Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NEWDELHI8237
2005-10-24 11:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

U/S BURNS AND F/S SARAN CLARIFY POSITIONS ON

Tags:  PREL PGOV KNNP ENRG IN 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 008237 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
DOE FOR SHANE JOHNSON, MAUREEN CLAPPER, MOLLY WILLIAMSON,
ROBERT PRICE, TOM CUTLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP ENRG IN
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS AND F/S SARAN CLARIFY POSITIONS ON
INDIA-US CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

REF: SECSTATE 190856

Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford for reasons 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 008237

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
DOE FOR SHANE JOHNSON, MAUREEN CLAPPER, MOLLY WILLIAMSON,
ROBERT PRICE, TOM CUTLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP ENRG IN
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS AND F/S SARAN CLARIFY POSITIONS ON
INDIA-US CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

REF: SECSTATE 190856

Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford for reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: U/S Nicholas Burns' meeting with GOI Foreign
Secretary Saran on U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation

SIPDIS
clarified differing perceptions on how to sequence each
side's fulfillment of obligations in order to build
sufficient confidence in the other side's executive and
legislative branches to encourage reciprocal steps. The GOI
feels that its progress so far warrants prompt U.S.
Congressional passage of India-specific legislation, after
which the GOI would proceed with a phased separation of
military and civilian facilities; and that guarantees of
nuclear cooperation at a given civilian facility should
precede its submission to IAEA safeguards. Citing USG
actions to date, U/S Burns stressed that, realistically, the
GOI should first present and start implementing a credible
and transparent separation plan in order to secure support
for the passage of the necessary legislation by the U.S.
Congress and the approval of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG); and that a facility's submission to IAEA safeguards
would be a practical prerequisite for any cooperative
programs. Both sides committed to work to bridge the gaps in
implementing the interlocking obligations. END SUMMARY


2. (C) GOI VIEW: At the U.S.-India Senior Civil Nuclear
Political Working Group's first meeting in New Delhi October
21, India Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Secretary Shyam
Saran told U/S Nicholas Burns that the GOI expects the
commitments and obligations of the Bush-Singh Joint Statement
(July 18, 2005) to constitute the sole basis of bilateral
cooperation (i.e. without further conditions by the U.S.
Congress or the NSG). "We have to stake out the parameters of
this agreement. We do not want the GOI to have to be
constantly responding to additional conditions imposed by
Congress, the non-proliferation lobby in the US, or others,"
Saran stated. Saran believes GOI steps on non-proliferation
taken so far have demonstrated sufficient GOI good faith to
warrant USG submission of India-specific, civil-nuclear
enabling legislation to the US Congress. These GOI steps
include: passage of new legislation on Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) in line with international standards;
harmonizing of India's export lists to Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
guidelines; and the GOI unilateral declaration against

exporting fuel-enrichment or reprocessing technology.


3. (C) The GOI is committed to separation of civil and
military nuclear facilities, but Saran stressed that the
process would be solely "India's own decision," would be
comprehensive and not token, and would be phased,
complicated, and expensive since historically they have been
organically intertwined. In order for the GOI to allow a
civil facility to be placed under IAEA safeguards, it would
first have to be assured of international cooperation at that
facility -- otherwise it risks irrevocably giving up autonomy
without a compensating benefit. The GOI recognizes it needs
U.S. cooperation to expand its nuclear power output in order
to help supply the energy needed to sustain high GDP growth,
said Saran. To help convince cautious parliamentarians and
GOI officials, Saran said the GOI hopes the U.S. Congress
would first pass India-specific "enabling legislation" that
would allow commercial relations in fuel and technology and
as India reached its milestones of separating military and
civilian facilities.


4. (C) USG VIEW: U/S Burns detailed vigorous USG advocacy
efforts to date, in favor of full civil nuclear energy
cooperation and trade with India, to members of the U.S.
Congress and to NSG members states, including by two
assistant secretaries at the recent NSG meeting. Instead of
opting for more expedited passage by attaching civil-nuclear
legislation as a rider to a larger bill this fall, the USG
was pursing a strategy of full Congressional hearings and
debate, aimed at getting an India-specific law passed
empowering the President to reach a full bilateral civil
nuclear agreement during his proposed visit to India in early

2006. The USG is also advocating for India's full
participation in the International Thermonuclear Experimental
Reactor (ITER) and in the Generation-IV International Forum.


5. (C) However, U/S Burns cautioned that -- realistically for
Congress to pass legislation and for NSG members to agree on
a special regime for India -- the GOI must first present a
credible and transparent plan for separating civilian and
military nuclear facilities, and start implementing it to
show that the GOI would carry the process through to the end.
Moreover, if the GOI were to delay the separation process,
seeking instead conditioned "kick-in" laws from Congress, it
would risk having Congress impose the type of additional
stringent conditions that Saran said the GOI would want to
avoid. Similarly, the NSG member countries would want to see
prior progress on separation. So far NSG members Russia and
the USA have strongly supported India's inclusion; the UK,
France, and Germany have been favorable; Japan and Canada are
still seeking some clarifications; and Italy has not yet
expressed its opinion.


6. (C) Moreover, both the USG and NSG members would expect
India to agree to IAEA supervision at each civilian facility
before agreeing to cooperation on fuel or technology for that
facility. Dr. Grover (Director, Strategic Planning Group,
Department of Atomic Energy) underscored that India has its
own full fuel-cycle capability, and was more in need of
natural uranium fuel than enrichment or processing
technology. In response to some Indians' concerns that a
facility put under IAEA safeguards may find itself without
any compensating international cooperation, fuel, or
technology, NSC Senior Director John Rood stressed that
India's access to the vigorous competitive world market, made
possible by fulfilling its obligations, would assure that the
facilities would get the cooperation they sought.


7. (C) Saran and U/S Burns confirmed that it was in the
interest of both countries to reach an agreement. Both
acknowledged that each side was seeking confidence-building
steps by the other side to help overcome respective
parliament's caution and skepticism about agreeing to
measures that potentially risked not receiving reciprocal
action by the other country. Ambassador Mulford noted that
the Joint Statement had not been explicit concerning the
tactics by which the sides would coordinate fulfillment of
their respective obligations. Saran said he would present a
progress report to the GOI's Apex Committee (apparently
including the Prime Minister and the Defense Establishment)
and further discuss the issues raised. Both sides agreed to
consider the other's concerns and seek ways to coordinate the
interlocking process for implementing commitments and
addressing legislative branch concerns.


8. (SBU) USG Participants:
-- U/S Nicholas Burns
-- Ambassador David C. Mulford
-- John Rood, Senior Director, NSC
-- Don Camp, DAS, South Asia Bureau
-- Robert O. Blake, DCM
-- Marco DiCapua, Science Counselor, US Embassy
-- Geoffrey Pyatt, Political Counselor, US Embassy
-- Tobin Bradley, P Special Assistant
-- Jason Ellis, T Special Assistant
-- John Sanborn, ISN Technical Expert
-- Adam Scheinman, DOE
-- Stacey Gilbert, USEmbassy, POL
-- Notetaker: Eric Anthony Jones, USEmbassy, ECON

Government of India Participants:
-- Shyam Saran, Secretary, GOI Ministry of External Affairs
(MEA)
-- V J Nambiar, Deputy National Securty Advisor
-- Dr. R. Grover, Director, Strategic Planning Group,
Dept of Atomic Energy
-- Dr. Raguraman, Head of International Studies Divisions,
Dept of Atomic Energy
-- Dr. S. Jaishankar, Joint Secretary (Americans),MEA
-- Hamid Ali Rao, Joint Secretary (DISA),MEA
-- Santosh Jha, Deputy Secretary, MEA


9. (C) This cable was cleared by U/S Burns' delegation.
MULFORD

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