INDIA PREPARED TO ENGAGE INTERNATIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003811 SIPDIS PASS TO NRC E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2015 TAGS: PREL MASS KSTC KNNP KOMC ETTC IN GOI SUBJECT: INDIA PREPARED TO ENGAGE INTERNATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIMES REF: A. NEW DELHI 3653 ¶B. NEW DELHI 3652 Classified By: PolCouns Geoffrey Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (U) Summary: In an important May 17 address at the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO),India's premier military R&D facility, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared that with the passage of the new WMD law, India is prepared for "the broadest form of engagement with the international non-proliferation regime," as long as this engagement does not endanger its indigenous strategic programs. He argued that India has a "double imperative" to pursue opportunities for greater high-tech trade from foreign sources while maintaining its own development of critical strategic technology. Stressing that indigenous development of strategic technology would remain a priority to maintain India's autonomy, the PM encouraged greater collaboration between DRDO and the Indian private sector and more interaction with foreign R&D institutions as means to improve the effectiveness of India's defense research industry. ¶2. (C) We believe the GOI is committed to fulfilling NSSP conditions regarding the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines. The PM's speech, however, highlights the thin line he must walk between the Indian political elite's dislike of these control regimes and GOI commitment to non-proliferation to achieve its larger objectives, i.e., nuclear fuel for its growing energy needs, greater access to high-tech goods, and most importantly, acceptance as an emerging global power. End Summary. Maintaining Strategic Autonomy -------------- ¶3. (U) Throughout his address to the defense scientists, Manmohan Singh returned to the theme of maintaining and maximizing GOI strategic programs and autonomy. With the recent passage of the WMD law (Ref B),the PM boldly declared that "India is prepared for the broadest form of engagement with the international non-proliferation regime." He also highlighted an important nuance that such engagement was evidence of GOI commitment to stop outward proliferation, but would not curb the country's indigenous strategic programs. "In the defense and nuclear fields, our strategic programs are indigenous and not dependent on external sources of support. Nor can they be the subject of externally imposed constraints." He went on to emphasize the need to continue strategic self-reliance so that India's defense options are not constrained by "bilateral and multilateral technology denial regimes." He added pointedly that "such regimes are contrary to the logic of globalization, and are increasingly an anachronism from the past." ¶4. (U) The PM also spoke about finding the right balance between indigenous development and acquiring critical technology from foreign sources. "We must concentrate our indigenous efforts on critical technologies of strategic value, for which, in most cases we have no option but to rely on our own resources. At the same time, we must explore fully what is available through external sourcing, be it through technology transfer or co-production, both for use in the Indian market or for third country exports." He cited the Indian-Russian BrahMos cruise missile joint venture as a successful example of the benefits of defense co-production and as an answer to the persistent problem of reliability of spares and product support. Indigenous Development a Priority -------------- ¶5. (U) While pursuing opportunities for greater high tech trade and collaboration, the PM stressed that indigenous development of strategic technology would continue to be a priority to maintain India's autonomy. "The higher the indigenous content of our weapon systems, the greater our confidence that the autonomy of national decision-making will not be affected in a crisis." Need to Improve Defense Research Effectiveness -------------- - ¶6. (U) Praising DRDO's wide-ranging contributions to both defense and civilian objectives, the PM also cautioned against delays and cost overruns, outlining opportunities to make the organization more effective. Addressing DRDO's notoriously sluggish production times, the PM outlined the economic, tactical, and strategic consequences of such delays, "Delays not only affect the national exchequer, they can also seriously undermine the confidence of the defense services if a weapon system is practically obsolete by the time of its induction. Most importantly, delays also limit our strategic options." ¶7. (U) The PM went on to encourage initiatives to make DRDO more efficient: greater collaboration with India's private sector and leveraging the country's human resources to attract more foreign R&D opportunities. In this context, he lauded DRDO's efforts to set up Research and Development Boards in areas such as aeronautics, armament research, naval research and life sciences research, to promote collaborative arrangements with academic institutions and other national R&D laboratories. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) To complete Phase II of the NSSP, the GOI must agree to adhere to MTCR and NSG guidelines, two primary examples of the "multilateral technology denial regimes" which the PM seemed to rebuke in his address to the defense scientists. However, senior GOI officials such as FS Saran have assured us that the GOI will fulfill its NSSP obligations by Executive Decree. ¶9. (C) The PM's statement highlights the fine line he must walk: On one side, assuring the defense industry that the GOI will not accede to external controls on its legitimate defensive programs, while on the other, associating India with domestically unpopular regimes in order to demonstrate GOI commitment to non-proliferation and achieve India's larger objectives, i.e., nuclear fuel for its burgeoning energy needs, greater access to high-tech goods, and most importantly, acceptance of India as an emerging global power. Considering the profound distaste for "discriminatory" control regimes among the influential Indian scientific establishment and many of the political elite, the GOI will have to boost its efforts to explain the nuances of its policy regarding MTCR and NSG as it moves ahead with our NSSP partnership. BLAKE