CANADA OPEN TO "CREDIBLE" AND "DEFENSIBLE" MODUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L OTTAWA 003116

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2015
TAGS: PARM KNNP PREL CA IN
SUBJECT: CANADA OPEN TO "CREDIBLE" AND "DEFENSIBLE" MODUS
VIVENDI TO ENABLE INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH NSG

REF: (A) STATE 190856 (B) OTTAWA 2909 (C) OTTAWA 2768

Classified By: POL M/C BRIAN FLORA. REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Polmiloff delivered reftel demarche points to Terry
Wood, Deputy Director for Nuclear Non-Proliferation (IDN) at
Foreign Affairs Canada on October 18. Wood expressed
appreciation for timely briefing materials in light of last
week's discussions at the G-8 Senior Group meeting in London,
and this week's NSG Consultative Group meeting in Vienna.
He said that Assistant Deputy Minister Jim Wright looked
forward to following up on U/S Joseph's invitation to consult
in Washington prior to the November 24-25 meeting of the IAEA
Board of Governors.


2. (C) Wood said that Canada agrees with the strategic
reasons we have articulated for engaging India. He
reaffirmed that his government welcomes India's new
commitment as manifested in the Joint Statement of July 18
(REF C),underscoring that Canada, as a NNWS, will want to
ensure a net gain to nonproliferation objectives and no
weakening of the nonproliferation regime(s). For example,
Wood said, Canada will press for India's adoption of
"comprehensive safeguards" as a condition of supply.


3. (C) The Canadian government generally agrees with the
terms and principles for a modus vivendi at the NSG, Wood
continued, stressing that it must, however, be "credible" and
"defensible". He outlined Canada's position going into the
Consultative Group meeting, noting that the GOC wants to move
forward in a "calibrated manner" with specific steps:
-- India must formally adhere to NSG guidelines;
-- India must halt fissile material production;
-- India must sign and ratify the CTBT.


4. (C) Wood emphasized that, media headlines notwithstanding,
Canada's four-point program for potential civilian nuclear
cooperation with India (ref B) was "fully consistent with
existing policy"; no decision had been taken to pursue active
civil nuclear cooperation with India at this time. India
will need to meet its nonproliferation obligations first, he
said. He speculated that a likely difficult hurdle in this
regard would be the GOC's understanding that India is not
prepared to put its CIRUS reactor (originally donated by
Canada in the 1950s for peaceful nuclear pursuits) under
safeguards. (COMMENT: Resumption of active nuclear
cooperation with India would be decided at the political
level, with the effects of such a decision on the governing
party's domestic political standing in the run-up to national
elections an important consideration. END COMMENT).

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WILKINS