VISITING AF/W DEPUTY DIRECTOR DISCUSSES COTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000327

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2014
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV XY FR
SUBJECT: VISITING AF/W DEPUTY DIRECTOR DISCUSSES COTE
D'IVOIRE, SENEGAL, TOGO AND OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES WITH
FRENCH MFA

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: During a January 10 meeting with visiting
AF/W Deputy Director Larry Andre, French MFA DAS-equivalent
for West Africa Bruno Foucher stressed deep GoF pessimism on
Cote d'Ivoire (CdI). GoF demarches to regional leaders prior
to the Libreville Summit called for African Union (AU)
reinforcement of the UN arms embargo on CdI, establishing a
simplified political calendar on the basis of Accra III, and
reinforcement of ONUCI by 1200 troops, to come mainly from
Africa. France was not ready to call for further CdI
sanctions yet, but if the situation continued to deteriorate,
the UNSC should sanction lower-level actors. The GoF was
eager to begin consulting on sanctions lists with the U.S.
and within the UN CdI sanctions committee as a warning to the
parties. Foucher described a turnaround in the GoF position
on a referendum as a means of ratifying the Linas-Marcoussis
changes to Article 35 of the CdI constitution, which the GoF
now opposed and viewed as a tool for President Gbagbo to
negate this key element of the Linas-Marcoussis accords.
Foucher reported "rumors" that former U.S. Ambassador Render
was a possible candidate to replace SRSG for CdI Tevoedjre,
and suggested France welcomed her "candidacy." He also
reported that a senior MFA official had received an ominous
warning from CdI Assembly leader Mamadou Coulibaly, that the
GoF should be vigilant to possible kidnappings or other
security problems in Abidjan. Foucher confirmed that the GoF
had made permanent reductions in its embassy staffing in
Abidjan, and that French cooperation programs with CdI were
practically frozen.


2. (C) On Senegal, Foucher revealed that President Wade
demanded the departure of French Ambassador to Senegal Jean
Didier Roisin (who will be replaced by the current Elysee
Middle East advisor Andre Parant in February),after Roisin
met with former Prime Minister Idrissa Seck. Foucher
expressed satisfaction with the situation in Togo and
asserted that Eyadema had completed 20 of the 22 commitments
for resumption of EU cooperation, and that goal posts should
not be moved now. He stressed GoF concerns on Guinea-Bissau,
both on the amnesty granted to accused coup plotters and the
dire economic situation. Foucher also described Guinea as in
a catastrophic situation and noted President Conte appeared
under increasing pro-reform influence of his interior
minister and other younger generation officials. On ECOWAS,
Foucher described French views as close to those of the U.S.
and described it as an institution only as strong as its
president; possible candidates for the next president, to be
chosen January 18, included the Presidents of Mali and
Gambia. End summary.

PESSIMISM ON COTE D'IVOIRE
--------------


3. (C) Foucher opened discussion on Cote d'Ivoire by
describing France as "extremely pessimistic, like the U.S."
The GoF was not at all satisfied with how the parties had
worked together in recent months, and, for this reason, had
sought to use the opportunity of the Libreville AU summit to
move the process forward. Prior to the summit, the GoF had
demarched heads of state in AU capitals with a five-part
message, calling for the summit to:
-- demand reinforcement of the UNSC arms embargo, which
required effective CdI enforcement in the north and south;
-- agree to begin work in the UNSC CdI sanctions committee on
a draft list of individuals subject to sanctions, based on
violations of human rights and incitement of hatred;
-- establish a simplified calendar for the peace process on
the basis of Accra III, with priority on beginning the
cantonment of parties for disarmament and avoiding a
referendum on modification of article 35 of the constitution;
-- call for the reinforcement of ONUCI, with about 1200
supplemental troops, primarily from Africa; and
-- ask for international supervision of elections, involving
the AU and the UN.

(Note: Foucher provided Deputy Director Andre with a French
language text of the GoF non-paper, which was faxed to AF/W
and Embassy Abidjan. End note.) Foucher conceded that there
had been a turnaround in the French position on the
referendum on article 35 of the CdI constitution. France now
opposes the referendum, which it views as a tool for Gbagbo
to negate the Linas-Marcoussis accords and effectively
eliminate RDR leader Alassane Ouattara from the political
process. When Andre noted that the GoF had demarched the USG
to express a contrary position just last October, Foucher
reported that the GoF was divided on the issue even at that
time, and those in the GoF who had advocated the October
position were "no longer dominant."


4. (C) Foucher also stressed French eagerness to begin
discussions in the UNSC CdI sanctions committee on lists of
persons subject to UN sanctions, as suggested in the GoF
demarche to AU capitals (para 2). Foucher agreed with
Andre's assessment that the lists should include persons from
both sides of the conflict, and stressed that the UNSC needed
to show the parties that it was working on the issue. The
GoF believed we should start with lower level officials,
particularly those directly responsible for human rights
violations or inciting hatred. To demonstrate GoF
seriousness on the issue, Foucher showed Andre a draft list
that the MFA had put together of such individuals, which it
was vetting with the Elysee. According to Foucher, the GoF
wanted to proceed by discussing the lists in the sanctions
committee now, as a sort of warning to the parties; then, if
the situation deteriorated further, we should move to
sanctioning individuals.


5. (C) On potential mediators in the CdI conflict, Foucher
reported that the GoF had heard rumors that former U.S.
Ambassador to CdI Arlene Render was under consideration to be
named the next SRSG on CdI, replacing Albert Tevoedjre.
Foucher indicated that the GoF would welcome Render's
appointment, as she had significant expertise and it would be
positive to have an American in such a key position. Foucher
added that Gbagbo had rejected former Moroccan Ambassador to
France Aboulhasan in the SRSG position, prompting the UN to
continue the search for a suitable candidate. As for the
efforts of South African President Mbeki, Foucher said the
GoF could only support his efforts, though it was clear that
the South African president knew less about CdI than its
Gabagbo-skeptic neighbors and that he was close to Gbagbo.


6. (C) Foucher expressed alarm on potential deterioration of
the security situation in CdI, describing the pro-Gbagbo
militias as ready to begin massacres "at a moment's notice."
French A/S-equivalent for Africa Bruno Joubert, during the
recent reinvestiture of President Kufour in Ghana, had
received a disturbing warning from CdI National assembly
leader Mamadou Coulibaly, who advised him that the French
should be vigilant on security in Abidjan and be on the
lookout for possible kidnappings. Joubert, Foucher said, had
interpreted the message as threatening. Asked by Andre about
staffing of the French Embassy in Abidjan, Foucher confirmed
that the GoF had drawn down staff considerably, consolidated
them on one site, and would make permanent cuts in staffing
due to the continued difficult security environment and
forecast that this situation would not improve significantly
in the foreseeable future. The French embassy had just
received a new shipment of armored cars, having previously
just one in its possession. Meanwhile, French cooperation
activities in CdI were essentially suspended, with a few
credits remaining open in case the situation dramatically
improves.

SENEGAL: NEW AMBASSADOR
--------------


7. (C) Moving to other topics, Andre asked Foucher about the
circumstances surrounding the replacement of French
Ambassador to Senegal (and former MFA Africa Director)
Jean-Didier Roisin, who had been at post only since August

2003. Foucher confided that Rosin had been removed at the
request of President Wade, who was angered by the French
Ambassador's having invited former Senegal Prime Minister
Idrissa Seck (now seen by the GoF as out of favor) to lunch
and complained to President Chirac. Wade had demanded the
replacement of Rosin's predecessor under similar
circumstances. Roisin's replacement will be current Elysee
Technical Advisor on Middle East/Americas Andre Parant, whom
Foucher stressed had significant Africa experience. (Note:
Parant is an excellent, longtime embassy contact and we will
report bio information on him septel. End note.) Roisin
would remain in Senegal for the state visit of President
Chirac February 2-3, and Parant would not arrive until later
that month. Foucher stressed that Roisin was moving to a
plum assignment as French Ambassador to Switzerland.

GUINEA-BISSAU
--------------


8. (C) Asked about the situation in Guinea Bissau, Foucher
observed that the GoF was much less involved there than
Portugal. The GoF hoped the political transition was
returning to normalcy, with elections on track for May 2005.
In the wake of the recent mutiny, the President and PM had
managed to remain in place, though they were running scared.
Foucher described as "scandalous" the fact that the murderers
of the Army Chief of Staff had been offered amnesty with no
punishment. He summed up that the GoF remained worried about
the political as well as economic situations, which remained
grave.

TOGO
--------------


9. (C) Foucher responded positively when asked whether the EU
was likely to resume full economic cooperation with Togo. He
stressed that the GoF was content with the situation in Togo,
and supported the efforts of the government to move towards
legislative elections. He stressed that while the European
Commission (EC) had previously questioned whether progress
was genuine in Togo, the recent visit of EU commission
representative Louis Michel had improved the situation.
During Michel's trip to Togo, he saw "everyone" and observed
two types of opposition, those who were constructive, vice
those who were purely anti-regime. Foucher claimed that
Michel had observed a real Togolese government seeking to
advance, and added that Togo had met 20 of the 22 demands
made by the EU. Foucher added that even once EU cooperation
resumed, the EC would not give "carte blanche" to the
Togolese, and that "every euro" of EU aid would be tightly
controlled. Deputy Director Andre expressed skepticism on
Foucher's positive assessment of the Eyadema government and
questioned whether elections would indeed take place as
scheduled, or if they could be free and fair, citing
continued GoT harassment of political opposition. Andre
questioned whether President Eyadema was ready to make the
reforms which Foucher described as forthcoming. Foucher
responded that Togo had fulfilled 20 of the 22 commitments
asked of it although no one thought it would be willing to
meet the conditions. It would be unjust to add new conditions
or move the goal posts now. Also, Togo served as an
important example to Guinea, as it sought to negotiate a
contract with the EC on conditions for resumption of EU aid.
Foucher cited the sentiment expressed by some African
governments that we are more kind (or less demanding of)
governments which come about via coups rather than those
trying to reform themselves.

GUINEA
--------------


10. (C) Foucher shared Andre's view that Guinea remained in a
catastrophic economic situation. For the first time, Guinea
was seeking aid from France, a move which it had avoided
given its long history of uneasy rapport with France.
Foucher credited the Guinean decision to open talks with the
EU on resumption of aid to the influence of younger ministers
on President Conte, particularly the Minister of Interior.
As for Conte's health, Foucher said it was impossible to
predict how long he might last as the Guinean leader had long
defied expectations of his imminent demise. Foucher said the
GoF preferred to take a step-by-step approach in encouraging
Guinea's readiness for the post-Conte era, rather than a
"blank slate" approach. He downplayed French security
cooperation with Guinea, claiming he was unsure whether such
cooperation existed.

ECOWAS
---


11. (C) Asked for French views on the evolution of ECOWAS,
Foucher said he saw the situation much in the same was as the
U.S. So far, ECOWAS had failed to become a strong
institution independent of its leadership; it was only as
strong as its president. Foucher said the GoF was aware of
two possible candidates, to be chosen January 18 as next
ECOWAS president: President Toure of Mali or President Jammeh
of Gambia. Andre noted that the USG had presumed the next
ECOWAS president, following tradition, would be Francophone,
and was unaware that Jammeh was in the running. Foucher said
that the GoF had heard the rumor of a possible Gambian
presidency directly from Ghanaian President Kufour in Accra.

Leach