US-CANADA POLMIL TALKS: FIRST IN A DECADE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 OTTAWA 001502

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR PK IN CA
SUBJECT: US-CANADA POLMIL TALKS: FIRST IN A DECADE

Classified By: POL M/C BRIAN FLORA. REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY


1. (SBU) On April 27, Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) hosted the
first US/CAN political-military consultations in more than a
decade. The day-long talks opened with each side providing
an overview of its recently released national defense
policy/strategy. Topics covered in the talks included
continental security, transatlantic relations (NATO, EU and
OSCE),Haiti, Venezuela, Sudan, the Global War on Terrorism,
the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI),India and
Pakistan (raised by A/DM Wright),the EU China arms embargo,
SA/LW and landmines. Discussions were substantive and
informative, reinforcing shared security interests around the
globe, and presenting opportunities for closer cooperation in
a number of areas. END SUMMARY


2. (SBU) Led by Acting A/S for Political-Military Affairs
Rose Likins, the U.S. delegation included representatives
from DOD/OSD, NORTHCOM, State WHA/CAN and EUR/RPM, and
Embassy Ottawa. Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) Assistant
Deputy Minister for International Security Jim Wright and DG
Paul Chapin led the Canadian side, flanked by DG-level
representation from DND and the PCO, as well as several other
divisions in FAC and Canadian Embassy representation.

"SCENESETTERS"


3. (C) In introductory remarks, A/DM Wright hailed the
consultations as an opportunity to strengthen our mutual
engagement on a number of issues. The meetings coincided
with the release of Canada's long-awaited International
Policy Statement (IPS),which included significant funding
(CAD 100 million/approx. USD 80 million annually for 5 years)
in support of the GOC's key foreign policy priorities:
-- dealing with failed and fragile states;
-- countering terrorism and organized crime;
-- combating WMD proliferation; and
-- promoting human security.


4. (C) In reviewing the defense component of the IPS, the GOC
noted a "radical departure" from the last defense review
exercise in 1994. The demands on Canadian Forces (CF) had
changed dramatically in the past decade: In the post-9/11
environment there was new and increased demand for support to
civil authorities and Canadian security requirements, while
internationally, the CF had been stretched thin through a
combination of factors. In addition to outlining the
transformational changes that were needed, the new defense
paper articulated CF priorities -- defense of Canada,
defense of the continent, and promoting international peace
and stability. To this end the GOC was expanding the size of
the CF and designating a single, integrated operational area
--"CANCOM," or Canada Command -- that would balance the
still-emergent demands on the domestic front (to include
Arctic sovereignty concerns) with international demands for
the CF. Finally, the document emphasized the primacy of a
strong security and defense relationship with the United
States as a basic tenet in the defense of Canada and the
continent. Wright emphasized that the approach outlined in
the IPS represented "a huge change in mindset" for Canadians
and the government.


5. (C) Ambassador Likins thanked the GOC for taking the
initiative to restart pol-mil consultations and welcomed the
opportunity to amplify the US-Canada dialogue. Briefly, she
outlined U.S. foreign policy priorities, from winning the
GWOT as the centerpiece of U.S. policy, to the many
components in aiding the spread of democracy. In all these
endeavors the key to success was working with partners like
Canada, whether through the G-8 Action Plan for the Global
Peace Operations Initiative or bilaterally. OSD Director for
Northern European Policy Jesse Kelso provided a briefing on
DOD's recently completed National Defense Strategy (NDS) in
support for the U.S. National Security Strategy. While he
underscored that the NDS was an internal document and did not
reflect U.S. government policy, Ambassador Likins hailed the
unprecedented involvement of the State Department in this
defense review.

CONTINENTAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY


6. (C) Reacting to the briefing on NDS, Chapin asked how the
U.S. "sees Canada" in its security future. Canada had
invested a great deal in the joint NORAD command, he said,
but it was unclear whether the trend might be moving toward a
U.S.-only approach to defend the United States, or if the USG
saw a "real future for sharing continental defense with
Canada." Ambassador Likins responded that when one
considered the tremendous security cooperation that had
evolved post-9/11, all approaches pointed to Canada as our
primary partner. That said, was Canada willing to be a full
partner? This was a decision for Canadians to make. Canada
had to decide if it wanted to maintain collaboration "at
arm's length" or closer; the U.S. would "react" to Canada's
choice. Wright asserted that Canada wanted to be a good,
strong partner for its own sake; that it sees itself as
America's primordial partner in defense of the continent.


7. (C) Though not an agenda topic, Wright raised the subject
of missile defense as an element of continental security.
The GOC had taken a certain decision "at this time," he said,
but the two countries' threat perceptions were not that far
apart. Canada "will need to know how the U.S. is taking
(missile defense) forward"; Canada "will need to follow" the
process, Wright concluded.


8. (C) The GOC also wanted to "encourage and cajole our
Mexican friends" to become more engaged, to become "more
aware." Stating that Canada would be looking for
opportunities to bring Mexico into the discussion, Wright
floated the possibility of having the NORAD/NORTHCOM
Binational Planning Group look at broader hemisphere security
initiatives, to include Mexico. Ambassador Likins welcomed
the initiative, noting that Canada was in a unique position
to engage Mexico's interest.

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS


9. (C) Opening the discussion on transatlantic relations,
Chapin reaffirmed Canada's view of NATO as the cornerstone of
the transatlantic relationship. He voiced Canada's deep
concern about the direction in which the Alliance seemed to
heading given the "overlay of EU ambitions," and appealed for
greater Canada-U.S. discussion and collaboration.


10. (C) Ambassador Likins said the U.S. shared Canada's
concerns and agreed that a joint Canada-US approach could
provide a wake-up call. EUR/RPM Deputy Director Jeff
Hovenier observed that there appeared to be some disparity
between Ottawa's view and that of the Canadian mission in
Brussels, which on the whole seemed more sympathetic to
European perspectives. Ambassador Likins asked Hovenier to
have the U.S. mission in Brussels reach out to their Canadian
counterparts to promote greater collaboration on these
issues. (NOTE: Discussion of ISAF caveats reported septel.
END NOTE)


11. (C) Chapin said that Canada was very concerned about
Russia's effort to undermine the OSCE. At the same time,
OSCE achievements had brought it closer to Russia's back yard
and Chapin wondered if "we" had been sensitive enough to
Russia's concerns in that sense. He proposed follow-on
Canada-US consultations on Russia in the NATO/OSCE context.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES


12. (C) Haiti. Chapin shared Canada's concerns about the
slow pace of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti's
(MINUSTAH) progress and noted that Prime Minister Martin was
personally engaged on this issue. Ambassador Likins noted
that the U.S. and Canada share the same concerns about the
situation on the ground in Haiti, including Brazil's approach
to leading the MINUSTAH force, the use of MINUSTAH's civilian
police (CIVPOL),and MINUSTAH's lack of an intelligence
capability. Chapin commented that he didn't think Canadian
CIVPOL Commissioner David Beer was getting the support he
needed from MINUSTAH due to tension between military and
CIVPOL forces in MINUSTAH. Ambassador Likins suggested the
creation of a bilateral working group to further examine U.S.
and Canadian concerns on Haiti. Chapin agreed and noted that
Beer should be included in the discussion.


13. (C) Venezuela. Ambassador Likins raised concerns about
Venezuela's recent arms purchases and their impact on
stability in the Andean region. Venezuela's neighbors might
be able to influence Venezuela and deter them from concluding
these sales but they have not taken any action on this issue.
It might be helpful if Canada engaged Venezuela and its
neighbors on this issue. Chapin said Canada shares US
concerns about Venezuelan arms purchases and is willing to
engage bilaterally, though it wasn't clear that Canada had
"much influence on its own." Canadian Political M/C Jon
Allen also noted that Canada believes we need to find a way
to engage President Chavez. Continued criticism grows his
popularity and gives him a soapbox to stand on. Ambassador
Likins commented that given Chavez's recent actions, it is
hard to imagine how the United States could engage him.
Chapin proposed sending a team down to Washington to continue
this discussion and to explore a possible OAS strategy for
addressing Venezuela.


14. (C) GPOI. Canada and the U.S. share concerns that some
elements of the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)
have not made as much progress as originally hoped.
Ambassador Likins said it would be good to have the UK focus
on logistics and transportation. She underscored the
importance of Italy's training initiative. She noted that
the U.S. had started to look a little beyond the initial
implementation of GPOI and its focus on Africa. In this
regard, there is a burgeoning interest in developing a
Central American peacekeeping battalion through the existing
CFAC mechanism. Chapin responded that Canada cannot provide
financial support to the CFAC initiative but may be able to
help with training through Canada's Pearson Centre for
Peacekeeping, which already gives courses in Spanish.
Ambassador Likins also asked Wright if Canada might be able
to provide French-speaking trainers for the Center of
Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) in Vicenza,
Italy. Wright responded that Canada has already provided a
number of French-speaking gendarme to Haiti and a number of
African countries but the GOC will see if it might be able to
provide additional support to COESPU.


15. (C) GWOT. Ambassador Likins summarized achievements to
date in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). She voiced U.S.
gratitude for Canada's support in Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) and multilateral counter-terrorism activity. Wright
reaffirmed Canada's commitment but voiced concerns about
growing public "complacency" in the face of perceived
successful deterrence. This had influenced the GOC's
decision to launch its anti-terrorism "capacity building"
program.


16. (C) Afghanistan. Wright reaffirmed Canada's support for
OEF/ISAF merger and southward expansion of ISAF. South Asia
Director General Jim Fox briefed on Canadian lessons learned
in Afghanistan, sharing the GOC's conclusion that greater
emphasis needs to be placed on the civilian component of PRTs
and that strengthening Afghan leadership is key to success in
Afghanistan. Addressing the narcotics problem is a prime
concern for Canada. The Canadians said there was an
opportunity at the G-8 Summit to show more support to the UK
on this. Rear Admiral Robertson said that Canada was
committed to a continued presence in Kandahar but was
awaiting financial approval for establishing its PRT this
summer. Responding to a question from Wright about the
long-term engagement of the United States, Ambassador Likins
asserted that USG was committed to getting things "right" in
Afghanistan and was engaged for the long haul. She urged
Canada not to let aspects of the ongoing review of global
U.S. defense posture overshadow perceptions about that
commitment.


17. (C) Pakistan and India. Though not on the agenda for
discussion, Wright raised concerns about the security
situation in Pakistan and the disturbing trend for a
significant increase in the drug trade. He had just returned
from the region, he said, and found the situation on the
ground worrisome. Despite a robust USG counternarcotics
effort there appeared to be reversals in progress and the
political process was "very fluid" on the ground, with the
emergence of more conservative religious parties. Though
President Musharaf says he will remove his uniform for
elections in 2007, he had said so before. At the same time,
it was Wright's judgment that Musharaf was showing courage
and leadership in terms of dealing with India but Wright was
uncertain about the prognosis for the next two years.


18. (C) Ambassador Likins said that U.S. relations with India
were better than they had been in a long time. It was
important to keep the India/Pakistan relationship moving and
the United States was cautiously optimistic on this front.
Wright acknowledged that his readouts from senior GOI
officials indicated that they saw the visit of Secretary Rice
as a success. Canada was worried about India's proclivity to
heavy spending on armaments; it would be a challenge to keep
this under control. There was a need to take the bull by the
horns and deal with India and Pakistan on nonproliferation.
Both countries faced energy shortfalls in the not-so-distant
future; the trend was toward significant growth in nuclear
energy for civilian use. Pakistan was not as forthcoming as
it needed to be on the nuclear question and has been
increasingly active with China on this subject. Wright
floated the idea of approaching Pakistan based on both
countries' status in the British Commonwealth and proposed a
bilateral Canada-U.S. dialogue to discuss how best to advance
shared nonproliferation objectives with India and Pakistan.


19. (C) Iraq. In her briefing on Iraq, Ambassador Likins
thanked Canada for its support of Iraq reconstruction and
urged the Canadians to take "process ownership" of various
sectors within Iraqi ministries. Wright acknowledged that
the elections had turned out "better than expected." He
reaffirmed Canadian commitment to a positive outcome in
Canada, citing the continuing civilian police training effort
in Jordan and strong support through NATO.


20. (C) Sudan. Wright said the Prime Minister is a strong
believer in a Canadian focus on Africa and that we need to
act to prevent crimes against humanity in Darfur. But the
approach should be through the AU. Canada was undergoing a
comprehensive review of its policy in the region (including
the ongoing visit to Darfur of the Chief of Defense Staff) to
explore options. Wright said that NATO was far more capable
than the EU to lend assistance, should the AU invite it.
Concluding, he urged Canada-U.S. teamwork on getting
assistance to Darfur.

ARMS CONTROL


21. (C) EU China Arms Embargo. Ambassador Likins was
cautiously optimistic of progress in getting through to the
EU on its prospective lifting of the arms embargo. She noted
that in consultations with the EU and member states, some had
cited Canada as an example of a country with no embargo on
China that maintains good defense cooperation with the U.S.,
including an ITAR waiver. While USG understood that Canadian
policy was not to export military items to China, it might be
useful if Canada underscored this aspect to the Europeans.
Bristling somewhat, Chapin said that Canada had indeed been
delivering the message to the Europeans, emphasizing its
effective export control regime. Canada's focus was less on
the embargo than preventing sales to China that would affect
stability. Chapin said he would raise this issue with the
Europeans again to make clear Canadian policy on this issue.
Canadian Political M/C John Allen observed that Canada had a
vested interest in the embargo: There was some concern that
Canada could be "sideswiped by Congress" if the EU were to
lift the embargo.

SA/LW


22. (C) Ambassador Likins highlighted opportunities for
greater multilateral cooperation, particularly on MANPADS and
gave Canada a "heads-up" on upcoming changes to the Canadian
exemption in the ITAR that would affect MANPADS exports to
Canada. The United States reviewed the exemption and found
that MANPADS exports to Canada had been allowed to go to
Canada without an export license under the Canadian
exemption, a procedure that goes against the Wassenaar
Agreement. The exemption will be changes so that MANPADS are
no longer included in the exemption and therefore all exports
of MANPADS to Canada will require an export license. Chapin
said that Canada was "very conscious" of MANPADS and the need
to halt and prevent their proliferation. The GOC had
received excellent and positive feedback from a number of
capacity-building workshops it had undertaken in the context
of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); it hoped to conduct
additional workshops on aspects of aviation security and
airport vulnerability. Canada hoped to expand this approach
in other forums such as the OAS, APEC, G-8 CTAG and would
welcome opportunities to "do more" with the U.S. Chapin said
Canada was preparing a MANPADS agreement with Russia and
asked for a copy of the MANPADS agreement the United States
had recently concluded with Russia for use as a model.
Ambassador Likins agreed to brief Canada on the agreement.
Acting Director for International Crime and Terrorism Peter
Bates noted that Canada was conducting workshops on
possibilities for fixed countermeasures to MANPADS and said
they had been in contact with S/CT on this issue. Ambassador
Likins commented that PM/WRA had the lead on MANPADS issues
and offered to send a team up to meet with Canada on these
workshops. Joint Staff Deputy Director for Politico-Military
Affairs Brigadier General Field expressed interest in
accompanying the PM/WRA team in their discussion with Canada
on MANPADS.

LANDMINES


23. (C) Chapin opened the discussion by acknowledging that
USG is the largest single contributor to landmine
eradication. He said that Canada supported the U.S. proposal
in the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW),but
characterized as "very difficult to accept" the proposal in
the CD. Canada could not endorse "signing onto a lesser
standard" than those of the Ottawa Convention. At the same
time Canada wanted to try and find a way forward. Ambassador
Likins said the USG commitment to de-mining would remain
strong down the road. The public/private partner approach to
the Mine Action Plan was proving fruitful and had leveraged
USD 50 million. The U.S. continued to have difficulty with
its Conference on Disarmament (CD) proposal, though the
latter had been crafted to be attractive to signatories of
the Ottawa Convention. Ambassador Likins agreed that the
goal was to move forward and suggested further discussion on
this issue with Arms Control Assistant Secretary Rademaker.

CONCLUDING REMARKS


24. (C) In their concluding remarks, Ambassador Likins and
A/DM Wright agreed that consultations had been very useful
and were worth repeating at a later date. Wright expressed
hope that a follow-on session could take place in Washington
before the end of the year. Ambassador Likins noted that
timing would be driven by the selection and confirmation of a
new Assistant Secretary for Political Military Affairs.


25. (U) This report has been approved by Acting Assistant
Secretary for Political-Military Affairs Rose Likins.

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