U.S. PROPOSALS TO ENABLE CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 002768

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2015
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP IN CA
SUBJECT: U.S. PROPOSALS TO ENABLE CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION
WITH INDIA BY THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP

REF: STATE 166864

Classified By: POL M/C BRIAN FLORA. REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) In a meeting on September 14, Pol M/C and polmiloff
solicited Canada's engagement and support to advance civil
nuclear cooperation with India by the Nuclear Suppliers
Group; they emphasized that this was a top priority of
President Bush. Emboffs left reftel non-paper outlining
obligations that Indian Prime Minister Singh pledged to
undertake with DG for International Security Paul Chapin and
Nuclear Affairs Deputy Director Ron Stansfield.


2. (C) In a separate conversation the day before, DCM raised
the issue with Political Director and Assistant Deputy
Minister Jim Wright, who noted that India's Foreign Minister
would visit Ottawa at the end of the month (September 26-27).
Wright said that Canada looked forward to India's read-out
of the Singh visit and was eager to talk to the Indian FM
about Canadian proposals (NFI) on this matter. He welcomed
USG thinking on engaging India in light of the new agreement.


CANADA WANTS IN-DEPTH BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS


3. (C) Chapin expressed appreciation for the briefing. He
noted that while some of Canada's "major questions" in the
process of being addressed, the Canadian government still
sought information regarding the general time frame, the
importance of some of the undertakings, and "expectations" of
the Indians. As proposed during Washington consultations in
July, Chapin asked that USG consider meeting bilaterally in a
small group, in Washington or Ottawa, to review our mutual
nuclear nonproliferation agenda. Notionally he thought that
early October might be ideal, coming on the heels of the
Indian Foreign Minister's visit and in advance of the
anticipated visit to Ottawa later that month of Secretary
Rice. Canada was thinking seriously, he said, about how the
Secretary's visit could help the government to address

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outstanding concerns.

CABINET APPROVAL NEEDED TO CHANGE POLICY


4. (C) Stansfield acknowledged that while the U.S. was moving
ahead with helping India to "burnish its nonproliferation
credentials," Canada still never wanted them to become a de
facto nuclear weapons state (NWS) in the first place. His
Bureau and others in the Department of Foreign Affairs
recognized that it was a case of having to "surrender to
reality." At the same time, the broader Canadian public had
not gotten over a sense that it was betrayed by India in
1974, after which Canada suspended its civil nuclear
cooperation program. Public sentiment about Canada's
commitment to nonproliferation ran high, and given the
domestic political predicament of the Martin government,
Chapin said, Canada would have to proceed with great care to
address such a dramatic change in policy. It almost
certainly would require Cabinet approval, Chapin concluded.


5. (C) Pol M/C underscored that in pursuing its commitments
in the U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation initiative the
U.S. has no intention of assisting India's nuclear weapons
program; of recognizing India as a nuclear-weapons state; or
of seeking to amend the NPT. Chapin welcomed the
clarification.

IMPACT ON OTHERS AND NEXT STEPS


6. (C) Canada particularly is concerned about the effect of
the changed policy on other countries -- in the immediate
vicinity and beyond -- that will be encouraged by India's
perceived success in "gutting it out." For example, Chapin
said, India's approach on Iran at the upcoming IAEA Board of
Governors meeting would be of interest. The nonproliferation
community needed to sustain integrity in the region.


7. (C) The GOC was exploring how to leverage the U.S.-India
agreement to "draw in" the Indians, Stansfield said, and what
the nonproliferation community might do to "make them do
more." For example, India had made no commitment to a
moratorium on production of fissile material, as pledged by
the P-5. Canada envisions a phased approach. How the U.S.
sees the evolution of civilian cooperation would be critical
to strategizing, Chapin added. Based on Indian public
statements to date, it seemed that India "expects the U.S. to
make the first move."


8. (C) Pol M/C thanked Chapin and Stansfield for Canada's
willingness to work with the U.S. to bring India into the
nonproliferation community. He once again underscored the
importance of this stragetic initiative to the U.S.
government and the engagement of senior USG officials in
advancing its objectives.
Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa

DICKSON