MEA WARNS OF NUCLEAR IMPASSE IN NSSP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000551

SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS NRC FOR MERRIFIELD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2015
TAGS: PREL ETTC KNNP TRGY TPHY IN NSSP
SUBJECT: MEA WARNS OF NUCLEAR IMPASSE IN NSSP

REF: A. USDOC 0087


B. NEW DELHI 0072

C. STATE 1152

D. STATE 6093

Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) The Ambassador used a January 20 meeting with MEA
Joint Secretary (Americas) S. Jaishankar to press for a
timely reply to the US requests conveyed via ref A and to
underline the importance of India coming to us with draft
export control legislation and other outstanding items
related to Phase 2 of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership
(NSSP). Jaishankar acknowledged the importance of our
request and promised a reply on the trade-related items
connected to the High Technology Cooperation Group. However,
he warned, "we have a problem" regarding the NSSP. Echoing
comments we have heard from others in the Indian system,
Jaishankar reported that officials of India's nuclear
establishment have reached the judgment that there is nothing
for them in the NSSP, and as a result have become outspokenly
opposed to Indian movement on our quid-pro-quos. (Indeed, a
well connected GOI consultant told us recently that the
Atomic Energy Commission - AEC -has been circulating memos
within the Indian interagency actively opposing the export
control steps associated with the NSSP).


2. (C) Because the AEC plays such an important role in
India's technology sector, Jaishankar explained, the MEA
cannot move ahead without them. He expressed concern that if
we cannot find some way to bolster the civil nuclear element
of our interaction, we may be faced with a period of limited
progress in the NSSP.


3. (C) Comment: The GOI has been frustrated from the
beginning by the tight constraints that Washington has
imposed on our revived civil nuclear relationship, and in
this context, we do not rule out the possibility that New
Delhi is using the threat of an NSSP impasse to re-open that
issue. However, there was nothing in Jaishankar's
presentation to the Ambassador (or other conversations we
have had with senior Indians) to suggest that New Delhi is
playing that game. We believe the MEA is resolved to move
ahead on the Rice-Mishra export control benchmarks, but has
been thwarted by opposition from elsewhere in the Indian
interagency. For instance, during the recent round of
Israel-India non-proliferation consultations, the Indians
asked all the right questions on issues such as how Jerusalem
controls the activities of non-government scientists and the
mechanics of MTCR adherence. The Israelis left with the
impression that New Delhi is resolved to modernize its export
controls, but is still working through the "how's." Prime
Minister Singh's recent presentations to Codel's Frist and
Leach also emphasized the GOI commitment to maintain a clean
export control record.


4. (C) Against this background, we should think hard about
whether there are steps that we could take (including
cooperation on nuclear fusion -- Ref B) that would help to
win over the skeptics in India's scientific community who
might otherwise stand in the way of our NSSP partnership. In
this regard, we would like to encourage Washington to keep
the door open for possible Indian participation in ITER. We
understand that adding members to the ITER consortium is
problematic. However, perhaps we should not deter India from
in-kind contributions to the ITER effort. The upcoming visit
by NRC Commissioner Merrifield will provide another
opportunity to reach out to India's nuclear establishment, as
will the Nuclear Disaster Management Activity proposed by
NNSA (Ref D). But without something additional to sweeten
the pot, we may find that slow progress on the nuclear leg of
the NSSP becomes an impediment to Indian movement on the
export control steps that we have long sought from New Delhi
-- and which the Indian foreign ministry now appears ready to
deliver.
MULFORD