CANADA: SUSPENSION OF TITLE III OF THE LIBERTAD ACT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 003518 SIPDIS WHA/CCA; WH/CAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015 TAGS: CU ETRD ETTC PREL SUBJECT: CANADA: SUSPENSION OF TITLE III OF THE LIBERTAD ACT REF: A. (A) SECSTATE 207359 ¶B. (B) OTTAWA 1676 Classified By: EconMinCouns Brian Mohler, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C)Summary: While Canada has a long history of economic engagement with Cuba, it has supported U.S. efforts to address Cuban human rights issues in international fora and has practiced a consistent, if cautious, policy of maintaining ties with dissidents and pressing CUBA on human rights issues. Post recommends that Title III of the Libertad Act continue to be suspended for Canada, on grounds of national interest. End Summary. CANADA-CUBA ECONOMIC TIES -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In 2004, Canada's exports to CUBA were 327 million Canadian dollars (252 million USD),somewhat less than U.S. exports. Canadian imports from CUBA in 2004 were 453 million USD. The 600,000 Canadian tourists to CUBA each year, attracted mainly by low cost, account for roughly a third of Cuba's total tourist trade. In 2004, CUBA ranked fifth in popularity as a tourist destination for Canadians, after the United States, Britain, Mexico and France. Canadian companies are active in the Cuban tourism industry through hotel supply-contracts. Two Canadian-based tourism-related companies have recently been listed as Specially Designated Nationals under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. Because of the tightly intertwined nature of U.S. and Canadian financial services markets, much back-office processing for Canadian banks takes place in the U.S., raising potential for payments to Cuban companies operating in Canada to be blocked. ¶3. (U) Canada is also currently the largest foreign investor in Cuba; the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council lists over eighty Canadian companies which do business or have done business with Canada (listing available at www.cubatrade.org.). Canadian officials consistently complain about the extraterritorial reach of the Libertad Act. CUBAN HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN THE UN -------------- ¶4. (SBU) This year, Canada cosponsored --for the 14th consecutive time-- the U.S.-led resolution on CUBA in the UN General Assembly. It also issued a statement in the UN Human Rights Committee listing CUBA among Canada's top 25 priority human rights countries. While the list is not in rank order and space constraints limit detail on each country, it does specifically address Cuba,s human rights record. ¶5. (C) Though it does not support U.S. positions in every UN vote, Canada is generally helpful and cooperative with regard to Cuban-sponsored UN human rights resolutions. Canada demonstrates significant cooperation in working quietly and behind the scenes, frequently complementing USG efforts. Recently, during the UNGA's Third Committee, Canada called the vote on one of the three resolutions that the U.S. opposed and, indeed, voted with the U.S. on the Cuban-sponsored resolution "Promotion of Peace as a Vital Requirement for Full Enjoyment of Human Rights by All." ¶6. (C) In general, the Government of Canada evaluates each resolution based on its merits and Canada's perceived ability to influence or moderate the language and outcome. Canadian counterparts stressed that they were influential in moderating the language in some of the more controversial paragraphs in the recent "Right to Food" resolution that passed in the Third Committee by a vote of 171 to 1 (the U.S. was the lone objector). Canada shares the U.S. objective of creating a strong Human Rights Council(HRC) in the UN system that would address human rights issues more effectively than the current Human Rights Commission. While flexible about the Council's membership, Canada is receptive to the U.S. idea of HRC candidates providing letters in support of their candidacies. A POLICY OF POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) Canadian officials believe that Canada's policy of economic and political engagement with CUBA allows them to raise human rights and democracy issues more effectively with Cuban officials. Canada -- like the U.S. -- is mindful of future opportunities to influence the post-Castro Cuban transition to a democratic system and focuses on maintaining access to the full range of people in the political process. ¶8. (C) Both the USG and GoC give high priority to outreach to Cuban dissidents, although the Canadians prefer to meet privately with Cuban Government officials to protest crackdowns on dissidents, rather than making public statements. Out of concern for the safety of dissidents, Canadian diplomats do not publicize meetings with them. They do not ask for permission to meet with dissidents, although they assume Cuban intelligence services know of most of these meetings. At the May civil society assembly held at a private location in Cuba, a Canadian Embassy representative attended as an observer to prevent interference from Cuban officials, despite Cuban government requests that they stay away. ¶9. (SBU) The policy of engagement also allows Canada to raise human rights in other venues. During Cuban Foreign Minister Filipe Perez Roque,s visit to Ottawa in October, Foreign Affairs Minister Pettigrew raised human rights abuses in Cuba. Press reports highlighted that Canada pressed CUBA on its human rights record, and expressed particular concern about three dissidents on hunger strike. The three dissidents in question ended their hunger strikes soon after the Foreign Minister,s visit to Canada. Although there is no proof that the two are directly linked, the Canadians believe that their pressure encouraged the Cuban government to address their concerns. 10 (U) Canada also has a small bilateral aid program (3-5 million USD a year)which includes some support for Oxfam work with NGOs, technical assistance for economic agencies, and periodic shipments of medicines and other essential needs items. (See www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb for details.) ¶9. (SBU) Local CUBA watchers have generally endorsed the GOC,s approach. Ana Faya, Director of the CUBA project at the Canadian Foundation for Latin America, (FOCAL) an independent think tank that receives GOC funding, corroborated much of what Foreign Affairs Canada officials told us about Canada,s dealings with CUBA and Cuban dissidents. Faya, who recently moved to Canada from CUBA where she observed the Canadian Embassy in action, said that Canadian diplomats maintain consistent, quiet contact with dissidents. &They know the organizations and their people,8 she said. With the support of the GOC, FOCAL publishes a newsletter and runs a series of CUBA programs designed to draw attention to human rights issues in CUBA and to encourage democratization. The group is currently working on a 2-year research initiative on governance and social justice in CUBA (in conjunction with the Florida International University Cuban Research Institute). RECOMMENDATION: CONTINUE TO SUSPEND TITLE III IMPLEMENTATION -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C)Embassy Ottawa recommends that implementation of Section III of the Libertad Act continue to be suspended for Canada on grounds of national interest and further cooperation on transition to democracy in Cuba. In addition to the overall value of our close cooperation with Canada, a NATO ally, in key regions of the world (e.g. military support in Afghanistan) and in Latin American democratic institutions and processes such as the OAS and Summit of the Americas, Canada has given us effective support on Cuban human rights issues in the UN Third Committee and in our efforts to forge a more effective human rights structure in the UN. Canada practices a cautious but consistent policy in CUBA of maintaining communications with key dissidents. ¶11. (C)Canada has longstanding economic ties to Cuba; a decision to apply title III would not change the level of Canadian economic engagement. However, it would generate a new bilateral irritant at a time when we are looking for Canadian cooperation in other regions and areas ranging from earthquake relief to continuing military support in Afghanistan, where the Canadian Forces just took its first casualty during its current deployment. We believe that U.S. entry restrictions on key Canadian corporate officials under Title IV of the Libertad Act create a sufficient disincentive to Canadian investment in potentially expropriated properties and effectively underscore our opposition to such investments. (Comment: given the geography of Canada and the degree of bilateral economic, social and cultural integration, an entry bar to the U.S. can be a major logistical and social headache for a Canadian. End comment) Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa WILKINS