GOI SATISFIED WITH KOIRALA VISIT, BUT NOT HOPEFUL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 004531

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2015
TAGS: PREL MASS IN NP
SUBJECT: GOI SATISFIED WITH KOIRALA VISIT, BUT NOT HOPEFUL
FOR FUTURE

Classified By: Charge Bob Blake for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: As former Nepalese PM GP Koirala prepared to
depart New Delhi after his meetings with GOI officials and
politicians, MEA Under Secretary (Nepal) Manu Mahawar told
Poloff on June 14 that the visit was a success for the GOI,
allowing frank exchange of views on the political impasse in
Nepal. The GOI reiterated to Koirala its opposition to
Nepalese political parties forming a common front with the
Maoist insurgency, and explained that the resumption of
non-lethal military assistance was intended to encourage the
King to make progress in restoring civil liberties and
democracy. The GOI is working on an assessment of the RNA's
ammunition needs, and looks forward to an exchange of views
with the USG on this issue. End Summary.

Koirala's and GOI's Assessments
--------------


2. (C) Mahawar declared that Koirala's ten-day visit to New
Delhi was "very successful," as it incorporated meetings with
the PM, Congress Party President Sonia Gandhi, FM Natwar
Singh, Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee, NSA MK Narayanan,
FS Shyam Saran and BJP leader AB Vajpayee. In these
meetings, Koirala assessed the Nepalese political situation
as "worrying," saying that he saw no signs of rapprochement
between the King and the parties. The parties insist that
the King take the first step, Mahawar observed, and do not
believe he is interested in a compromise.


3. (C) The GOI message to Koirala was that ultimately there
must be a political solution to the turmoil in Nepal, Mahawar
said. The first step requires reconciliation between the
King and parties, followed by the presentation of a unified
face for talks with the Maoists to bring them into a
political settlement. Although the Palace and parties are
currently at odds, the parties have remained in touch with
the Maoists, Mahawar noted, adding that any eventual
representative government would need to maintain
communication channels with the Maoists as a prelude to
negotiations. However, the parties are cautious in their
interactions with the insurgents, Mahawar said, and recognize
the dangers of compromising with Maoists still willing to use
violence. Koirala told the GOI that senior political leaders
are restraining younger cadres who have a more radical view
and are more apt to recommend joining with the Maoists in
calling for a republic, Mahawar reported.

Pressuring the King
--------------


4. (C) Koirala emphasized the role that the international
community should play to press the King to accept multiparty
democracy and constitutional monarchy, the Under Secretary
said. However, Koirala stated that the pressure must come
from the Nepalese people. In this regard, the parties were
continuing their demonstrations in an effort to show the King
that the people demand democracy.


5. (C) Mahawar observed that the political parties feel they
cannot back down and compromise on their demands lest they
lose the respect of the Nepalese population. Previous
compromises have delivered less than the Palace agreed to,
and the parties recognize that both the King and the Maoists
now see them as powerless. They are convinced that they must
continue their agitation to regain credibility. Moreover, if
a political solution to the Maoist insurgency is necessary,
healthy political parties will be essential, Mahawar
observed. However, if progress to democracy is delayed too
long, the parties will become so estranged from the monarchy
that they will have no choice but to join the Maoists.

Military Assistance and Ammunition
--------------


6. (C) The GOI explained to Koirala its rationale for
resuming non-lethal military assistance, Mahawar stated,
adding that Koirala heard that India's release of aid was
intended as both a reward to the Palace for partial progress
on restoring civil rights and encouragement for more.
However, the GOI emphasized that the release of assistance
did not "dilute" India's support for the political parties.
Koirala indicated that the parties understand the GOI's
concern about Maoists, but complained that any military
support gives the King the impression that he is on the right
path.


7. (C) Mahawar stated that India plans to give only what
military assistance it believes to be necessary to hold back
the Maoists, recognizing that an RNA military victory over
the Maoists is unlikely regardless of what aid is given. He
reported that the GOI is "finalizing" its assessment of the
RNA's ammunition needs in preparation for comparing views
with the US, noting that India would prefer to wait until the
RNA is "desperate" before providing ammunition.

Party Leaders Returning to Kathmandu
--------------


8. (C) Koirala was scheduled to return to Kathmandu on June

15. Mahawar told us that now that there is a "little bit" of
freedom, "most" of the Nepali Congress leaders who had been
staying in New Delhi since February 1 will be accompanying
Koirala to Nepal, and many of the other parties' leaders here
are also returning to Kathmandu.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) The GOI's warning to Koirala to avoid dalliances with
the Maoists is reassuring, as is the continued interest in an
exchange of views on RNA ammunition requirements. MEA has
not proposed a mechanism for exchanging assessments of
ammunition requirements. While MEA expects that the upcoming
monsoon season will suppress overt agitation for a few
months, it remains worried that without a plan for resolving
the impasse, the political party dissatisfaction will boil
over into an alignment with the Maoists.


9. (C/NF) On June 9, Naval Attache provided Indian Defense
Intelligence Agency (IDIA) with several JICPAC reports on
Nepal and suggested that the situation in Nepal was an
appropriate subject for intelligence exchange under the
Morning Dew agreement. Informal comments from IDIA Liaison
Officer indicated there is interest in pursuing the subject,
but IDIA is not able to respond positively until cleared by
the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). If this approach is
accepted by the GOI, it will provide an appropriate channel
for exchange of analysis on RNA ammunition status.
BLAKE