Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NEWDELHI8237
2005-10-24 11:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

U/S BURNS AND F/S SARAN CLARIFY POSITIONS ON

Tags:  PREL PGOV KNNP ENRG IN 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 008237 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
DOE FOR SHANE JOHNSON, MAUREEN CLAPPER, MOLLY WILLIAMSON,
ROBERT PRICE, TOM CUTLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP ENRG IN
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS AND F/S SARAN CLARIFY POSITIONS ON
INDIA-US CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

REF: SECSTATE 190856

Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford for reasons 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 008237 SIPDIS STATE FOR SA/INS DOE FOR SHANE JOHNSON, MAUREEN CLAPPER, MOLLY WILLIAMSON, ROBERT PRICE, TOM CUTLER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP ENRG IN SUBJECT: U/S BURNS AND F/S SARAN CLARIFY POSITIONS ON INDIA-US CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION REF: SECSTATE 190856 Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford for reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: U/S Nicholas Burns' meeting with GOI Foreign Secretary Saran on U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation SIPDIS clarified differing perceptions on how to sequence each side's fulfillment of obligations in order to build sufficient confidence in the other side's executive and legislative branches to encourage reciprocal steps. The GOI feels that its progress so far warrants prompt U.S. Congressional passage of India-specific legislation, after which the GOI would proceed with a phased separation of military and civilian facilities; and that guarantees of nuclear cooperation at a given civilian facility should precede its submission to IAEA safeguards. Citing USG actions to date, U/S Burns stressed that, realistically, the GOI should first present and start implementing a credible and transparent separation plan in order to secure support for the passage of the necessary legislation by the U.S. Congress and the approval of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); and that a facility's submission to IAEA safeguards would be a practical prerequisite for any cooperative programs. Both sides committed to work to bridge the gaps in implementing the interlocking obligations. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) GOI VIEW: At the U.S.-India Senior Civil Nuclear Political Working Group's first meeting in New Delhi October 21, India Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Secretary Shyam Saran told U/S Nicholas Burns that the GOI expects the commitments and obligations of the Bush-Singh Joint Statement (July 18, 2005) to constitute the sole basis of bilateral cooperation (i.e. without further conditions by the U.S. Congress or the NSG). "We have to stake out the parameters of this agreement. We do not want the GOI to have to be constantly responding to additional conditions imposed by Congress, the non-proliferation lobby in the US, or others," Saran stated. Saran believes GOI steps on non-proliferation taken so far have demonstrated sufficient GOI good faith to warrant USG submission of India-specific, civil-nuclear enabling legislation to the US Congress. These GOI steps include: passage of new legislation on Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) in line with international standards; harmonizing of India's export lists to Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines; and the GOI unilateral declaration against exporting fuel-enrichment or reprocessing technology. ¶3. (C) The GOI is committed to separation of civil and military nuclear facilities, but Saran stressed that the process would be solely "India's own decision," would be comprehensive and not token, and would be phased, complicated, and expensive since historically they have been organically intertwined. In order for the GOI to allow a civil facility to be placed under IAEA safeguards, it would first have to be assured of international cooperation at that facility -- otherwise it risks irrevocably giving up autonomy without a compensating benefit. The GOI recognizes it needs U.S. cooperation to expand its nuclear power output in order to help supply the energy needed to sustain high GDP growth, said Saran. To help convince cautious parliamentarians and GOI officials, Saran said the GOI hopes the U.S. Congress would first pass India-specific "enabling legislation" that would allow commercial relations in fuel and technology and as India reached its milestones of separating military and civilian facilities. ¶4. (C) USG VIEW: U/S Burns detailed vigorous USG advocacy efforts to date, in favor of full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India, to members of the U.S. Congress and to NSG members states, including by two assistant secretaries at the recent NSG meeting. Instead of opting for more expedited passage by attaching civil-nuclear legislation as a rider to a larger bill this fall, the USG was pursing a strategy of full Congressional hearings and debate, aimed at getting an India-specific law passed empowering the President to reach a full bilateral civil nuclear agreement during his proposed visit to India in early ¶2006. The USG is also advocating for India's full participation in the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) and in the Generation-IV International Forum. ¶5. (C) However, U/S Burns cautioned that -- realistically for Congress to pass legislation and for NSG members to agree on a special regime for India -- the GOI must first present a credible and transparent plan for separating civilian and military nuclear facilities, and start implementing it to show that the GOI would carry the process through to the end. Moreover, if the GOI were to delay the separation process, seeking instead conditioned "kick-in" laws from Congress, it would risk having Congress impose the type of additional stringent conditions that Saran said the GOI would want to avoid. Similarly, the NSG member countries would want to see prior progress on separation. So far NSG members Russia and the USA have strongly supported India's inclusion; the UK, France, and Germany have been favorable; Japan and Canada are still seeking some clarifications; and Italy has not yet expressed its opinion. ¶6. (C) Moreover, both the USG and NSG members would expect India to agree to IAEA supervision at each civilian facility before agreeing to cooperation on fuel or technology for that facility. Dr. Grover (Director, Strategic Planning Group, Department of Atomic Energy) underscored that India has its own full fuel-cycle capability, and was more in need of natural uranium fuel than enrichment or processing technology. In response to some Indians' concerns that a facility put under IAEA safeguards may find itself without any compensating international cooperation, fuel, or technology, NSC Senior Director John Rood stressed that India's access to the vigorous competitive world market, made possible by fulfilling its obligations, would assure that the facilities would get the cooperation they sought. ¶7. (C) Saran and U/S Burns confirmed that it was in the interest of both countries to reach an agreement. Both acknowledged that each side was seeking confidence-building steps by the other side to help overcome respective parliament's caution and skepticism about agreeing to measures that potentially risked not receiving reciprocal action by the other country. Ambassador Mulford noted that the Joint Statement had not been explicit concerning the tactics by which the sides would coordinate fulfillment of their respective obligations. Saran said he would present a progress report to the GOI's Apex Committee (apparently including the Prime Minister and the Defense Establishment) and further discuss the issues raised. Both sides agreed to consider the other's concerns and seek ways to coordinate the interlocking process for implementing commitments and addressing legislative branch concerns. ¶8. (SBU) USG Participants: -- U/S Nicholas Burns -- Ambassador David C. Mulford -- John Rood, Senior Director, NSC -- Don Camp, DAS, South Asia Bureau -- Robert O. Blake, DCM -- Marco DiCapua, Science Counselor, US Embassy -- Geoffrey Pyatt, Political Counselor, US Embassy -- Tobin Bradley, P Special Assistant -- Jason Ellis, T Special Assistant -- John Sanborn, ISN Technical Expert -- Adam Scheinman, DOE -- Stacey Gilbert, USEmbassy, POL -- Notetaker: Eric Anthony Jones, USEmbassy, ECON Government of India Participants: -- Shyam Saran, Secretary, GOI Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) -- V J Nambiar, Deputy National Securty Advisor -- Dr. R. Grover, Director, Strategic Planning Group, Dept of Atomic Energy -- Dr. Raguraman, Head of International Studies Divisions, Dept of Atomic Energy -- Dr. S. Jaishankar, Joint Secretary (Americans),MEA -- Hamid Ali Rao, Joint Secretary (DISA),MEA -- Santosh Jha, Deputy Secretary, MEA ¶9. (C) This cable was cleared by U/S Burns' delegation. MULFORD

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