EXPLAINING INDIA'S ANGER OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN NEPAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000858

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MASS EAID PREF ASEC IN NP CH
SUBJECT: EXPLAINING INDIA'S ANGER OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN NEPAL


Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D).


1. (C) Summary: New Delhi's surprisingly angry reaction to
developments in Nepal underlines the serious mid to long-term
implications the GOI believes King Gyanendra's actions will
have on Nepal, India, and the GOI's larger foreign policy
objectives. From New Delhi's perspective, the King has
strengthened the Maoists and critically injured legitimate
political forces in Nepal, including multiparty democracy and
the monarchy itself. The resulting instability could spill
across the border, a scenario that is particularly worrying
given indications of growing cooperation between Nepalese
Maoists and anti-India insurgents. The King's dismissal of
Indian concerns and his refusal even to communicate with New
Delhi also comes as an embarrassment, especially in light of
India's aspirations to a growing extra-regional role.
Finally, the situation in Nepal raises uncomfortable
questions about India's foreign policy strategies, especially
better relations with the PRC, which has taken a far
different approach to the crisis. For the GOI, one of the
few bright spots in this episode has been the close,
collaborative approach that Washington has taken. Given
acute Indian frustration over the King's action and threats
to "take some unpopular decisions," it is plausible that
India could suspend military assistance or other support. We
should communicate to the GOI our strategy for dealing with
the Palace, and the limits on what we are prepared to do.
Mission would appreciate overnight guidance for a meeting the
Ambassador has with NSA Narayanan on February 4. See action
request paragraph 6. End Summary.

Undermining Democracy and the Monarchy
--------------


2. (C) India believes that King Gyanendra's actions have
threatened Nepal's long-term political stability by
undermining both the monarchy and multiparty democracy, while
inadvertently strengthening the Maoists. According to South
Asian Studies Professor and influential GOI advisor SD Muni,
the Palace has eroded the democratic advances made in Nepal
since 1960, effectively destroying gains in openness and
human rights and setting Nepal's political development back
by many years. From India's perspective, the King has also
substantially damaged the monarchy, a concern that has grown
since Maoist leaders offered to unite with the parties to
defeat the Palace.


3. (C) The waning of democracy and potential increase in
Maoist influence could have immediate domestic repercussions
for India, particularly in the border areas of West Bengal,
Bihar, and Sikkim. Foreign Secretary Saran noted in a
February 2 press conference that the Maoist insurgency has
already resulted in a "very large exodus of ordinary Nepalis"
to India, and the local press is reporting that senior
Maoists have crossed the border since the King's February 1
seizure of power. This is particularly troubling given GOI
concerns about the growing nexus between the Maoists and
anti-India militants, and is likely to loom especially large
for NSA Narayanan, who in the past has expressed to us deep
concern about the Maoist phenomenon. The reported exodus
into India of Nepalis -- including some Maoists -- is a
particular concern because the border state of Bihar is among
the worst affected by "Naxalite" violence.

A Snub to India
--------------


4. (C) Gyanendra's actions were interpreted by many here as
a "snub to India" given the GOI's repeated insistence that
the King work with the political parties to defeat the Maoist
insurgency. During his February 2 press conference, FS Saran
reiterated his annoyance with Gyanedra, complaining that
India had advised the King on numerous occasions "against
taking the kind of step that he has taken." As an additional
insult, the Palace has rebuffed repeated Indian attempts to
communicate through diplomatic and military channels, a move
viewed by New Delhi as an overt act of defiance. Commenting
on Gyanendra's refusal to speak with Indian officials, Saran
noted that "there is no way in which we are able to engage
the Government of Nepal in even making a proper assessment of
what is happening." Given that Nepal falls squarely within
New Delhi's sphere of influence, the King's refusal to bend
to Indian insistence, or even to communicate with New Delhi,
is an embarrassment.

Foreign Policy Concerns
--------------


5. (C) The on-going crisis in Nepal also raises prickly
questions for India's foreign policy agenda, particularly
with respect to China. Beijing's tacit acceptance of the
King's actions, and local suspicions that the Palace has
tried to ingratiate itself with the PRC by closing the
offices of the Dalai Lama, have the potential to create a
source of friction in the India-China relationship,
especially given the widespread perception that Beijing hopes
to "contain" and encircle India.

Comment and Action Request
--------------


6. (C) Continued cooperation with the GOI on Nepal provides
a tangible opportunity to put the US-India strategic
partnership to work in furtherance of our shared objectives.
Given Indian anger over Gyanendra's actions, we are inclined
to take seriously Foreign Secretary Saran's warning to the
Ambassador that New Delhi may have to "take some unpopular
decisions." We find it entirely plausible that if the Palace
persists in the current course, New Delhi could decide to
express its unhappiness by suspending military assistance or
other forms of support. Given that, it will be important to
communicate to the GOI our strategy for dealing with the
Palace, and the limits on what we are prepared to do in
sanctioning the GON. If we fail to do this upfront and India
takes steps we are unable to support, we could find our
currently favorable relations severely strained. Mission
requests specific points on this issue that we could convey
to Foreign Secretary Saran and NSA Narayanan, for a meeting
the Ambassador has with Narayanan on February 4.
MULFORD