PM SINGH'S US TRIP MEETS NEW DELHI'S HIGH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 005616 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL KNNP ETRD ENRG IN NSSP SUBJECT: PM SINGH'S US TRIP MEETS NEW DELHI'S HIGH EXPECTATIONS REF: A. NEW DELHI 5445 ¶B. NEW DELHI 5018 Classified By: Charge Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Initial reactions to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's highly anticipated July 18-19 meetings in Washington have been overwhelmingly positive. Most commentators believe that the US decision to normalize our civil nuclear relationship puts substance behind the US promise to assist India's rise as a global power. Focusing on nuclear issues as the "litmus test" for the visit, to the exclusion of other parts of the joint statement, most Indian media and pundits seem convinced that President Bush is serious about addressing India's strategic needs. Although the visit may not appear on the radar screen of the average Indian, the PM's visit has raised the profile of the transformation of US/India ties, making it part of India's domestic political debate for the first time in many years. When the next Parliamentary session begins on July 25, skeptics from across the political spectrum will likely question whether the Bush Administration will deliver on its nuclear promises, and criticize US reluctance to endorse India's UNSC candidacy. Nevertheless, most political contacts have been upbeat, and Congress believes that opposition will be manageable. End Summary. Visit Passes The "Litmus Test" -------------- ¶2. (C) Prior to the visit, Delhi-based strategists argued that the US must prove its stated intention to assist India's rise as a global player by either supporting India's UNSC campaign or making progress on the civil nuclear relationship. Many had concluded that the US would likely embrace the nuclear concessions rather than support India's UNSC bid, but none anticipated the broad scope of what was agreed in the joint statement. Foreign Secretary Saran downplayed disappointment regarding US opposition to the G-4 proposal before the visit (Ref A),and celebrated the nuclear news afterwards. Most Delhi-based analysts embraced Saran's emphasis from Washington that "the outcome of the meeting...exceeded even our own expectations." While US silence on UNSC may be a point of domestic vulnerability for PM Singh, former Foreign Secretary Salman Haidar echoed many on commenting to Poloff that energy was New Delhi's number one priority, and Washington's concessions had demonstrated its seriousness about India's needs. (The debate about Washington's ability to deliver on its promises, the affordability of nuclear technology and the effects of India's responsibilities on its domestic nuclear program will be dealt with Septel). With immediate reaction largely restricted to the nuclear issue, other areas of the joint statement have been overlooked, and should become more apparent in the next few days. (Business community reaction to the CEO Forum will be covered in Mumbai Septel). The Political Fallout -------------- ¶3. (C). In contrast to former PM Vajpayee's official visit to Washington in 2000, Manmohan Singh was much more careful about domestic political reaction to his trip. Even so, some have criticized the government's failure to "take the nation into confidence" before agreeing to the joint statement language on nuclear cooperation. One well-connected senior editor remarked to us that many in the Congress leadership were unpleasantly surprised by the Washington announcement, but a former Ambassador to the US countered that the Congress hierarchy was similarly in the dark concerning the early years of India's nuclear weapons program. Former FS Haidar placed this in context, explaining that during the 1990's, US/India relations were strained and the general public not interested in the bilateral relationship, resulting in little discussion of India's policy toward the US. He believes that the dramatic improvement in ties has increased public interest and opened up the subject for domestic political discourse. Haidar maintains that this has narrowed Congress options to take dramatic action, compelling it to adapt a more cautious approach. Ironically, some of the strongest criticism of the visit has come from within the UPA Coalition (Ref B),putting increased pressure on the Prime Minister to win substantive concessions. Congress Reacts Enthusiastically -------------- ¶4. (C) Our Congress party interlocutors were satisfied with the overall results of the visit and particularly excited about the nuclear "breakthrough." Congress Spokesman Anand Sharma maintained that the visit had brought the mainstream of the Congress leadership firmly on board with the US-India transformation while establishing a valuable public rapport between the PM and President Bush. Remarking that the "Congress-led government had achieved a significant understanding," Congress spokesman Abhishesk Singhvi was in high spirits, giving credit to the PM for convincing the US to treat India as a "nuclear equal." Kirip Chaliha, a Congress MP from Assam, emphasized that the visit shows the "natural coming together" of the two democracies in ways that are tangibly helping India. Indians are united in welcoming what was perceived here as a discriminatory policy that treated India's nuclear sector as less legitimate than that of the P-5 (an idea that resonates deeply in India's hierarchical culture.) Communists Still Formulating Response -------------- ¶5. (U) The Communist parties expressed vocal opposition to strengthened Indo-US defense ties after DefMin Mukherjee's visit, but have been more equivocal this time. There are a few initial positive signals from the Left, with some stating that the Left Front (LF) will take a wait-and-see approach. With Communist Party of India (Marxist) General Secretary Prakash Karat still on a ten-day tour of China, the "Asian Age" reported that his party would "wait to react to developments" in order to "carefully study the implications and formulate an appropriate response." Surprisingly, Communist Party of India General Secretary AB Bardhan hailed the US initiative as a "welcome step" for greater collaboration on nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, although he said a full LF response would come only after its joint meeting scheduled for July 22. Another anonymous CPI leader told the press that the UPA government has diverted from the Common Minimum Program's promotion of a multi-polar world by enthusiastically building military and nuclear relationships which support US hegemony. Our Left Front contacts indicated they were waiting for the Prime Minister's briefing before preparing an official response. ¶6. (C) Congress contacts were hopeful that the US-India deliverables would make it harder for the Left to argue that India had given up too much without receiving enough in exchange. Congress spokesperson Singhvi said that the agreement should quiet the "doubting Thomases on US-Indo cooperation", but that the Left would nevertheless "oppose anything that is American" for "their own audiences and not for the country at large." Assam MP Chaliha also guessed that the Communists would stubbornly beat the non-alignment drum and argue that India has sold out in order to mobilize their cadre in the run up to elections in West Bengal and Kerala in early 2006. Nuclear Black Box Vulnerable to Conspiracy Theories -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Some of the political complications arising from the Washington visit reflect the highly secretive nature of the Indian nuclear weapons program. At a July 20 lunch hosted by the Charge, a group of very senior retired officials, several with long histories in India's nuclear sector, agreed that the proposal for separating India's military and civilian infrastructures and placing the latter under IAEA safeguards served GOI interests. They dismissed the commentaries from several retired nuclear scientists who have condemned the US-India agreement, and cited approvingly an article by former PMO adviser G. Parthasarthy, who notes that separation of civil and military nuclear facilities had been advocated by Dr. Raja Ramanna, one of the architects of India's weapons program. But even these advocates of US-India transformation acknowledged that the nuclear understanding would be controversial, since politicians without understanding of the technical details could be easily attracted by suggestions that India was "giving up its secrets" and "capping its military options." Acting Deputy National Security Advisor V.K. Nambiar commented to the Charge that the PM would face questions in Parliament about the expense of separating military and civilian nuclear facilities and the extent to which the other nuclear powers have adhered to the changes that India is being asked to make. BJP Wants Credit -------------- ¶8. (C) The BJP and RSS have been largely silent, but party interlocutors were cautiously positive in private. BJP Spokesperson Prakash Javadeskar still needed time to look carefully at the joint statement, but noted that his first impression was that the meeting "looked good," although US silence on "endorsing India's claim for a UNSC seat would be a sore point." While still waiting for "expert opinions," Shyam Parande of the RSS International Affairs Council mentioned the results of the visit "looked very well," and that the RSS was "happy with the level of US/India cooperation." Several BJP and RSS contacts were critical of the PM's failure to win Washington support for India's UNSC bid. ¶9. (C) NDA leaders complained that the PM did not give their coalition enough credit for its role in transforming US/India ties. RSS Spokesman Ram Madhav called the PM "unstatesmanlike for ignoring the fundamental contribution of the NDA/BJP in building up India-US relations." Hailing the visit, BJP MP Kalraj Mishra praised Congress for pursuing NDA government efforts after its skeptical stance while in the opposition. BJP President for Uttar Pradesh Kesrinath Tripathi downplayed the PM's achievement, saying that he was "just carrying out the process of transformation of Indo-US relations initiated by the previous government." Ultimately, we expect that this BJP history with the US, and the PM's pre-trip outreach to Vajpayee, Advani and Jaswant Singh, will blunt any effort to score political points. Nonetheless, we do anticipate the BJP to harp on the UNSC issue during the upcoming session of Parliament. ¶10. (C) Brajesh Mishra is so far the most vocal BJP opponent, claiming in a press interview that separation of India's civilian and military nuclear facilities would amount to "accepting a cap on the size of our nuclear deterrent with a small number of nuclear weapons." G Parthasarathy noted in the "Pioneer" that this contradicted Mishra's 2002 stance, when he proposed to designate certain nuclear facilities as entirely for peaceful purposes and open others to inspectors in exchange for access to western nuclear technology. Mishra was less negative in a July 20 meeting with the Charge, (Septel) explaining that his main concern was India's failure to think through the full implications of its side of the nuclear bargain. Common Man Positive But Not Concerned -------------- ¶11. (C) Summarizing the "average Indian" opinion is difficult. While general impressions of the US are improving around the country, this visit was largely off of the common man's radar screen. The pomp of the South Lawn arrival resonated well, but the details of the visit did not break through. Even in the capital, most people remain more concerned about what they view as more pressing issues such as infrastructure, power, health and education. Sandeep Dikshit, a Congress MP from East Delhi and son of Delhi's Chief Minister, commented to the Charge that Indo-US relations do not affect his four million constituents. Agreeing that nuclear cooperation is of little or no concern to the average citizen, All India Congress Committee Secretary Manish Tewari commented that "the political elite SIPDIS and New Delhi think tanks will herald the accord as a major coup for India, but most of the population will ignore it." ¶12. (C) While recognizing that India has benefited economically from increased business ties, Sandeep Dikshit noted that most of the population still associates the US with unflinching support for Pakistan. According to Jawaharlal Nehru University Professor of American Studies K. ¶P. Vijayalaxmi, Indians will welcome President Bush's statement reaffirming the sanctity of the Line of Control and the need for an internal solution to Kashmir as an indication that the US is finally distancing itself from the Pakistani view of that issue. Acting Deputy NSA Nambiar predicted that PM Singh would emphasize the ecnomic benefits of his visit, such as the creation of the CEO Forum and the Agricultural Knowledge Initiative that have not recieved wide publicity. Comment -------------- ¶13. (U) This visit was well-timed, as a broad spectrum of Indian society has come to view US-India relations in a positive light and are ready for closer ties. These positive attitudes are reflected in the latest Pew poll, a surge in the number of people traveling to the US, and deepening US-India economic ties. The ruling UPA carefully gauged political reaction within and outside the ruling UPA coalition to shape the discourse, dampen opposition and ensure progress. The US-India nuclear accord was particularly important in this context, since it took an issue that was a focus of US-India discord for 30 years, and turned it into an area for future cooperation. BJP gripes that they did not get credit for contributing to US-India transformation, and Communist criticism that the UPA is veering away from non-alignment are expected and manageable. Mirroring debate in the US Congress, the greatest acrimony is likely to come from nuclear hawks and scientific nationalists, who will feed the Parliamentary debate over whether the PM is constraining India's nuclear options. In this context, as Congress leader Anand Sharma pointed out, it will be important for the GOI to develop a short, plain language briefing that explains what was agreed and disarms the critics. While initial reactions have focused almost entirely on our nuclear breakthrough, the range of deliverables from agriculture to the CEO Forum should spread the benefits of Indo-US cooperation to a broader range of Indian society and receive closer attention in the days ahead. In this regard, the PM's visit has helped to convince the skeptics that the US is serious about engaging India, has furthered the momentum generated by Secretary Rice's visit in March, and sets us up for a successful Presidental visit in ¶2006. BLAKE