CANADA OPEN TO "CREDIBLE" AND "DEFENSIBLE" MODUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L OTTAWA 003116 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2015 TAGS: PARM KNNP PREL CA IN SUBJECT: CANADA OPEN TO "CREDIBLE" AND "DEFENSIBLE" MODUS VIVENDI TO ENABLE INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH NSG REF: (A) STATE 190856 (B) OTTAWA 2909 (C) OTTAWA 2768 Classified By: POL M/C BRIAN FLORA. REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Polmiloff delivered reftel demarche points to Terry Wood, Deputy Director for Nuclear Non-Proliferation (IDN) at Foreign Affairs Canada on October 18. Wood expressed appreciation for timely briefing materials in light of last week's discussions at the G-8 Senior Group meeting in London, and this week's NSG Consultative Group meeting in Vienna. He said that Assistant Deputy Minister Jim Wright looked forward to following up on U/S Joseph's invitation to consult in Washington prior to the November 24-25 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors. ¶2. (C) Wood said that Canada agrees with the strategic reasons we have articulated for engaging India. He reaffirmed that his government welcomes India's new commitment as manifested in the Joint Statement of July 18 (REF C),underscoring that Canada, as a NNWS, will want to ensure a net gain to nonproliferation objectives and no weakening of the nonproliferation regime(s). For example, Wood said, Canada will press for India's adoption of "comprehensive safeguards" as a condition of supply. ¶3. (C) The Canadian government generally agrees with the terms and principles for a modus vivendi at the NSG, Wood continued, stressing that it must, however, be "credible" and "defensible". He outlined Canada's position going into the Consultative Group meeting, noting that the GOC wants to move forward in a "calibrated manner" with specific steps: -- India must formally adhere to NSG guidelines; -- India must halt fissile material production; -- India must sign and ratify the CTBT. ¶4. (C) Wood emphasized that, media headlines notwithstanding, Canada's four-point program for potential civilian nuclear cooperation with India (ref B) was "fully consistent with existing policy"; no decision had been taken to pursue active civil nuclear cooperation with India at this time. India will need to meet its nonproliferation obligations first, he said. He speculated that a likely difficult hurdle in this regard would be the GOC's understanding that India is not prepared to put its CIRUS reactor (originally donated by Canada in the 1950s for peaceful nuclear pursuits) under safeguards. (COMMENT: Resumption of active nuclear cooperation with India would be decided at the political level, with the effects of such a decision on the governing party's domestic political standing in the run-up to national elections an important consideration. END COMMENT). Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa WILKINS