Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NEWDELHI551
2005-01-20 13:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

MEA WARNS OF NUCLEAR IMPASSE IN NSSP

Tags:  PREL ETTC KNNP TRGY TPHY IN NSSP 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000551 

SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS NRC FOR MERRIFIELD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2015
TAGS: PREL ETTC KNNP TRGY TPHY IN NSSP
SUBJECT: MEA WARNS OF NUCLEAR IMPASSE IN NSSP

REF: A. USDOC 0087


B. NEW DELHI 0072

C. STATE 1152

D. STATE 6093

Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000551 SIPDIS PLEASE PASS NRC FOR MERRIFIELD E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2015 TAGS: PREL ETTC KNNP TRGY TPHY IN NSSP SUBJECT: MEA WARNS OF NUCLEAR IMPASSE IN NSSP REF: A. USDOC 0087 ¶B. NEW DELHI 0072 ¶C. STATE 1152 ¶D. STATE 6093 Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) The Ambassador used a January 20 meeting with MEA Joint Secretary (Americas) S. Jaishankar to press for a timely reply to the US requests conveyed via ref A and to underline the importance of India coming to us with draft export control legislation and other outstanding items related to Phase 2 of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP). Jaishankar acknowledged the importance of our request and promised a reply on the trade-related items connected to the High Technology Cooperation Group. However, he warned, "we have a problem" regarding the NSSP. Echoing comments we have heard from others in the Indian system, Jaishankar reported that officials of India's nuclear establishment have reached the judgment that there is nothing for them in the NSSP, and as a result have become outspokenly opposed to Indian movement on our quid-pro-quos. (Indeed, a well connected GOI consultant told us recently that the Atomic Energy Commission - AEC -has been circulating memos within the Indian interagency actively opposing the export control steps associated with the NSSP). ¶2. (C) Because the AEC plays such an important role in India's technology sector, Jaishankar explained, the MEA cannot move ahead without them. He expressed concern that if we cannot find some way to bolster the civil nuclear element of our interaction, we may be faced with a period of limited progress in the NSSP. ¶3. (C) Comment: The GOI has been frustrated from the beginning by the tight constraints that Washington has imposed on our revived civil nuclear relationship, and in this context, we do not rule out the possibility that New Delhi is using the threat of an NSSP impasse to re-open that issue. However, there was nothing in Jaishankar's presentation to the Ambassador (or other conversations we have had with senior Indians) to suggest that New Delhi is playing that game. We believe the MEA is resolved to move ahead on the Rice-Mishra export control benchmarks, but has been thwarted by opposition from elsewhere in the Indian interagency. For instance, during the recent round of Israel-India non-proliferation consultations, the Indians asked all the right questions on issues such as how Jerusalem controls the activities of non-government scientists and the mechanics of MTCR adherence. The Israelis left with the impression that New Delhi is resolved to modernize its export controls, but is still working through the "how's." Prime Minister Singh's recent presentations to Codel's Frist and Leach also emphasized the GOI commitment to maintain a clean export control record. ¶4. (C) Against this background, we should think hard about whether there are steps that we could take (including cooperation on nuclear fusion -- Ref B) that would help to win over the skeptics in India's scientific community who might otherwise stand in the way of our NSSP partnership. In this regard, we would like to encourage Washington to keep the door open for possible Indian participation in ITER. We understand that adding members to the ITER consortium is problematic. However, perhaps we should not deter India from in-kind contributions to the ITER effort. The upcoming visit by NRC Commissioner Merrifield will provide another opportunity to reach out to India's nuclear establishment, as will the Nuclear Disaster Management Activity proposed by NNSA (Ref D). But without something additional to sweeten the pot, we may find that slow progress on the nuclear leg of the NSSP becomes an impediment to Indian movement on the export control steps that we have long sought from New Delhi -- and which the Indian foreign ministry now appears ready to deliver. MULFORD

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