INDIA SUPPORTS SRI LANKA'S JOINT MECHANISM AND AIR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 004434 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MASS ECON CE IN SUBJECT: INDIA SUPPORTS SRI LANKA'S JOINT MECHANISM AND AIR CAPABILITIES REF: A. NEW DELHI 7497 ¶B. CHENNAI 1203 Classified By: CDA Bob Blake, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary: During Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga's visit to New Delhi on June 2-3, PM Singh gave GOI conditional support for the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS),discussed concerns about the LTTE's air capability, and offered to upgrade Sri Lankan Air Force capabilities without signing the Defense Cooperation Agreement. Kumaratunga came to thank India for its help after the Tsunami, but also hoped to clear up Indian ambiguity on and gain backing for the P-TOMS in order to shore up support for the mechanism at home. In an interview after the meetings, NSA Narayanan complicated the message by stating that support was conditional upon the inclusion of non-LTTE Tamil parties, leading to some speculation about GOI intentions. The message Chandrika took home was of GOI support for the joint mechanism and Sri Lanka's defenses, thus furthering the post-Tsunami feel-good relations with India's most agreeable neighbor. End Summary. Public Thanks from Chandrika -------------- ¶2. (U) President Kumaratunga used the occasion of her first visit to India since the Tsunami to "thank the Government and people of India for their generous assistance" since December. PM Singh reiterated that India was committed to reconstruction, and stated that GOI assistance included a grant of almost USD 25 million for relief projects, a moratorium on debt repayments for three years and possible changes to lines of credit to accommodate post-reconstruction priorities. Singh Backs the P-TOMS... -------------- ¶3. (C) Most Delhi-based analysts speculated that the real reason for Chandrika's visit was to gain GOI support for the P-TOMS, also commonly known as the Joint Mechanism (JM). The P-TOMS is the formal international and multilateral instrument for coordinating Tsunami aid distribution between the GOSL, LTTE and Muslim groups throughout the island. India's silence on the issue had fed rumors that the GOI disliked the mechanism for, as one expert put it, "needlessly giving the LTTE a status they didn't deserve in areas they shouldn't control." Singh addressed the subject by expressing his "understanding of and support for these ongoing efforts," which was widely perceived as an endorsement. MR Narayan Swamy, an editor for the Indo-Asian News Service and Prabhakaran biographer, noted that India felt pressure to take a public position "in line with all of the major countries and aid organizations who support the P-TOMS." ...But NSA Narayanan Says Support Is Conditional -------------- --- ¶4. (C) After the bilaterals, NSA Narayanan clarified GOI support in a thinly-reported interview with TV news channels, stating that "We have agreed to the proposal, as long as it is not with the LTTE alone but with other Tamil parties too." Dr. Anupam Ray, MEA Deputy Secretary for Sri Lanka stressed the language of support in the joint statement, but told Poloff that Indian support was "only theoretical until the JM is signed." Although the press also focused on GOI support, one Indian reporter speculated that Narayanan's statement had "scuttled the proposal." Most Delhi-based experts agreed that the LTTE would not accept other Tamil party involvement, but differed on the importance of Narayanan's statement. Swamy argued that the GOI actually "doesn't want to back the mechanism, but also doesn't want to sound negative" in light of international support and the close relationship with Kumaratunga, leading to intentional vagueness in the official language. ¶5. (C) Professor Sahadevan from Jawaharal Nehru University (JNU) noted to Poloff that Indian policy is to "encourage all of the Tamil parties to get involved in democracy," so Narayan's statement was "not a precondition, just a policy statement." The real question of "how much the GOI stressed this condition is unknown," but he expects the statement to play out in the details of India's aid, speculating that the GOI may not send aid or aid workers directly to LTTE-controlled areas unless other Tamil parties were included. ¶6. (C) N. Manoharan, a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, refuted the importance of Narayanan's statement, saying that "there is no point to whether India backs it" because the greatest challenge to the JM was the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) Party, and GOI support would not influence their opinion. On the contrary, Professor Sahadevan argued that India's support has huge political significance. If the GOI opposed the JM, they would be the only outside dissenting voice, which the "JVP would make use of to oppose the mechanism." By dissenting, India would run the risk of "demonstrably refuting the need for tsunami reconstruction." According to Sahadevan, the PM knows that Chandrika's regime is struggling with the JM, and "doesn't want to make it any harder" and upset the improvement in relations that has resulted from greater economic cooperation and India's Tsunami aid (Ref A). LTTE's Air Tigers -------------- ¶7. (C) Following press reports about LTTE air capability and its potential to affect South India, most Delhi-based analysts say the fear of a suicide attack or bombing is overblown but that the Air Tigers are nevertheless a cause for concern. A recent report in the "Asian Age" pointed out that the two aircraft have a range of 1,000 km-plus and are capable of flying directly to Chennai and back. In response to a "possible threat by the LTTE," the "Asian Tribune" reported on May 30 that intelligence agencies put a red alert on Cochin International Airport through June 7. Professor Sahadevan observed that after the backlash from Rajiv Gandhi's assassination, the LTTE will "never again threaten India" because they won't want to risk "changing the military balance by unduly antagonizing New Delhi." IPCS's Manoharan agreed that a suicide attack was unlikely, and that the LTTE would be more interested in a threat with either less human casualties, more economic power or a public figure target. ¶8. (C) Although there was "no need to worry now," Manoharan saw this development as one which Delhi will need to closely monitor as the LTTE builds up the force and accumulates more powerful technology and more aircraft. The Observer Research Foundation Chennai-based analyst RS Vasan told Poloff recently that the Air Tigers are "at the moment not a threat, but certainly a future worry" because the size of the runway makes it apparent that the LTTE is "looking toward the future." Stronger aircraft could strengthen the LTTE by allowing them to bring in supplies from all over Southeast Asia. The "Asian Age" reported on June 4 that the PM offered to "upgrade capabilities of the Lankan Air Force," an offer FM Natwar Singh emphasized during his June 8-10 visit to Sri Lanka. Defense Agreement Buried -------------- ¶9. (C) The two leaders reportedly did not focus on the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA),which was widely expected to be signed during Chandrika's last visit in November 2004 but continues to face opposition from pro-Tamil parties in South India. In its 2004-2005 annual report released in May, the Home Ministry described the LTTE as "extremely potent, and the most lethal and well organized terrorist force in Sri Lanka" that "has strong liaisons in Tamil Nadu and certain pockets of Southern India." Without this formal agreement, New Delhi already assists the GOSL with military supplies, training, intelligence and naval cooperation against the LTTE. ¶10. (C) Although the GOI has strong anti-LTTE leanings, UPA coalition partners and pro-Tamil parties MDMK and PMK oppose the DCA, and the PM stalled the agreement to avoid upsetting them, particularly in advance of Tamil Nadu state elections expected before May 2006. According to "The Hindu," MDMK General Secretary Vaiko met with the PM on June 5 to protest the DCA as direct Indian assistance against the LTTE and an interference in Sri Lanka's internal affairs. Since both the MDMK and the PMK were also coalition partners under the previous NDA government, IPCS Manoharan told Poloff that "as long as pro-Tamil parties are in the coalition, the defense agreement won't be signed." Sahadevan stressed that PM Singh is less likely than Vajpayee to ignore Tamil politics and sign the agreement because "his leadership is not strong enough to withstand the tension in the coalition." Despite coalition pressures, the Bangalore-based "Deccan Herald" reported that FM Natwar Singh said on June 10 in Sri Lanka that the agreement is "in the process of being finalized." Whether or not the DCA is signed, Manoharan argued that it is largely a symbolic gesture telling the LTTE that "India is with us," and defense cooperation has been and will continue to rise without a formal agreement in place. Economic Cooperation -------------- ¶11. (C) Looking forward to FM Natwar Singh's June 8-10 trip to Sri Lanka to discuss the Joint Economic Commission (JEC), economics reportedly figured prominently in the PM's discussions with President Kumaratunga. The two leaders noted bilateral trade reached USD 1.8 billion in 2004 and set a deadline for the negotiations on a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) to conclude by the end of 2005. The meetings came just days after the Indian parliament passage of the Sethusamudram channel in between the countries, which strategists such as C. Raja Mohan saw as a lost opportunity for economic integration and a bow to Tamil politics (Ref B). Calling the CEPA the "next stage of cooperation" after the Free Trade Agreement (covering only trade in goods) was signed in 1998, Professor Sahadevan told Poloff that it will focus on cooperation in the service sector and increase bilateral investment. Manoharan stressed the importance of this agreement in "institutionalizing recent increased economic linkages and paving the way for greater bilateral cooperation." Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) Despite NSA Narayanan's statement placing conditions on Indian support, Chandrika still took home the prize of GOI backing for the JM. Just as Sri Lanka has chosen not to make a public spat out of the Sethusamudram channel, the GOI kept its disagreements with the JM mostly quiet and stressed its support for Tsunami reconstruction. The stalling of the DCA is a testament to the small, but still influential, power that pro-Tamil coalition partners hold in Indian coalition governments, but will not prevent further Indian assistance to counter what New Delhi sees as the continuing threat of the LTTE. PM Singh was careful not to introduce any dissonance into India's model relationship by giving support for the JM, and will continue to use tsunami reconstruction aid, economic cooperation and defense assistance to further the positive trend in Indo-Sri Lankan relations. BLAKE