KIDS THESE DAYS: WHAT DO GREEK CYPRIOT YOUNG

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 002007 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM CY SUBJECT: KIDS THESE DAYS: WHAT DO GREEK CYPRIOT YOUNG PEOPLE REALLY WANT? Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schilcher; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In the April 2004 referendum on the Annan Plan for a Cyprus settlement, Greek Cypriots in the 18-24 age group voted "No" by a margin of nine-to-one. Both anecdotal impressions and polling data lead to the conclusion that, on balance, young Greek Cypriots take a harder line on the Cyprus issue than do their parents. They are also less flexible than their Turkish Cypriot counterparts and less willing to compromise on the terms of a settlement. Young people in the south are also generally more conservative. Why this is and what can be done about it are critical questions to answer in considering the future of the Cyprus question. A big part of the problem is undoubtedly the education system, which is highly politicized and presents a distinctly one-sided view of recent Cypriot history. Moreover, young people in Cyprus have no memories of a unified island with mixed communities. Few have friends on the other side or a personal connection to the old family home in the north. We have been speaking to a large number of young people, educators, academics and journalists about the attitudes and political inclinations of young people in Cyprus -- particularly on the Greek Cypriot side -- and what can be done to ensure that this generation remains committed to an achievable Cyprus settlement. End Summary. From the Cradle -------------- ¶2. (C) In our extensive embassy outreach efforts, we have learned, to our chagrin, that young audiences are the most difficult. Greek Cypriot high school and college students generally take a hard line on the Cyprus issue and have adopted and built on their parents' anti-American attitudes to the point of willful ignorance. Available polling data, including some polls commissioned by us, bear this out. In the April 2004 referendum on the Annan Plan, more than 90% of Greek Cypriots in the 18-24 age group voted "NO" to a settlement package that would have reunified the island and enabled the majority of refugees to return to their homes. What comes through most clearly in our conversations with Greek Cypriot young people is the sense of "injustice" that colors their perception of the Cyprus dispute and limits their willingness to compromise. As one student told Polchief succinctly during a presentation to a political science class at the University of Cyprus, "we have international law on our side. We're right. They're wrong. Justice must be done." If the youth are in fact the future, there is cause to fear for the future of the Cyprus issue. ¶3. (C) The politicization of Greek Cypriot youth begins early. While family attitudes are the most important forces shaping the political attitudes of the young, the education system also plays a significant role. School teachers in the south are notoriously political and largely Greek-nationalist in orientation. Most of the teachers have studied at universities in Cyprus or Greece rather than in the UK or the United States. The available teaching materials are largely out of date, even by Greek standards, and reflect nationalist and intolerant sentiments that were more mainstream half a century ago. Impressionable students are instructed to prepare projects documenting Turkish atrocities dating back to the Ottoman period, but with particular attention to the events of 1974. Greek Cypriot students can recite a list of Turkish crimes in Cyprus with the ease of an American 8th grader offering a list of the world's longest rivers. The school parking lot may be full of BMWs and students may be dressed in the latest fashions, but a strong streak of victimization nevertheless runs through the curriculum. A recent circular from the Ministry of Education instructed teachers to give special emphasis to "Greek nationalism and the strengthening of the historical memory of the loss and enslavement of patriarchal land." ¶4. (C) Moreover, students are taught that the roots of Hellenic civilization lie in Periclean Athens rather than Byzantium and that the Greek ideal represents all that is great and good in western civilization. One recent university graduate, Andreas, explained that this ancient tradition was presented as both an honor and a burden, something he should strive to live up to, but with the understanding that he will necessarily fail. This is obviously not a recipe for compromise and goes a long way towards explaining the Greek Cypriot sense of residing precariously at the point of the spear in a Huntington-esque clash of civilizations. One middle-aged teacher explained his thinking to us in the following way. "Atilla cannot be trusted. The Turks inevitably will move south -- either through war or a Cyprus solution. It is our responsibility as educators (sic) to ensure our students are prepared." There is, however, some room for self-criticism. In a recent Embassy-sponsored poll, 31% of Greek Cypriots agreed with the statement that the education system plays a negative role in efforts to reach a Cyprus settlement. Study War No More -------------- ¶5. (C) For Greek Cypriot men, 25 months of mandatory military service is the norm and, for most, represents a significant formative experience. There are no student deferments. Even foreign-born men of Cypriot origin are subject to induction if they visit Cyprus. Learning to hate the enemy is a part of the Greek Cypriot National Guard (GCNG) training program, and time in the army clearly hardens attitudes toward Turkey, Turkish Cypriots, and settlement efforts. One young man who had recently completed his tour of service told us that his time in the GCNG was like an out-of-body experience. He clearly understood that his emotions were being manipulated by his officers, but it worked nevertheless, and at least during his military service he was alienated from his own (progressive) political beliefs. One factor that might help account for the extraordinarily high percentage of "no" voters in the 18-24 age group is that many of the men were either current GCNG soldiers or had recently completed their tour of duty. Meanwhile, many of the Greek Cypriot students at universities abroad -- who could reasonably be expected to be on the more progressive end of the political spectrum -- did not return to the island to participate in the referendum vote. ¶6. (C) There is a real question as to the carry-over effect of military service. For some -- and this is strictly anecdotal -- two years carrying a rifle in the GCNG seems to generate a permanent change of attitude with respect to the other side and the future of a Cyprus settlement. Some, of course, remain unchanged by the experience. Most young men seem to experience at least some change in their attitude towards Turkish Cypriots, but the harder or more negative of these new emotional leanings seem to lose their edge over time. In other words, their military service is transformative, but not necessarily permanent. The Role of the Church -------------- ¶7. (C) There is little doubt that Greek Cypriot young people are considerably more religious and observant than their Turkish Cypriot counterparts. Moreover, the Cypriot Orthodox Church is significantly more political than religious institutions in the north. Even the Greek Cypriot communist party goes out of its way to establish and maintain close relations with the Church. AKEL leader Demetris Christofias, for example, has two portraits on the wall of his party office -- Vladimir Lenin and an icon of St. George. With a few exceptions (i.e., the Bishop of Morphou),church leaders made no secret of their opposition to the Annan Plan. The Bishop of Kyrenia infamously warned his flock that "yes" voters were traitors to Cypriot Hellenism and "would not inherit the kingdom of heaven." Thanassis Tsokkos, leader of the youth wing of the opposition DISY party, told us that he saw a clear correlation between "religiosity" and views toward the Annan Plan, with the more religious members of his organization being most willing to reject the settlement on "principle." Ioannis Paifakos, chair of the Classics Department at the University of Cyprus, believed that the current incapacity of the Archbishop has further limited the ability of the Church to compromise and accept less than absolute victory. History and doctrine predisposed the Church to hard-line attitudes on the Cyprus issue and only a strong Archbishop -- notably lacking at this particular moment -- could push the Church in a different direction. Don't Go There: Why Bicommunalism Isn't Cool -------------- ¶8. (C) With the opening of the crossings in April 2003, it became possible for many young Cypriots to visit the other side for the first time in their life. As many as half of those in our key 18-24 demographic have done so, but half of those again have done so only once or twice. Chrystalleni, a 23-year-old aspiring teacher, told us that she would never cross north until she could do so "as a free Cypriot" to reclaim her family home in a village near Morphou. In social -- if not legal terms -- refugee status is inheritable and spreads through the population as a dominant gene. In one recent poll, nearly 60% of young respondents indicated they were "from refugee families." While it is considered "cool" among young Turkish Cypriots to go south for a night on the town, few Greek Cypriots return the favor. The opening of the crossings has allowed older Cypriots to re-establish relationships with friends and former neighbors from the other side, but their children seem to have little interest in building new ones. ¶9. (C) The exception to this seems to be those young people have made an affirmative choice to participate in bicommunal activities, including those supported by U.S. funding. Participants are universally positive about their experiences, and we have clear evidence of lasting ties being forged between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot young people. Committed bicommunalists represent a very small percentage of the population, and program implementers must be careful to avoid drawing repeatedly from the same well. Attitudes in the North -------------- ¶10. (C) Turkish Cypriot youth are, in general, less rigid and less doctrinal than Greek Cypriot youth. It is difficult, however, to identify the reasons why this so. A professor at Eastern Mediterranean University described Turkish Cypriot young people as "lost," trapped between Turkish and Cypriot identities without the ability to accept association with either one as a natural fit. Turkish Cypriot youth simply do not feel "Turkish" the way that Greek Cypriot young people feel "Greek." Like it or not (and they clearly do not), Turkish Cypriot young people also understand that they are the ones most disadvantaged by the status quo. More than one young person in the north has told us that he or she voted "yes" to the plan not because it would reunify the island but because it represented change. One young academic, Dr. Aysel Yontar, told us she supported the Annan Plan even as she expected it would ultimately fall apart. Cyprus' entry into the EU has brought the outside world tantalizingly close, but there is still a Greek Cypriot bouncer controlling the velvet rope at the entrance. Most of all, young people in the north are acutely conscious of the attitudes of Greek Cypriots, and bristle at the breezy dismissal of their aspirations. Turkish Cypriot young people are largely of the view that Greek Cypriots are looking, selfishly, to protect their privileged position and do not want to share the fruits of sovereignty with their poor cousins in the north. Burying the Past -------------- ¶11. (C) Nearly everyone working for a solution of the Cyprus problem is concerned about the attitudes of the young, particularly on the Greek Cypriot side. The nature of the problem seems clear enough. The $64,000 question (CYP 30,976 at today's rate of exchange) is: "What can be done about it?" Embassy-supported bicommunal activities are a start and seem to be making a difference, but reach only a limited segment of the population. Reforming the education systems on both sides of the Green Line remains a high priority. We have heard from more than one conflict resolution expert who has visited the island that, while the attitudes of the young are often more hard-line than those of their elders, they are typically easier to change. We have put considerable thought and energy into programs aimed specifically at the teaching of history and we intend to reinforce those efforts. Changing the attitudes of even a single teacher has important ripple effects through an entire community, particularly in terms of efforts to reach young people outside of the major urban centers. The same could be said of programs aimed at improving the quality of teaching materials. There is no escaping the fact that this generation of young people will one day grow up and take the reins of power in Cyprus. Whether or not the Cyprus problem is resolved by that point, the attitudes of today's youth will go a long way toward shaping the realities of the island's future. SCHLICHER