MEA UNSURPRISED BUT ANXIOUS IN REACTION TO BANGLA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 006414 SIPDIS STATE FOR S/CT E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015 TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV MOPS PBTS ECON IN BD PK SA SUBJECT: MEA UNSURPRISED BUT ANXIOUS IN REACTION TO BANGLA BOMBINGS REF: A. DHAKA 4090 ¶B. NEW DELHI 6340 ¶C. CHENNAI 1976 Classified By: A/DCM Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary: The MEA told us that the few indicators so far available point to the Jamaat ul-Mujahidin Bangladesh as author of the August 17 bombing wave. The MEA further theorized that the terrorists' goal was to demonstrate organization and sophistication. Delhi views Bangladesh's terrorism problem as symptomatic of its tolerance of extremists and is concerned about increasing evidence of international linkages. The MEA's archly-worded public statement on the attacks -- in a week that also saw the assassination of Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister -- demonstrates GOI concern about the way Bangladesh is going. End Summary. MEA: Bangla Suffering Blowback from Riding Tiger -------------- --- ¶2. (C) In an August 18 meeting with Poloff, MEA Deputy Secretary (Bangladesh) Puneet Kundal stressed it was too soon SIPDIS to tell who was behind the August 17 wave of bombings across Bangladesh (Ref A),but opined that Jamaat ul-Mujahidin Bangladesh seemed to be the leading culprit, largely by dint of their leaflets left behind at bomb sites. Separately, Ashutosh Misra of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis -- MoD's think-tank -- echoed Kundal's theory, remarking that, "as with Pakistan, and with India as regards Sri Lanka, Dhaka is learning that when you ride the tiger, eventually it turns around and bites you." An Attention-Grabber -- And It Worked -------------- ¶3. (C) When asked why the bombs were dispersed so broadly, MEA's Kundal theorized that the attack was intended to demonstrate how well organized and equipped the terrorists were. "They could just as easily have made ten bombs, added shrapnel, and caused many more injuries and deaths if they had wanted to," he commented. "Their intent was to maximize damage and their image, not casualties, it could have been much worse" Kundal concluded. ¶4. (C) Kundal argued that the most notable elements of this attack were its geographic breadth ("every district except one was bombed"),the tight timing (all blasts "within a 30-minute window"),and the very limited number of fatalities (only two as of late August 18, according to Indian press reports). "We were surprised at the size and coordination, we did not think any Bangladeshi group was this sophisticated," he added. "They have certainly got our attention as well." The New Afghanistan (or Pakistan) -------------- ¶5. (C) D/Polcouns attended an August 17 MEA-hosted lunch when word of the blasts spread. The initial reaction around the table was that Dhaka's tolerance of "India-haters" was coming back to haunt them, and that Bangladesh was headed in the direction of Taliban-era Afghanistan. The next day, D/Polcouns heard from MEA Americas Deputy Secretary Santosh Jha that India worried about Pakistani efforts to use Bangladesh as a launching platform for insurgency and instability in eastern India. Bangladesh's "inexplicable" attitude of resentment and hostility to India had resulted in active cooperation between the ISI and Bangladeshi jihadis, but the bombings made it clear that Dhaka was losing control, just as happened in Pakistan and Afghanistan. ¶6. (C) Kundal elaborated the MEA's view that terrorism problems in Bangladesh are symptomatic of the country's poor governance. He recalled prior USG characterization of Bangladesh as "a flailing state, not a failing state," and offered his own assessment that "Bangladesh is on the same trajectory as Pakistan ... first the government radicalizes elements of the population, this leads to repression of minorities -- Hindus and Ahmediyyas -- falling education standards, civil unrest, a deterioration of democracy, and eventually religious extremists and the military vie for power in the vacuum of failing democracy." GOI Says Evidence in Plain Sight -------------- ¶7. (C) After offering that this attack would be an opportunity to invigorate deeper information sharing under the umbrella of the CT Joint Working Group, Kundal demurred. "You can get all the information from the Awami League's website, there are numerous articles about these groups, including their cross-border activities and (Pakistani) ISI support," he answered. To Poloff's comment that the USG takes great interest in regional terrorist groups, especially those with international connections, Kundal immediately pointed to suspected Saudi funding behind Bangladeshi madrassahs. He underlined his suspicion by noting that the leaflets found at many of the bomb sites "were in Bangla and Arabic, not Urdu, and Arabic is not even a South Asian language." In closing, Kundal dismissed the notion that Dhaka would take any tangible steps, lamenting that, "I have had this job for two years, and I have not seen any major arrests, only very low-level people, never any planners or organizers." Archly-Worded MEA Statement -------------- ¶8. (C) Poloff also shared with Kundal the Department's press statement regarding the Bangladesh bombings. The MEA's (August 17) public statement, by comparison, was sterile, merely noting that "the scale and coordination of these explosions raises a number of questions," offering condolences to the victims, and reporting on the safety of Indian nationals in country. This marked a departure from the strong language used to denounce the assassination of Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister (Ref B),and reflects the MEA's deepening sense of impatience with Bangladesh, and the belief (in contrast to Sri Lanka) that Dhaka's problems are self-inflicted. Comment: We Warned You -------------- ¶9. (C) For a change, Indian railing against Pakistan-based terrorism is taking a back seat to other brands of regional political violence. The major attacks in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, along with the Naxal terrorism in Andhra Pradesh (Ref C),have largely overshadowed the Prime Minister's Independence Day warning to Islamabad and Indian Parliamentary questions on Pakistan-based terrorist infiltration and infrastructure (Septel). The MEA views of the August 17 bombings has a strong element of "I told you so," but at least so far this has not derailed the GOI's intention to use the PM's upcoming visit to Dhaka for the SAARC Summit to begin putting bilateral relations back on a more stable trajectory. The US and India have a common interest in helping Bangladesh to extinguish this radical Islamist spark, and we should work together closely in managing the aftermath of August 17. MULFORD