PM RAFFARIN'S APRIL 21-24 TRIP TO CHINA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002974

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON FR CH
SUBJECT: PM RAFFARIN'S APRIL 21-24 TRIP TO CHINA

REF: A. BEIJING 7133

B. PARIS 1698

C. BEIJING 7150

D. BEIJING 4854

E. BRUSSELS 1542

Classified By: Charge Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Building on the high-profile exchange of
French and Chinese presidential visits last year, Prime
Minister Raffarin focused his late April visit mostly on
economic issues and cultural affairs. His statement that
China's March anti-secession law is "compatible" with the
French position vis-a-vis Taiwan drew our interest, but few
headlines. The MFA tried to explain Raffarin's remarks by
saying that the anti-secession law was consistent with the
"one-China" policy that both the French and the United States
espouse. As for the military measures foreseen by the law,
the MFA said that the "non-pacific measures" referred to in
the law did not necessarily mean force, but could instead be
construed as an embargo or a block on investment. Both
Raffarin and our MFA colleagues also repeated the French line
in favor of lifting the EU's arms embargo, and in particular,
by the end of June as decided by the December European
Council.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Poloff spoke with MFA China desk officer Arnaud Roux
-- who was on the delegation -- on April 28 to discuss the
Prime Minister's trip to China. Roux noted that Raffarin
visited Beijing, Shenyang, and Shanghai from April 21 through
24, accompanied by Exterior Commerce Minister Francois Loos,
Agriculture Minister Dominique Bussereau, Minister Delegate
for Research Francois d'Aubert, MFA State Secretary Renaud
Muselier, and Transport Ministry State Secretary Francois
Goulard, along with some 30 business people -- reflecting the
strong commercial focus of the visit.

ANTI-SECESSION LAW


3. (C) It was, however, Raffarin's statement on China's
anti-secession law that caught our attention. Apparently
seeking to delink China's March passage of the law from EU
plans to lift the embargo, Raffarin, at a press conference,
described the law as "completely compatible" with the French
position on Taiwan. Queried on this point, Roux said that
what Raffarin meant was that the anti-secession law was
consistent with the one-China policy espoused by France ever
since it had opened diplomatic relations with the PRC.
"Raffarin only re-stated this position," Roux said. When
poloff pointed out the disturbing provision of the law that
would allow the use of military force against Taiwan, Roux
contested this, saying that the "non-pacific measures"
mentioned in the law did not necessarily mean using force.
China could employ, for example, an embargo against Taiwanese
goods or investment as a means to pressure Taiwan -- the law
did not necessarily mean the Chinese would use force. Poloff
responded that it appeared that the French had a different
understanding of "non-pacific measures" than not only the
U.S. but also than several of its European neighbors.


4. (C) Roux also remarked that the French find the recent
visit to Beijing by Taiwan KMT chairman Lien Chan to be a
positive step, noting that Chinese willingness to talk "even
with the opposition" showed its goodwill (this conversation
took place before the issuance of the joint communique from
the PRC and Taiwan's KMT).

EU ARMS EMBARGO


5. (C) Raffarin, during a press event with Chinese PM Wen
Jiabao, called the embargo "anachronistic, wrongfully
discriminatory, and in complete contradiction of the current
state of the strategic partnership between Europe and China."
Raffarin repeated that "France continues to request the
lifting of the embargo and does not see what could lead the
European Council to change its position," referring to the
December 2004 Council decision to lift the embargo by the end
of June 2005.


6. (C) Roux repeated the French line that the lifting would
be a "political step only" in recognition of Chinese
progress. He pressed poloff, noting even the U.S. had
recognized this when the USG declined to present a resolution
condemning Chinese human rights abuses at this year's HRC.
Poloff responded that indeed the U.S. had seen small steps of
improvement, which merited a modest measure such as
refraining from bringing the human rights resolution, but
that in no way had China made enough progress to merit
lifting an embargo that would allow it to buy more arms.
Roux responded with the repeated French line that the French
have no intentions of selling arms to the Chinese.


7. (C) Roux said that Chirac will continue to press for a
decision on the arms embargo -- positive or negative -- by
the end of the Luxembourg EU presidency. When poloff asked
whether Chirac would press for such a decision even if he
believed he might not get the answer he wanted, Roux said yes.

8. (C) According to Roux, the two sides did not discuss the
recent tension between China and Japan.

COMMERCIAL DEALS


9. (U) According to press accounts, China ordered 10 new
Airbus planes (5 A319s for China Eastern and 5 A319/A320s for
Shenzhen Airlines),worth 500 million to 600 million dollars,
and finalized the already announced contract for 5 Airbus
A380s. The French delegation also announced that they would
like to see 1,000 more French SMEs working in China "des"

2005.

COMMENT


10. (C) The French continue to press for the lifting of the
embargo (reftels B and C),even in the face of skepticism
coming from their EU colleagues, in particular since China's
March passage of the anti-secession law (refs D and E).
While the French press conveyed Raffarin's statement on the
compatibility of the law with the French position on Taiwan,
it did not attract much attention. Editorialists did not
seize on the issue, choosing instead to comment on the
commercial aspects of the trip. This illustrates the
underlying theme we have seen in the French view of the
French-Chinese relationship: strategic and commercial
interests prevail. As Raffarin demonstrated, the French
continue to characterize U.S. security concerns in the region
as overblown, allowing them to justify their pursuit of a
lift. They may calculate that being publicly outspoken in
favor of lifting the embargo even if their EU partners are
not persuade, will win them favor in Beijing. Paris
continues to cultivate that relationship in part because of
the commercial opportunities it sees there, but also because
Chirac believes that China is an essential element to the
multipolar political arrangement that he envisions as optimal
for French power projection. END COMMENT.
ROSENBLATT