FIRST INDIA-CHINA STRATEGIC DIALOGUE MODEST BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000719 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM IN CH SUBJECT: FIRST INDIA-CHINA STRATEGIC DIALOGUE MODEST BUT SIGNIFICANT REF: A. NEW DELHI 4145 ¶B. NEW DELHI 6787 Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary: The January 24 strategic dialogue between China and India "did not accomplish much," but did provide insight into China's view of the world, Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran told the DCM on January 27. From New SIPDIS Delhi's perspective, the dialogue illustrated China's willingness to engage with India as a global power, including on issues that traditionally fall into Beijing's orbit, such as North Korea, and underlined China's view (as conveyed to New Delhi) that India is not a rival in Asia. It also contributed to the overall positive atmosphere of the bilateral relationship, which FM Natwar Singh's January 27 speech at a conference on Asian Security reinforced. Despite this goodwill, India remains concerned by the PLA military buildup on the Tibetan Plateau and growing Chinese influence in Burma. End Summary. ¶2. (U) During the first-ever strategic talks between India and China, held in New Delhi on January 24, the two sides discussed globalization, democratization of international relations, UNSC reform, energy security, non-proliferation, terrorism and "the situation in the Korean Peninsula," according to an MEA press release. The dialogue, led by Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei, also included discussions on the March visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to New Delhi, an event the MEA predicted would be a "major milestone in bilateral relations." An Emphasis on Multilateralism -------------- ¶3. (C) Offering a readout of the strategic dialogue, Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran told the DCM that although the SIPDIS discussions "did not accomplish much," they provided insight into China's view of the world. The dialogue also illustrated Beijing's perspective on India-China relations in the context of the "emerging Asian architecture." According to Saran, Wu emphasized multipolarity and multilateralism as the only legitimate means of addressing regional and global challenges and said that China does "not, underline not" see India as a rival in Asia. They agreed that Asia was large enough to allow both countries to play significant, multilateral roles. Enough Space for Both -------------- ¶4. (C) FM Natwar Singh continued to promote the feeling of goodwill generated by the strategic dialogue in a January 27 speech at a New Delhi conference on Asian Security. With comments reminiscent of the June 2004 Panchsheel celebration (Ref A),Natwar emphasized the two countries' shared interests, noting that "while there are differences between us, there is also an increasingly greater realization that there is enough space and opportunity in the region for both India and China to prosper." However, Natwar also sought to demonstrate India's vested interests in China's neighborhood, emphasizing that "developments in East Asia are of direct consequence to India's security and development." Focus on Terrorism -------------- ¶5. (C) Although Beijing had not been willing to discuss counterterrorism in the past, during the strategic dialogue Wu displayed a much higher level of concern about the issue, Saran said, remarking that Wu was even willing to exchange information. Saran speculated that the PRC's changed demeanor resulted from the feeling that global terrorism posed an increasing threat to China, and said he was impressed by Beijing's heightened focus on the subject. No Direct Endorsement on UNSC Seat -------------- ¶6. (C) Although Beijing continued to avoid directly supporting India's bid for a permanent Security Council seat (Ref B),Saran cited "strong indications" and "allusions" that the PRC would ultimately support a seat for India. Both countries agreed that India should play a more important role in international affairs, he stated. Saran Committed to Boundary Talks -------------- ¶7. (C) Saran said that the two sides had not specifically addressed the boundary question during the strategic dialogue. He emphasized, however, the GOI's belief that the boundary dispute should be resolved in the context of larger Indo-Chinese strategic and political concerns, and remarked that India was prepared to work with China to find solutions. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) The accomplishments of this first-ever strategic dialogue between the two countries were modest but significant. Conversing with China about problems in the PRC's immediate neighborhood, such as North Korea, reflected India's ever broadening strategic horizon and its desire to project influence in areas in which it has not been active in the past. It also allowed India to showcase itself as an equal to China, able to engage on issues of global importance, including those in East Asia. The talks also demonstrated New Delhi's growing comfort level with Beijing. Despite the outward expressions of goodwill, serious reservations remain, including an on-going lack of trust fueled by the PLA's military buildup on the Tibetan Plateau and concern about Chinese influence in Burma. Such issues will ultimately need to be addressed in order for genuine long-term cooperation between New Delhi and Beijing to occur. MULFORD