PANAMA PRESIDENT TORRIJOS'S POPULARITY NOSE-DIVES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PANAMA 001415 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD VANCOUVER FOR CG ARREAGA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON PM POLITICS FOREIGN POLICY SUBJECT: PANAMA PRESIDENT TORRIJOS'S POPULARITY NOSE-DIVES REF: A. PANAMA 1377 ¶B. PANAMA 0629 Classified By: Ambassador Linda E. Watt for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d). SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (C) Panama President Martin Torrijos's popularity plummeted in the wake of the June 1 passage of the Social Security (CSS) reform package pushed through the National Assembly by his Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). Less than one in four Panamanians now believe that Torrijos is doing an adequate job as president, down from 80% when he took office ten months ago. In response to six weeks of unwavering labor pressure, Torrijos suspended implementation of the reforms on June 22 in favor of a 90-day National Dialogue (reftel A). When that move failed to bring FRENADESSO (National Front for Defense of Social Security) and SUNTRACS (Sole National Union for Construction and Related Industry) to the bargaining table, and after a surprise intervention by the Catholic Church, on June 27 Torrijos suspended the law for 90 days. Although many observers credit Torrijos with making a politically astute decision to back down, his new-found willingness to negotiate the controversial CSS reforms has not yet improved his public image. Instead, to many he appears weak and indecisive, as he did when he delayed making a decision on Supreme Court reforms in March with the creation of a 180-day Justice Commission (reftel B). The challenge for Torrijos is to find a way to regain the political initiative and recoup the credibility he has lost with the Panamanian people. End Summary and Comment. Torrijos's Popularity Sinking Fast -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Public opinion polls continue to show a steep slide in the president's popularity. According to Dichter and Neira/Latin Research Network, a 34 percentage-point drop in popularity coincided with the passage of CSS reforms in the beginning of June. From October 2004 to June 2005, President Torrijos's approval rating has dropped from 80% to 24%. In March 2005, his post-fiscal reform approval rating in the midst of the Supreme Court crisis held at 58%. CSS reforms have been enormously unpopular, with more than 80% unhappy that the reforms were passed in a rush and at midnight. When asked whether the reforms positively or negatively affected the public's view of the president, 86% responded that they negatively affected the public's view. ¶3. (SBU) When President Torrijos announced May 18 reforms to the CSS law (Law 17),he knew that his proposals would draw criticism. Faced with a collapsing pension and medical system, his approach called for all sectors to give up something. "Shared sacrifice" was his motto, hoping to get popular support for longer periods of payroll contributions, increased worker and employer contributions and later retirement ages. To shorten the period of unrest, the president rushed the legislation through the legislature, completing passage in just 10 days. ¶4. (SBU) Popular unrest, however, did not die down and opposition groups, students, labor unions, even the Catholic Church, took aim at the government for failure to consult the population on such an important and sweeping reform proposal. For six weeks, civil protests against Law 17, including demonstrations throughout the country, caused massive traffic delays and business closures at a substantial cost to the country's economy. When Torrijos appeared uncompromising in the face of popular rejection of Law 17, Archbishop Jose Dimas Cedeno gained influence by pushing dialogue, compromise and unity. Too Little, Too Late? -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Editorial opinion and comment in the media have been generally critical of the government for its initial failure to consult and its slow response to a burgeoning problem of public security. At the same time, media did not withhold criticism of the more radical sectors of the protest movement, faulting them for violent tactics and intransigence in the discussions. Although most observers believe it was the right move, Torrijos's offer to consult after the fact has also drawn criticism for the half-hearted manner in which he approached it. Also, Torrijos can still reactivate the current law, with no additional changes, after the 90-day period of National Dialogue is over, or whenever he wants. For their parts, FRENADESSO and SUNTRACS apparently plan to push for their maximum program, as suggested by their continued refusal to come to the table until the suspension of Law 17 is published in the National Gazette, Panama's equivalent of the Congressional Record. The Catholic Church Enters the Fray -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Torrijos's June 22 and June 27 announcements regarding CSS suspensions were both precipitated by public pressure brought to bear by the Catholic Church, particularly by Archbishop Jose Dimas Cedeno. Cedeno has consistently increased his influence making policy statements regarding the need for dialogue, compromise and unity. The Episcopal Conference, Ecumenical Committee and the Council of Pastors/Rectors all attempted to play the role of mediator during the unrest. Eleven days after workers in the construction, health and education sectors went on strike, the Panamanian Episcopal Conference called on all parties to open venues for dialogue. On June 14, under growing pressure from the Catholic community and for fear of an economic standstill due to the strike, Torrijos proposed that all sectors involved, including the Episcopal Conference, become involved in a national dialogue. On June 21, in its most influential move, the Church asked for suspension of the law. Archbishop Cedeno requested publicly that Torrijos suspend CSS reforms. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Though unions such as FRENADESSO and SUNTRACS, who many suspect of having ulterior political ambitions, do not enjoy wide popular support for their negotiating tactics, they have also not alienated the populace. Many sectors of society believe they have legitimate concerns about CSS reforms that have not been addressed by the GOP. Torrijos's challenge will be to convince middle class and professional Panamanians--represented by the teachers and physicians--that they have few interests in common with the SUNTRACS radicals, whom Torrijos needs to isolate. On the other hand, Torrijos's popular decline is not without a price. His loss of popularity may damage his administration's capacity to successfully pursue other policy goals. For example, according to La Estrella de Panama, support for Canal expansion has dropped 10 percentage points from 72% to 62% since the beginning of CSS reforms. A failure by Torrijos to successfully bring this chapter to a close on his terms already has delayed the holding of a referendum on Canal expansion at least until March 2006. WATT