Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NEWDELHI9771
2005-12-28 12:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

MEA LOOKS AHEAD TO PAKISTAN TALKS, SEEKS

Tags:  PTER PREL EAID EPET ELTN MOPS KDEM KNNP IN PK AF IR INDO PAK 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 009771 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2015
TAGS: PTER PREL EAID EPET ELTN MOPS KDEM KNNP IN PK AF IR INDO PAK
SUBJECT: MEA LOOKS AHEAD TO PAKISTAN TALKS, SEEKS
REASSURANCE ON US PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

REF: A. NEW DELHI DECEMBER 21 O/I

B. STATE 226670

Classified By: Acting DCM Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 009771 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2015 TAGS: PTER PREL EAID EPET ELTN MOPS KDEM KNNP IN PK AF IR INDO PAK SUBJECT: MEA LOOKS AHEAD TO PAKISTAN TALKS, SEEKS REASSURANCE ON US PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN REF: A. NEW DELHI DECEMBER 21 O/I ¶B. STATE 226670 Classified By: Acting DCM Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Speaking on December 27, MEA Joint Secretary (Pakistan/Afghanistan/Iran) Dilip Sinha judged that the GOP is dragging its feet in implementing agreed-upon confidence-building measures and presenting its own ideas in a "half-baked" manner, but was confident that relations would muddle through incrementally. Sinha's thoughts on Afghanistan were centered on protecting Indian nationals from terrorism and confirming that the USG (and the US military) would remain in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future; he also provided an update on Indian assistance to Afghanistan in the field of democracy-building. On Iran, he reiterated the Indian formula that energy, regional stability (including keeping Iran as a non-nuclear weapons state),and land access to Afghanistan and Central Asia continue to govern Delhi-Tehran relations. Despite ongoing GOI meetings with Iran pipeline negotiators, Sinha suggested that progress would be slow noting Pakistan's failure to appoint a project consultant. End Summary. Muddling Through with GOP on CBMs and "Half-Baked Ideas" -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Sinha gave an evenhanded assessment of GOI-GOP relations going into the New Year. He was upbeat on operationalizing the Amritsar-Lahore and Amritsar-Nankana Sahib buses to link Indian and Pakistani Punjab (Ref A),and especially Sikh holy places, in January. His attitude was tempered by Indian press reports -- which Sinha corroborated -- that the Pakistani negotiators for the Munnabao-Khokhrapar rail link to connect Sindh and Rajasthan were demanding the service run the same way the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus does -- that is, each train would stop at the border, passengers would cross on foot and board the opposite train to reach their final destination. Sinha reported that this was the first time he knew of a Pakistani team objecting to a vehicle crossing the border from India, as usually the Indian team objected to the prospect of Pakistani vehicles crossing as a potential ingress for terrorists. He also pointed out that whereas there is a Pakistani train platform approximately 100 feet from the border, the closest Indian
platform was two kilometers away, which would greatly complicate embarkation/disembarkation. The GOI assumed that the Rajasthan train -- like the Delhi-Lahore bus -- would physically cross the border. Neither the GOI nor the Rajasthani government foresees building a new platform in the Rajasthan wilderness -- the closest city, Barmer, is 100 km away -- and Sinha was concerned that lining up temporary staffing for customs and immigration even at the existing platform may be problematic. He concluded that this may not be insurmountable, and may be resolved during the next round of Munnabao-Khokhrapar talks on January 4-7 in India. ¶3. (C) Sinha also flagged the January 17-18 Foreign Secretaries' talks in New Delhi to inaugurate the Third Round SIPDIS of the Composite Dialogue (NOTE: The Foreign Secretaries will address the Composite Dialogue topics of Peace and Security including Confidence-Building Measures, and Kashmir. End Note.) He added that in March cross-LoC truck (i.e. trade) service should begin in Kashmir. To a question on Siachen glacier, Sinha held to the GOI requirement for the demarcation of the Actual Ground Position Line of the troops on both sides before any troop withdrawal goes forward. Noting the current lack of an Indian Foreign Minister, he confirmed that the Composite Dialogue can just as easily proceed under the PM's foreign policy stewardship. ¶4. (C) On back-channel negotiations, Sinha reported that the talks between NSA Narayanan and Pakistani NSA Tariq Aziz remain outside the Foreign Ministry's orbit. More broadly, he characterized the ideas flowing from Islamabad as frequently "half-baked": "they are not concrete, no specifics, no contours ... what exactly do they mean when they use words like 'autonomous,' 'self-governance,' 'demilitarize' ... we are not sure what we are supposed to respond to." He refused to be drawn out on NSA Narayanan's comments in a December 24 TV interview that the Indo-Pak back-channel was discussing Pakistan President Musharraf's proposal for "self-governance in divided Kashmir." Terror Concern Amid Afghan Assistance, Democracy Building -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Turning to Afghanistan, A/DCM passed Ref B demarche and asked that the GOI continue its robust involvement in Afghan reconstruction. Sinha responded that he expected to attend the conference himself, along with a Minister of State to provide political representation. ¶6. (C) On terrorism within Afghanistan, Sinha stated that "Pakistan-based sources" reported direct Pakistani involvement, "especially in Peshawar," in planning attacks on Indians working in Afghanistan. (NOTE: Sinha did not specify GOP involvement. End Note.) He said that terrorists were targeting Indians working on the roads projects in Jalalabad and Kandahar, prompting the GOI to review security protocols for both GOI projects and privately contracted roads using numerous Indian workers. When the transmission towers for the Kabul-Pul-e-Khumri power lines are erected, Indian security will ramp up to protect those workers as well. Sinha underlined that many Indian nationals are working on non-GOI projects, including for the USG, and their protection will have to be reevaluated. The Indo-Tibetan Border Police are currently providing security for GOI projects in Afghanistan, and project managers are trying to speed up the completion of their assignments to reduce India's footprint in Afghanistan. ¶7. (C) To A/DCM's query on how to expand Indo-US cooperation on democracy-building in Afghanistan, Sinha reported that the Indian Parliamentary Secretariat had hosted and trained members of the Afghan Parliamentary Secretariat in Delhi, and Indian Parliamentarians hope to conduct a 10-day training session for their Afghan counterparts in either Delhi or Kabul. He noted that the Indian Parliament is in recess, an ideal opportunity for such training. Sinha gave a positive assessment of the new Afghan Parliament leadership, saying that the elected officials are proving they are "adaptable, able to share power, and capable of co-existing." ¶8. (C) Sinha then asked if the USG withdrawal of 3,000 troops "would be all" or if further withdrawals were planned. A/DCM reassured Sinha that the USG would "see things through," adding that it was in everyone's interest to share the burden among allies beyond the original Coalition partners. A/DCM also noted that terrorists in Afghanistan may be tempted to test incoming ISAF troops, and that we must work together to counter any suggestion that the USG might "cut and run." Sinha welcomed these assurances, reflecting Indian support for a sustained US military presence in Afghanistan. Trying to Make Sense Out of Ahmadinejad -------------- ¶9. (C) Sinha told A/DCM that the GOI is still trying to "make sense out of" Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's actions and statements. He judged Ahmadinejad is playing to domestic hardliners as he tries to consolidate his own political power, particularly in supporting his allies for membership in the Council of Experts who will select the next Supreme Leader. Sinha was uncertain if Ahmadinejad could carry the whole country, however. ¶10. (C) On Indo-Iran, Sinha reiterated that multiple equities, including transit rights into Afghanistan/Central Asia and energy (natural gas) require the GOI to pursue an Iran policy that is "predictable and not confrontational." He agreed on the importance of preventing Tehran from crossing the second step on uranium enrichment, on which A/DCM asked Sinha for Delhi to continue to proactively nudge Tehran back into productive talks with the EU-3. On energy, Sinha reported bilateral talks on the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline between Indian Oil Secretary S.C. Tripathi and Iran's Deputy Oil Minister Mohammad Hadi Nejad-Hosseinian would begin December 29, with the Joint (Indo-Iran) Ministerial Commission meeting in March. The talks are still exploratory, though -- Sinha noted that Islamabad has not yet appointed its pipeline consultant, nor has Delhi named its negotiating team, and only after these people are in place could the serious negotiations on transit pricing, routes, security, and technical specifications begin. Likewise, Delhi and Tehran are not yet discussing gas pricing, available volumes, or other technical aspects of the pipeline. (NOTE: Until now, the three countries have been discussing the project bilaterally with each other. The next important step is for them to have a tripartite meeting. Although the three parties have agreed in principle to meet as a group, no date has yet been set. The parties have agreed to set a 4-6-month target to reach agreement on these financial, pricing, legal and technical project specifics in tripartite meetings. End Note.) Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Aside from updating us on the moving parts of Delhi's regional relations, nothing in Sinha's remarks journeyed beyond MEA's standard bottom-line assessments on India's difficulty in working with Islamabad, its concerns of working in Afghanistan, and the importance it grants to working with Tehran. His statements convey his cautious optimism that on all three fronts, progress will continue at a two-steps-forward/one-step-back pace. Also telling was his obvious anxiety about recent press suggestions that planned US redeployments in Afghanistan are a precursor to a broader withdrawal of US forces. ¶12. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: (http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) BLAKE

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -