INDIA HOPING TO LURE NEPAL MAOISTS INTO POLITICS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 005319

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2015
TAGS: PREL MASS PHUM PTER IN NP AF CE
SUBJECT: INDIA HOPING TO LURE NEPAL MAOISTS INTO POLITICS

REF: A. NEW DELHI 5048

B. NEW DELHI 4531

Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: In a July 11 meeting with MEA Joint
Secretary (North) Ranjit Rae, PolCouns emphasized the need to

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coordinate USG and GOI policy to prevent sending mixed
messages to the Nepalese political parties, Maoists, and
King, and expressed concern about the risks inherent in New
Delhi's recent feelers to the insurgents. Rae reassured us
that the GOI is strongly opposed to anything that would
facilitate Maoist gains, and is trying to press the King to
compromise with the parties, but ultimately hopes to bring
the Maoists into a political settlement. He said Foreign
Secretary Saran will provide U/S Burns with further details

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on this effort. The GOI is skeptical that the parties will
participate in municipal elections without real concessions
from the Palace. Rae warned that HMGN might interpret an
agreement to deploy RNA troops to Afghanistan as part of a
quid pro quo for normalization of military supplies from
Washington. End Summary.

Rationale for Engaging with the Maoists
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2. (C) PolCouns summarized the USG position that a political
reconciliation between the Palace and the parties is vital
for preventing a Maoist takeover in Nepal, reviewed the
decision to delay shipment of M-16 rifles for the RNA, and
reiterated our stance that US, UK and Indian actions should
not in any way encourage the political parties to believe
that their interests lie in siding with the Maoists. He
reminded Rae that PDAS Camp had expressed concern that
reports of GOI facilitation of meetings between party and
Maoist leaders could lead the parties to believe that India
would support a united front between them (Ref A).
Washington believes it is important to avoid allowing any
daylight to show between the USG and GOI positions that would
allow misinterpretation by the parties, Palace, or Maoists on
what the way forward should be, he emphasized.


3. (C) Rae assured us that India's "bottom line" is to rid
Nepal of the Maoist insurgency, and that the GOI will do
nothing to legitimate the Maoists until they renounce
violence and become a mainstream, peaceful political party.
That being said, he added, a cold assessment reveals that the
Maoists and the RNA are in a military stalemate, and the way
forward is therefore to bring the Maoists into a political
settlement, which would have "implications" for contacts with
the GOI and other parties. He reported that Foreign
Secretary Saran intends to discuss further GOI actions

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regarding the Maoists with U/S Burns when he meets him in
Washington on the margins of PM Manmohan Singh's visit.


4. (C) The GOI has heard many reports of "major divisions"
within the Maoists, Rae said, describing debates within the
leadership over whether to seek to reconcile with the King or
the parties, and how to view India's role in Nepal. He
speculated that perhaps the Maoists have realized that a
military victory over the RNA in the face of US and Indian
opposition would be unlikely, and emphasized that any actions
New Delhi takes would reinforce the bottom line that the
Maoists must renounce violence and participate in a
democratic process. In a separate meeting with Poloff on
July 11, JNU Professor of South Asian Studies SD Muni, an
advocate of political dialogue with the Maoists, reinforced
our perception of New Delhi's caution, criticizing the GOI
for being unwilling to engage in a substantial dialogue with
the Maoists because it was too closely aligned with the USG
position.

Worrying Signals from the King
--------------


5. (C) Rae worried that without some conciliatory gesture
from the King to the opposition, the parties and Maoists
would coordinate more closely, rhetoric would harden, and
compromise between the Palace and parties would be even less
likely. He commented that Vice Chairman of the Council of
Ministers Tulsi Giri had told Indian Ambassador Shiv
Mukherjee that India ought to choose between one of the "two
pillars" of constitutional monarchy and representative
democracy, as it was impossible to support both. "My sense
is that all the levers of government are being modified to
allow direct control by the Palace," Rae commented, pointing
to amendments to the Civil Service Act allowing royal
appointment instead of merit-based promotions to
Secretary-level positions, and rumors in Kathmandu of an

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upcoming ban on political parties or a new constitution. In
these circumstance, he added, the political parties will not
participate in the planned municipal elections.


6. (C) Ambassador Mukherjee, who walked in on our meeting,
is in New Delhi for consultations to prepare the message he
will take back to the Palace following GOI meetings with
senior Nepalese opposition representatives (Ref B). Rae said
that New Delhi intends to maintain pressure on King Gyanendra
but remain engaged with him. India's delivery of vehicles,
protective vests and other non-lethal supplies on July 2-3
was a signal that the GOI accepts the role of the RNA in
fighting terrorism, but not fighting democracy, and is trying
to strike a balance that will press the King to compromise
without weakening the RNA.

Wary of Maoists' Indian Links
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7. (C) The GOI is closely investigating allegations that the
June 23 Maoist attack on Madhuban village in Bihar included
Nepalese insurgents, but has turned up no evidence supporting
that claim, Rae reported. He added that it would be foolish
of the Nepalese Maoists to mount operations in India while
New Delhi is reviewing its policies. He was similarly
skeptical of reports alleging LTTE training of the Maoists,
although he did indicate that the Tigers have in the past
provided the Maoists and Indian naxalites with IED technology.

RNA to Afghanistan as Part of a Quid Pro Quo?
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8. (C) Mentioning reports from Kathmandu that Nepal was
considering plans to dispatch RNA units to Afghanistan, Rae
told us that he hoped RNA service there would not have any
implications for USG policies toward HMGN. The GOI has heard
that elements of HMGN and the RNA see Nepalese service in
Afghanistan as part of a quid pro quo with the US, Rae said,
adding that he hoped the US would be careful to avoid
allowing service by RNA units implicated in human rights
abuses, particularly as RNA participation in UN peacekeeping
operations has come under scrutiny as well. PolCouns noted
that these are preliminary conversations that have yet to
move into operational channels, and promised to flag Rae's
concern about any quid pro quo.

Comment: India Bringing Them Inside the Tent
--------------


9. (C) India has successfully transformed several domestic
insurgent groups into mainstream political parties over the
years, and this experience gives the GOI hope that its goal
of co-opting all but the most radical Maoists might bear
fruit. The GOI has backed the parties' joint platform as a
step to compromise with the Palace, and now seeks to find a
way to pressure the King to reciprocate with an offer of his
own. In the meantime, as reflected in Rae's candid
presentation, the GOI continues to attach a very high
priority to its Nepal partnership with Washington.
BLAKE