US-EU TROIKA CONSULTATIONS ON MIDDLE EAST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 OTTAWA 003400

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2015
TAGS: PREL KNNP IR IZ
SUBJECT: US-EU TROIKA CONSULTATIONS ON MIDDLE EAST

REF: (A) OTTAWA 3283 (NOTAL)

Classified By: POL M/C BRIAN FLORA. REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. On October 26 in Ottawa, NEA DAS Gordon
Gray and a U.S. delegation exchanged views with EU Troika
officials on developments in Iran and countries in the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Tri-lateral consultations
with the EU and Canada on Iran are reported reftel. END
SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) U.S. Participants:
- Gordon Gray, NEA DAS
- Jason Bruder, Iran desk officer
- Roopa Rangaswamy, nuclear nonproliferation officer (ISN/RA)
- Patricia Kim-Scott, Embassy polmil officer (notetaker)

EU Commission Participants:
- Julian Evans, UK Deputy High Commissioner for the
Presidency
- Peter Bainbridge, UK FCO
- Patrick Laurent, European Commission
- Bjorn Larsson, European Council Secretariat
- Chris Kendall, EC Representative Ottawa
- Martin Gaertner, Austrian Permanent Mission to the EU

IRAN
--------------


3. (C) UK Deputy H/C Evans briefly summarized the morning
discussion about Iran (reftel/NOTAL),noting that the EU
generally was on the same page as Canada. EU shared
perceptions about what it could (and could not) do vis-a-vis
Iran. As Chair of the IAEA Board of Governors, Canada was
obliged to take a tougher line on Iran's nuclear activities
but had been very supportive of EU efforts.


4. (C) Laurent stated that Western efforts to publicly
isolate Iran merely served to whip up nationalistic fervor.
The key to changing Iran's nuclear ambitions lay in the
internal dynamics of the country. Evans said the challenge
was getting Iran to engage constructively, as they seemed to
be in permanent "transmit mode."


5. (C) Gray said the U.S. goal was to modify Iran's behavior.
We want to avoid creating the impression that our policy
differences with Iran are the result of U.S.-Iranian
disagreements. India's IAEA vote helped shake the perception
that these are first versus third world issues.

U.S. PERSPECTIVE ON REFORM IN ARAB COUNTRIES
--------------

6. (C) Drawing on his recent posting in Cairo, Gray shared
insights into the progress of political reform in Egypt. The
upcoming parliamentary elections would be a good indicator of
the government's commitment to democratic reform; civil
society was gaining confidence. Assistance from the West was
still needed, particularly in areas such as electoral
monitoring, and he encouraged EU involvement.


7. (C) Regarding Palestinian elections, Gray said Hamas
participation was a key issue; it was difficult to envision a
democratic process that included militias. Such groups would
have to decide between engaging in the political process and
continuing armed conflict. That being said, Hamas was
unlikely to disarm by the January 26, election.


8. (C) Gray welcomed EU participation in and financial
support for the Forum for the Future conference in Bahrain,
November 11-12. He noted that cooperation among the U.S., EU
and G-8 countries had been very good.


9. (C) As in the rest of the region, there were positive
signs that democracy was taking root in Lebanon. Despite the
legacy of civil war and the Syrian occupation, Lebanon seemed
to be moving in the right direction in that the Lebanese had
greater freedom to determine their future.

EU COMMENTS
--------------


10. (C) Representing the incoming Austrian presidency,
Gaertner said the EU broadly shared the U.S. view of
developments in the region and thanked Gray for his
on-the-ground perspective of progress in Egypt. At the same
time, in ten years of trying to bring reform to the
Mediterranean Arab world (the Barcelona process) it was
dismaying to observe the continuing insistence of some
governments on "non-interference in internal affairs." EU
Presidency thinking on this was evolving, Gaertner said.
Every country in the region had unique experiences and
challenges in undertaking reform. Some cases turned out
better than expected, such as Turkey. Europe's Christian
democrat tradition was a model that could be adapted to a
Muslim country to help steer reform. The risk of following
"our" own agenda, he said, was another Algeria.


11. (C) In dealing with Islam, it was important to maintain a
dialogue between civilizations in order to convey a vision of
Islam in a pluralistic world. Conferences that promoted
Christian-Islamic dialogue and dialogue among Jews,
Christians and Muslims were an important tool to illustrate
the benefits of "co-existence."


12. (C) The EU's efforts to promote economic reforms had
produced mixed results. While countries in the MED dialogue
complained about the lack of foreign direct investment (FDI)
from Europe, they had failed to create the conditions on the
ground to facilitate FDI.


13. (C) Alluding to the EU-Canadian discussion of
Syria/Lebanon the previous day, Evans noted that while there
was no "smoking gun" evidence in the Mehlis report on the
Hariri assassination, there were interesting implications.
The next move was up to Syria, he said. Evans flagged EU
concern for Yemen as one of the poorest countries in the
Middle East. The EU had held some discussions on drug
trafficking and economic/social reforms but with mixed
results.

EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP
--------------


14. (C) Peter Bainbridge provided a briefing on the
Euro-Mediterranean partnership (Barcelona Process),the EU's
main tool for outreach to the near Middle East and North
Africa. In the ten years since the launch of the Barcelona
Process, bilateral agreements had been made with a majority
of the countries in the region to implement work plans in a
number of areas, including education, economic reform,
governance and migration. Nonetheless, illiteracy rates
remained high, especially among women. The EU hoped to
establish a governance fund from which monies would be
allocated as Mediterranean countries met their targets; the
approach might spur healthy competition among contenders.
The Euro-Med electoral observer system had proved a useful
tool to engage civil society. Bainbridge noted that in all
its approaches, the EU increasingly sought to promote its
image as a "player, not a payer."


15. (C) Bainbridge echoed Gray's assessment of positive
change in Lebanon and the opportunity that is now before the
Lebanese people. The European Neighborhood Policy Action
Plan included incentives for undertaking reforms that
hopefully would encourage the Lebanese government.

MAGHREB REGION
--------------


16. (C) Laurent said that the "Basra Process" involving the
countries of the Maghreb region was on track. He gave good
marks to Morocco and Jordan, and a "relatively good" for
Tunisia, noting that it was not up to par on human rights and
governance. In Lebanon, there was a "resurgence" of
difficulties in governance. Hopefully, the progress of
Morocco and Jordan would serve as an accelerator in the
region.


17. (C) The EU thought that Egypt was "playing" the Basra
Process to avoid being driven to reforms; this manipulation
put a damper on the speed of reforms. At the same time,
however, Laurent agreed with Gray that the creation of
"political space" in Egypt needed to be encouraged. The U.S.
and EU differed in their respective approaches, Laurent
observed, with the U.S. emphasizing change through civil
society and the EU seeking to work both the government and
civil society simultaneously. The EU had found that the Arab
world was open to importing "technical" knowledge but
remained closed to advances in human rights, particularly
women's rights.


18. (C) Gray welcomed the EU's engagement of civil society in
Egypt. The Egyptian diplomatic corps, for example, was "old
school" and often out of touch with the leanings of its own
government. As in the case of dealings with Iran, it was
important to de-associate calls for reform from government
efforts to label these as U.S. or U.K.-driven. It was
important to diversify the voices calling for reform not only
in Egypt, but the region as a whole.

YEMEN
--------------


19. (C) Gray said the USG shared EU concerns about Yemen.
The Yemeni government aspired to taking the bilateral
relationship to the next level, but the USG saw impediments,
including a lack of consistency in its commitment to reform.
While Yemeni cooperation on counter-terrorism was "not bad,"
it could be improved. The same was true of cooperation on
eradication of SA/LW, where minimal progress had been
achieved only after a great investment of time and effort.
Yemen had a talent for calculating the minimum it needed to
do in order to "skate."


20. (C) Laurent expressed the EU's disappointment in light of
expectations regarding Yemen, at one time the only Arab
country with a "germination" of democracy. Now the country
was so fragile it risked becoming a failed state. It was not
liked by the rest of the Arab world; in fact, the GCC
countries "despised" Yemen. The EU planned to enhance its
classic development assistance program to improve governance.


IRAQ
--------------

21. (C) Evans praised the positive referendum on Iraq's new
constitution as the best result that could have been hoped
for. Iraqi citizens were pleased about their autonomy and
were now talking about ensuring that it would last. Canada
had been a big help in this process, and Elections Canada
director Pierre Kingsley was already working on the next
round of elections. Financial assistance for Iraq remained
crucial. The EU was a major donor, having contributed 200
million Euros to reconstruction and another 30 million Euros
for parliamentary elections. Gray welcomed the EU's
contributions to Iraq.


22. (C) Laurent expressed a less positive view of Iraq
following his recent visit to Baghdad to advance the European
Commission's eventual offices within the premises of the UK
mission. Though matters were moving apace on the financial
plan, bilateral activities had been delayed. It was
regrettable that the security situation was not better.
While the constitution had been voted, a number of political
leaders were concerned that Iraq was too weak in the center.
This imbalance contained the seeds of future discontent. The
constitution had failed to achieve full inclusion of the
Sunnis and thus polarized the country. Europe was worried
about the increased degree of violence. In Iraq, everything
was linked, from the political process to the constitution.
There were conflicting signals on the Iraqi forces' ability
to take their destiny into their own hands. The infiltration
of the civil police by insurgents was disconcerting. Laurent
sought U.S confirmation that some Iraqi army units were being
reconfigured along sectarian lines. Gray said he was unaware
that this was the case and would look into it.


23. (C) Gray noted the interconnection between security,
political progress, and reconstruction. Training the Iraqi
army was a critical element. Gray agreed that improving the
security situation on the ground was crucial to
reconstruction efforts. Being able to address the basic
quality of life issues such as access to potable water,
housing and schooling, would make a difference.

24. (C) At the same time, even the most optimistic observers
could not have predicted the degree of progress achieved to
date. The run-up to the October 15 vote was encouraging, with
the number of predicted attacks off by two thirds. Roughly
fifty per cent of the electorate turned out for the elections
in January. Gray recommended to his EU interlocutors
Secretary Rice's testimony of October 19 which both

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supporters and detractors had said provided a clear and
articulate vision of the Administration's policy in Iraq.


25. (C) Evans agreed that statistics demonstrated impressive
progress in Iraq. The picture on reconstruction was much
better than one might be led to believe from the media.


26. (U) This cable has been cleared by DAS Gray.

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