Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05OTTAWA2987
2005-10-06 19:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Ottawa
Cable title:
60TH UNFC: CANADA HEARS USG CONCERNS ABOUT AD HOC
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 061941Z Oct 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L OTTAWA 002987
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2015
TAGS: AORC PARM PREL MNUC CA
SUBJECT: 60TH UNFC: CANADA HEARS USG CONCERNS ABOUT AD HOC
COMMITTEES, WANTS TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE
REF: SECSTATE 185313
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION JOHN DICKSON. REASON 1.4 (b) and
(d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L OTTAWA 002987
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2015
TAGS: AORC PARM PREL MNUC CA
SUBJECT: 60TH UNFC: CANADA HEARS USG CONCERNS ABOUT AD HOC
COMMITTEES, WANTS TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE
REF: SECSTATE 185313
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION JOHN DICKSON. REASON 1.4 (b) and
(d).
1. (C) DCM and polmiloff met with Canadian Assistant Deputy
Minister for International Security Jim Wright late on
October 5 to present general points on the UNFC draft
resolution and deliver oral points, as instructed. Arms
Control Director Rob MacDougall and incoming Deputy Director
Ron Stansfield sat in.
2. (C) Responding to the points in the non-paper, Wright
sought to reassure us that Canada's intention in supporting
AHCs was merely to "jumpstart" the CD, not undermine it. The
alternative, he said, was to continue to "do nothing."
Canada's concept of the AHC mechanism was that it would be
pursued only in the continued absence of progress in the CD;
were the CD to reach an understanding on a work plan there
would be no need to activate AHCs. At the same time, Wright
recognized that the AHC concept would need more fulsome
discussion in New York.
3. (C) The GOC had no intention, Wright continued, of
creating a separate vehicle to drive the CD agenda. The
institution was "very important" to Canada, he said, and the
prospect of yet another year of gridlock difficult to
countenance. Wright affirmed that Canada greatly valued
consensus, as did the U.S. McDougall noted that "using
consensus to block discussion," however, was going too far.
4. (C) In conclusion, Wright asserted that the United States
is a partner that Canada wants and needs in the CD. He noted
that Canada would not/not be pursuing the two prior UNFC
resolutions that had created such anxiety for the U.S. and
conveyed assurance that Canada would examine USG concerns
"carefully and constructively." Wright urgently appealed to
the U.S. to help end the gridlock in the CD.
5. (C/NF) COMMENT: In a separate conversation on October 6,
Stansfield (protect please) said that GOC was taken aback by
the "vehemence" of USG demarche, particularly given that the
AHC concept had not been widely discussed among other
delegations, let alone tabled as a resolution. He confirmed
that the DCM's message "was heard" and confided that Canadian
Ambassador Meyer, who had been in the vanguard of Canadian
activism on AHCs, was instructed to "stand down and not take
a prominent role" in the briefing convened for October 6. END
COMMENT.
Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa
WILKINS
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2015
TAGS: AORC PARM PREL MNUC CA
SUBJECT: 60TH UNFC: CANADA HEARS USG CONCERNS ABOUT AD HOC
COMMITTEES, WANTS TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE
REF: SECSTATE 185313
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION JOHN DICKSON. REASON 1.4 (b) and
(d).
1. (C) DCM and polmiloff met with Canadian Assistant Deputy
Minister for International Security Jim Wright late on
October 5 to present general points on the UNFC draft
resolution and deliver oral points, as instructed. Arms
Control Director Rob MacDougall and incoming Deputy Director
Ron Stansfield sat in.
2. (C) Responding to the points in the non-paper, Wright
sought to reassure us that Canada's intention in supporting
AHCs was merely to "jumpstart" the CD, not undermine it. The
alternative, he said, was to continue to "do nothing."
Canada's concept of the AHC mechanism was that it would be
pursued only in the continued absence of progress in the CD;
were the CD to reach an understanding on a work plan there
would be no need to activate AHCs. At the same time, Wright
recognized that the AHC concept would need more fulsome
discussion in New York.
3. (C) The GOC had no intention, Wright continued, of
creating a separate vehicle to drive the CD agenda. The
institution was "very important" to Canada, he said, and the
prospect of yet another year of gridlock difficult to
countenance. Wright affirmed that Canada greatly valued
consensus, as did the U.S. McDougall noted that "using
consensus to block discussion," however, was going too far.
4. (C) In conclusion, Wright asserted that the United States
is a partner that Canada wants and needs in the CD. He noted
that Canada would not/not be pursuing the two prior UNFC
resolutions that had created such anxiety for the U.S. and
conveyed assurance that Canada would examine USG concerns
"carefully and constructively." Wright urgently appealed to
the U.S. to help end the gridlock in the CD.
5. (C/NF) COMMENT: In a separate conversation on October 6,
Stansfield (protect please) said that GOC was taken aback by
the "vehemence" of USG demarche, particularly given that the
AHC concept had not been widely discussed among other
delegations, let alone tabled as a resolution. He confirmed
that the DCM's message "was heard" and confided that Canadian
Ambassador Meyer, who had been in the vanguard of Canadian
activism on AHCs, was instructed to "stand down and not take
a prominent role" in the briefing convened for October 6. END
COMMENT.
Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa
WILKINS