APRIL 7 LARSEN MEETINGS WITH FRENCH OFFICIALS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002394

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
TAGS: PREL SY LE FR UNSC
SUBJECT: APRIL 7 LARSEN MEETINGS WITH FRENCH OFFICIALS
FOCUS ON LEBANON ELECTIONS, NEXT STEPS

REF: A. PARIS 2243

B. PARIS 2305 (EXDIS NOTAL)

C. BEIRUT 1092

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: French Elysee and MFA officials reported that
UN Envoy Larsen, during April 7 meetings in Paris, emphasized
the absolute centrality of holding Lebanon's elections on
schedule, for which he proposed creation of a 10-12 member
committee composed equally of opposition and loyalists to
reach agreement on the electoral law and election date.
Larsen also stressed the need to look at post-election
international assistance to Lebanon and floated the idea of
an international task force to coordinate security, economic
and institutional assistance. French officials were cautious
on the latter idea, and stressed the need to wait to hear the
views of an elected Lebanese government and avoid creating
international tutelage over Lebanon or a cumbersome
coordination mechanism. On Lebanon's internal situation,
Larsen noted that increased nervousness among pro-Syria
loyalists is leading them to look for new alliances, and
expressed concern over lack of unity and an emergent leader
among the opposition. Larsen also suggested creation of a
small team of two to four people to verify, but not certify,
the Syrian withdrawal, an idea fully supported by the GoF.
Larsen and MFA officials discussed a possible third UNSCR on
Lebanon, with both sides open to the idea. French officials
also reported that Larsen was reluctant to contact Danish FM
Moeller to urge him to cancel planned visits to Beirut and
Damascus, and preferred that the U.S. and France take the
lead; FM Barnier was scheduled to call Moeller on the issue
April 7. End summary.


2. (C) UN Special Envoy for 1559 implementation Terje-Roed
Larsen visited Paris April 7 to brief GoF officials on his
just-completed meetings in Beirut and Damascus. We received
separate readouts on Larsen's visit from Presidential Middle
East Advisor Dominique Boche and MFA DAS-equivalent for the
Levant Christian Jouret April 8. Jouret reported that Larsen
was expected to meet with FM Barnier, but due to his late
arrival in Paris April 7, he met with the minister for only
about five minutes. Larsen had a working lunch with MFA
Political Director Stanislas de Laboulaye, MFA A/S-equivalent
for North Africa/Middle East Jean-Francois Thibault, MFA
A/S-equivalent for IO Affairs Jean-Maurice Ripert, and
Jouret. Larsen was later received at the Elysee by
Diplomatic Advisor (NSA equivalent) Maurice
Gourdault-Montagne and Boche.


3. (C) Boche reported that Larsen emphasized two main points
during his Elysee meetings: the absolute centrality of
holding elections on time, and the need to think about
post-election international assistance to Lebanon. On
elections, Larsen said the pro-Syrian loyalists in Lebanon
wanted to delay for as much as one year, and we needed to
force progress to maintain the schedule. He proposed the
creation of a working group committee composed of five to six
oppositionists and an equal number of loyalists, to reach an
understanding on the election date, and the electoral law,
i.e. large or small districts. Jouret told us separately
that it wasn't clear whether the working group idea was
Larsen's, Jumblatt's or perhaps someone else's. Jouret added
that Larsen wanted to keep the committee proposal discreet,
and viewed it as a possible embryonic form of a national
unity government to prepare elections. Neither Boche nor
Jouret suggested GoF resistance to, or great enthusiasm over
the working group idea.


4. (C) On post-election international assistance to Lebanon,
Boche noted that Larsen floated the idea of an international
task force on the ground to coordinate security, economic and
institutional assistance. Both Boche and Jouret suggested
GoF caution on the task force proposal. Boche said the GoF
stressed to Larsen that nothing was possible without the
election of a new Lebanese government, and we needed to
remain cautious and wait to hear what that government wanted
in terms of assistance. Boche said the GoF side raised
points recently made with visiting U.S. officials (refs a-b)
that Lebanon was not a failed state, had a strong national
tradition, and should not be under any form of international
tutelage, or even a heavy coordination mechanism similar to
that in place for the Palestinians. Boche said the GoF side
also cautioned that international coordination on the ground
might be interpreted negatively in the region. Boche summed
up that the GoF preference was for cooperation on
coordinating bilateral assistance to Lebanon post-elections,
vice a heavy coordination mechanism which would give the
impression that the Lebanese couldn't manage on their own.
Jouret quipped that the French message was that the Lebanese
were not the Palestinians nor the East Timorese.


5. (C) On Lebanon's internal situation, Jouret said Larsen
observed that the pro-Syrian loyalists in Lebanon were
getting increasingly nervous and looking for new alliances.
Bashar al-Asad was aware of the problem, and realized that
"loyalists were no longer all loyal." At the same time,
Larsen viewed the opposition as facing many difficulties and
lacking unity, an assessment shared by the GoF. Jouret said
Larsen was troubled by the non-emergence of a single,
recognized leader among the opposition, which remained in
disparate groups.


6. (C) Jouret noted that Larsen also spoke of the need to
verify the Syrian troop and security services' withdrawal,
and proposed the creation of a small team of two to four
people for this purpose. Larsen wanted the verification team
to remain very discreet, with no publicity, and proposed that
their mission should be to verify, but not certify, the
Syrian withdrawal. Jouret confirmed that the GoF fully
supported the verification team proposal.


7. (C) Jouret reported that, during the working lunch, Larsen
and MFA officials had discussed whether a new Lebanon UNSC
resolution might be necessary, with both sides concluding,
"why not?" Jouret said the possible scope of such a
resolution, and whether it might focus on elections, for
instance, remained to be determined. Nevertheless, the GoF
was open to the idea.


8. (C) When we asked Jouret whether Larsen raised the SARG's
desire to be rewarded for its Lebanon withdrawal, he
confirmed that the subject did not come up. Jouret conceded
that Larsen had raised the SARG's continued dismay over the
poor state of its relations with France, which it wanted to
resolve through dialogue. Jouret reported that the MFA
response was "No way," and stressed that Larsen remained the
sole international interlocutor for the SARG and GOL on these
issues. On this point, Jouret confirmed that the GOF was
seeking to turn off Danish FM Moeller's proposed visit to
Damascus and Beirut (ref c),and had raised the issue already
via its embassy in Copenhagen. Jouret said the GoF had
suggested that Larsen raise the issue in a call to Moeller,
however Larsen was reluctant to do so, given Norwegian-Danish
sensitivities, and preferred that the U.S. and France take up
the issue with the Danish FM. FM Barnier, therefore, had
agreed to call Moeller and would urge him to cancel the
Beirut and Damascus stops. Jouret said as of the morning of
April 8, he was unsure whether the Barnier-Moeller call had
taken place though it was scheduled for April 7.

LEACH