Villepin. The new government's top priority will be tackling France's endemically high unemployment, currently at about 10 percent of the workforce. In a televised address to the nation on the evening of May 31, Chirac called for a "national mobilization" against the economic failings and lack of confidence that undermine France's national strength. In his remarks, Chirac was careful to insist that, though all approaches to solving social and economic problems were on the table, restructuring France's social model was not. DRAMATIC GESTURE UNDER THE DURESS OF POPULAR DISAVOWAL -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Details of the deal-making that brought about a government led by Villepin, but with Sarkozy as number two are not yet known. Most observers agree however, that it would never have happened had not the referendum signaled such a massive rejection of France's political class by ordinary people. In the days following the May 29 referendum there is a palpable sense of crisis in political circles. France's political class feels its legitimacy is under attack -- by the onslaught of popular disavowal expressed through the referendum. ¶4. (SBU) The dramatic gesture of putting France's two most effective, high-profile and popular, but rival, center-right politicians to work repairing a widening "trust gap" is a calculated gamble on Chirac's part with no guarantee of success. He has attempted to minimize chances of a fallout between his two ministers by assigning Sarkozy responsibility for a non-economic affairs ministry, perhaps foreseeing that Sarkozy's free-market approach and Villepin's more statist solutions to unemployment would have inevitably produced a clash. To the question many observers are asking about why the ambitious Sarkozy agreed to accept Chirac's offer, Sarkozy himself suggested an answer. In an exchange with parliamentary supporters who were advising him not to join the government, he reportedly asked them, "How would you feel about me if I just stood by while the ship sank?" ARBITER BETWEEN TWO BIG PLAYERS -------------- ¶5. (C) The referendum, to the extent it was a plebiscite on Jacques Chirac and his leadership, further weakened Chirac's already tenuous hold on the public's esteem. By assigning himself the role of arbiter between France's two most visible political figures, Chirac regains some lost stature. In addition, for Chirac, a hyperactive Sarkozy struggling with immigration policy, ethnic tensions and crime is better than a hyperactive Sarkozy occupied only with planning his run for the presidency in 2007 against Chirac (or a successor). Villepin would like to be that successor. Villepin, like Chirac, is at heart a Gaullist, intent on preserving France's national power, and with it, France's social model. Sarkozy is ever more overtly advocating a market-oriented approach to social and economic policy. For example, in remarks following the announcement of referendum results, Sarkozy directly linked France's social model to France's under-performing national economy. This division between more statist "Chiraquists" and more pro-business "Sarkozists" has long been present in the UMP, and involves much more than personal, partisan loyalties. TACKLING UNEMPLOYMENT AND LACK OF CONFIDENCE -------------- ¶6. (C) In his first public declarations as Prime Minister, Villepin has let be known that he will give himself 100 days to "re-instill the confidence of Frenchmen and women." A crash program to tackle unemployment is clearly the new government's primary mission. In his first TV interview as prime minister, Villepin called for "action and more action" -- true to form, Villepin was long on inspirational rhetoric and short on convincing programs and details. All indications are that the two key social and economic affairs ministers, Jean-Lois Borloo (Social Affairs) and Thierry Breton (Economy),will remain in place. To them will fall the lead responsibility for devising, executing and figuring out how to pay the for the government's initiative against unemployment. In his TV interview June 1, Villepin promised he would personally manage his government's attack on joblessness. NO QUARTER FROM THE OPPOSITION -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The Villepin-Sarkozy government-to-be is already under harsh criticism from the center-left Socialist Party (PS) and the centrist, Union for French Democracy (UDF). The consensus among PS leaders seems to be to mask their own deep divisions engendered by the referendum by pitilessly lambasting the new government before its composition is even known. (The new line-up will only be announced sometime before the new government's first cabinet meeting, scheduled for June 3). The pro-Europe UDF, led by Francois Bayrou, sees Chirac's recourse to Villepin as a wholly inadequate response to the demand for change from the voters. Bayrou, in statements high in political fire and brimstone and low in operational specifics, has called for a "refoundation of national policy" in response to the "fracture" revealed by the referendum. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (SBU) It remains to be seen if Chirac's most recent gamble will work any better than many of his previous ones (French commentators point to his dissolution of the National Assembly in 1997 and his agreeing to put the EU constitution to a referendum as examples of decisions that backfired in a big way). However, whatever their shortcomings (including short tempers and outsized egos) Villepin and Sarkozy are also both uncommonly talented, energetic, hardworking and able. The grudging consensus among the political elites is that Villepin and Sarkozy are about the only really exceptional figures on the French political scene. The daunting problems facing the new government, however -- institutional ineffectiveness; social and economic problems that are structural; clashing visions for social and economic policy; a mistrustful public; and a particularly uncompromising and partisan (although divided) center-left opposition -- are not the kinds of problems that yield to dramatic gestures and quick fixes. END COMMENT. WOLFF