SIKH TERRORISTS, WEAPONS CACHES SEIZED AFTER DELHI

C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 004449 STATE/SCT FOR MOLANDER AND RPARENT E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015 TAGS: PTER PREL IN PK CA GM TH TC SUBJECT: SIKH TERRORISTS, WEAPONS CACHES SEIZED AFTER DELHI CINEMA BOMBINGS REF: NEW DELHI 3846 Classified By: Charge Bob Blake, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary: The recent arrests of terrorists from the Babbar Khalsa International (BKI) group -- which is proscribed under the US Terrorist Exclusion List -- included all the main conspirators in the May 22 twin cinema bombings as well as a BKI leader who had escaped police custody earlier this year. The arrests also led to a haul of money, weapons, and explosives that would reportedly have been used for further spectacular attacks. Indian investigators say their analysis of cell phone traffic at the bomb sites focused the initial (May 31) raids. Indian law enforcement officials continue to turn down FBI LEGAT's offer of technical assistance with the case. Police, Indian media, and our CT contacts point to a possible Pakistan connection, but opinions differ as to what direct role was played by Sikh terrorists reportedly residing in Pakistani Punjab, terrorist jihadi group Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, and/or Pakistan's ISI. These bombings were the first in Delhi in three years, the first successful BKI attacks in India in a decade, and were apparently intended to spark communal violence. The attacks also coincided with an uptick in Sikh political dissent, but there is no clear connection between the two. This cable also provides biographic notes on BKI head of Indian operations Jagtar Singh Hawara, who was arrested on June 8 with two of the bombing suspects. Except when specified otherwise, the police information cited herein is from public statements and Indian press reporting. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Founded in the late 1970s, BKI's stated goal is an independent Sikh state ("Khalistan") in what is now Indian Punjab. The group is now reportedly active in the US, Canada, Pakistan, and Europe, according to Indian counterterrorism researchers. Indian terrorism expert Dr. Ajai Sahni called BKI "the most active and committed of the Khalistani groups worldwide," but their activities in recent years had been primarily "irritants." Sahni's research and police reporting indicate that BKI has in the past worked with other Sikh terrorist groups and with Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). Indian media reported recently that LeT was tasked in 2002 to train BKI cadres to foment terrorism in Punjab, but Sahni was not certain if BKI-LeT linkages remain. BKI is on the US Terrorist Exclusion List and is banned by the GOI under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (2004). Cinema Bombing Meant "To Send a Message" -------------- ¶3. (U) Police told Indian media (based on information reportedly gleaned during interrogations) that the assailants smuggled explosives and bomb components into the theaters in their shoes and underwear, and assembled the bombs in the men's lavatory at each location. Each device contained about one kilogram of RDX, which was enough to destroy two rows of seats in the Liberty Cinema, but the lack of shrapnel minimized casualties. Delhi Police Commissioner Dr. KK Paul said that the bombs -- the first in the capital after a three-year hiatus -- were meant to cause panic but not to kill: "They wanted to send a message," he explained. Police claimed that one suspect, Balwinder Singh, said that he helped with the attack because "The film ("Jo Bole So Nihaal") made fun of Sikhs." Suspects Arrested, RDX and Weapons Seized -------------- ¶4. (C) On May 31, the first series of simultaneous raids in Delhi and several Punjab villages netted two suspects, Jagannath Yadav and Balwinder Singh, respectively. Joint Police Commissioner (Special Cell) Karnal Singh announced that they also seized a Punjab police uniform, one kilogram of RDX, three detonators, a rifle and ammunition, plus two kilograms of gold and approximately $6,800 in Indian currency from Jagannath Yadav's Delhi home. Police sources indicated that the cash may have come through a New Delhi hawala dealer receiving a transfer from Pakistan that was routed through the Middle East. They point to BKI top leader Wadhwa Singh Babbar, whom Indian officials had asked Islamabad to extradite a few years ago as one of a "list of twenty" Indian absconders, as the source of the funds. Dr. Sahni said that Wadhwa Singh Babbar has been living in Pakistan for some 15 years. ¶5. (U) More arrests in Punjab followed on June 5, when the Delhi Police Special Cell tracked down two people that Balwinder Singh claimed as accomplices, Gurdeep Singh and Bahadur Singh. During this arrest, police also seized one kilogram of RDX and 11 detonators, but they are not stating publicly the exact role these two men played. ¶6. (U) The three suspects arrested after a June 8 car chase in Haryana included the operation's alleged mastermind, Jaspal Singh, whom police accuse of having assembled the bombs; BKI member Vikas Seghal, who reportedly planted the Liberty Cinema bomb; and BKI's head of Indian operations Jagtar Singh Hawara, a fugitive who in January 2005 tunneled 100 feet to escape from a Chandigarh jail where he was charged with the 1995 assassination of Punjab Chief Minister Beant Singh. The police seized 10 kilograms of RDX, remote-control blast devices, four pistols and over 200 rounds of ammunition, and a hand grenade. Hawara reportedly told police that the money and RDX from this arrest and the other raids were obtained "from Jammu," but he claimed not to know the specific source. Police spokespeople say that they do not expect further arrests in this case. ¶7. (U) The "Indian Express" on June 13 reported that the man who had been harboring Hawara pointed police to a cache of automatic weapons ammunition and bomb components hidden in the Sirhind canal in Punjab. Police found several different kinds of detonators, including pressure-release which are used by suicide bombers. Investigation Used Technology & Analysis, No US Role -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Police spokespeople announced that a study of cell phone calls made near the explosions helped initially identify the four assailants (Jagannath Yadav, Balwinder Singh, Jaspal Singh, and Vikas Seghal). There is a cell tower near each cinema, which allowed police investigators to home in on cell numbers that were active near both towers. In the hour preceding the first explosion (at Liberty Cinema),Jaspal repeatedly called a number in Germany that police say belongs to BKI Chief Wadhwa Singh Babbar's son-in-law, Satnam Singh Malian; Balwinder Singh later told police that Malian ordered the bombing. After the investigators identified Jaspal's phone number, they examined his call records to add the names of the other suspects, and noticed that each of the four attackers had called each other at least once. Balwinder Singh's cell received more calls than any other single number in the area, suggesting that he played a key operational role. Because all four phones were serviced by the same provider, the police could quickly request all the relevant billing records to obtain the names and addresses of the four men. ¶9. (C) New Delhi LEGAT reports that India's Central Bureau of Investigation has turned down its offers of technical assistance in investigating this case (Reftel). Pakistani Links Alleged -------------- ¶10. (C) The "Hindustan Times" recently quoted intelligence sources as reporting that the bombers received approximately $10,000 from a BKI operative in Germany, and used the money to pay for the explosives and bomb materials and for Balwinder and Jaspal to travel to Dubai, Bangkok (for explosives training),and Pakistan, returning nine days before the blasts. Deputy Police Commissioner Anita Roy told us that "international groups, including from Pakistan, were involved" in the bombings, but she declined to give specifics. Although BKI has historical links to entities in Pakistan and the investigation is pointing in that direction, there are three possible -- though not mutually exclusive -- "Pakistani connections": -- The first and most prominent in the media is that many Sikh separatists fled India for Pakistan after the collapse of the Khalistan movement. BKI leader Wadhwa Singh Babbar reportedly has been living in Pakistan for the last 15 years, and is one of five Sikh terrorists on the list of 20 "most wanted persons" that New Delhi has in past years asked Islamabad to extradite for trial. "The Pioneer" on June 10 claimed that he had been spotted in Muzaffarabad, protected by a "heavily guarded convoy." Any other Sikh terrorists resident in Pakistan would conceivably support attacks in India. -- Although Dr. Sahni was uncertain as to the current status of BKI-LeT relations, a BKI plan intended to spark communal violence would be a point of convergence for the two groups. Some past linkages may yet remain, and LeT's supply chain across the LoC could have been the route for ferrying RDX to India. -- Sahni also suggested that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) may have played a role in the bombings, claiming that ISI provided "continuous support" for BKI in recent years and that ISI houses BKI leaders and cadre. He also credited ISI with having created a brief nexus between BKI and the Dawood Ibrahim crime syndicate some time ago. First Successful BKI Operation in a Decade -------------- ¶11. (U) The last known BKI terrorism attempt prior to the May 22 bombings was a thwarted attack on the Hindu nationalist RSS Delhi offices in April 2002, according to the database maintained by the "South Asia Terrorism Portal" (http://www.satp.org); police reportedly disrupted other planned bombings over the past several years. An arrested BKI suspect in August 2001 told Punjab police that the group had planned to revive terrorism in the state through a series of bombings in public places. Police over the past decade have seized dozens of kilograms of RDX and other explosives from suspected BKI cells in Delhi and Punjab, in one instance netting a cache of 30 kilograms of RDX. The last successful BKI operation was the August 1995 assassination of Punjab Chief Minister Beant Singh by a reported BKI human bomb. The group was also accused of masterminding the June 1985 mid-air explosion of Air India Flight 182 ("Kanishka") off the Irish Coast, which killed 329 people. Blasts Intended to Herald Wave of Attacks -------------- ¶12. (C) Police claim that the four lead suspects also planned to assassinate Sikh political and religious leaders in Punjab with the goal of exploiting caste tensions among Sikh groups, and reviving the Sikh separatist movement -- which Dr. Sahni dismisses out of hand, because "the time of Khalistan separatism has long passed." The cinemas playing "Jo Bole So Nihaal" appear to have been targets of opportunity. Although Delhi Police Commissioner Paul said that the movie itself was not the target "because the attack had been planned as early as December 2004," the film had generated interest in on-line discussion groups by September 2004, and was undoubtedly known to Sikh extremists well before its debut. ¶13. (U) Police reported after Hawara's preliminary interrogation that the terrorists had also planned to target Congress Party leaders -- Sajjan Kumar, HKL Bhagat, and Minister for Overseas Indian Affairs Jagdish Tytler -- who were implicated in the 1984 anti-Sikh riots following Indira Gandhi's assassination. Other suspected targets included Punjab Chief Minister Amarinder Singh and former Chief Minister Prakash Singh Badal, as well as former Director General of the Punjab Police, KPS Gill, whom his critics call "The Butcher of the Punjab" for his violent crackdown on Sikh extremism in the late 1980s and early 1990s. ¶14. (U) After the last arrests, police said that the foursome had planned to set larger bombs that would have been detonated using ham radios as remote controls -- this would have been the first use of such a tactic in the capital. Remote-control detonations would allow the bombers to plant explosives ahead of time and provided more flexibility and accuracy in timing future attacks. The terrorists would have been able to set off the charges from up to two kilometers away, which would greatly reduce the likelihood that eye-witnesses or technical investigations would lead to speedy identification of the attackers. Uptick in Sikh Dissent May Not be Linked to Attacks -------------- -------------- ¶15. (U) Whether by planning or by chance, the bombings came during a rise in Sikh dissent in northern India. After several years of reserved commemorations for the anniversary of Operation Bluestar, the 1984 Indian Army assault on Sikh militants who had taken refuge in Amritsar's Harmandir Sahib (Golden Temple) that left over 100 soldiers and 500 civilians dead, members of radical Sikh groups attending the June 6 ceremony brandished swords and renewed their demands for an independent Khalistan. They also seized the public address system for about a half hour at the event convened to commemorate Ghallughara ("Genocide") Day, and shouted down leaders of the mainstream Sikh establishment, such as SGPC leader Bibi Jagir Kaur. Bio-Notes: Jagtar Singh Hawara -------------- ¶16. (U) Born on May 17, 1970 in Bassi Hawara Kalan village, Fatehgarh Sahib district, Punjab, Hawara joined BKI in 1987 at the age of 16. According to Indian press reports, he lived in Pakistan until 1990, where he reportedly received weapons and explosives training. Hawara is credited with having recruited and trained Dilawar Singh, the suicide bomber who assassinated Beant Singh. Police claim he similarly motivated some 20 more youths, many of whom he met in jail, to act as human bombs while he was in Chandigarh jail in the early 1990s. Dr. Sahni told Poloff that, as the group's prominence (and political violence in Punjab) declined over the years, BKI recruits "are increasingly drawn from the criminal population, working as mercenaries." Police who questioned Hawara characterized him as "hard-working but not very sharp." At the time of his arrest, there was a reward of approximately $11,500 for information leading to his capture. Comment -------------- ¶17. (C) The rapid response by Indian police and their skilled use of technology to track down the bombers augurs well for the GOI for any future attack, although the detailed press reporting will undoubtedly cause future bombers to use different tactics and to limit using cell phones. We will watch as the GOI prepares its case against the attackers, which, given the typical pace of the Indian legal system, may take some time. This will also be an opportunity to see how the government applies the new Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, which last year replaced the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA). ¶18. (C) Aside from the attacks themselves, the most potentially troubling aspect of the case is the reported Pakistani link. Although the GOI is not letting this incident affect the rapprochement with Pakistan, officials cite cases like this as a major drag on sentiment in the government. In the midst of cross-border political and economic progress, further such incidents could seriously set back Indo-Pak rapprochement. Islamabad could boost its credibility with New Delhi if it arrested and extradited Wadhwa Singh Babbar, if Indian authorities and pundits are able to bite their tongues and accept such a move as CT cooperation, and not hail such a move as "proof" that the GOP had been harboring the terrorist leader all this time. BLAKE