MEA UPBEAT ON INDO-PAK, CLEARER ON SIACHEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003745 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2015 TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS ENRG IN PK AF TX INDO PAK SUBJECT: MEA UPBEAT ON INDO-PAK, CLEARER ON SIACHEN REF: A. NEW DELHI 3717 ¶B. NEW DELHI 3213 ¶C. NEW DELHI 2189 Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a May 18 meeting with Polcouns and Poloff, MEA Joint Secretary (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran) Dilip Sinha gave us the clearest GOI position on Siachen we have had in some time, stressing that settlement will require a signed map showing current troop positions in order to close a deal with Islamabad on demilitarizing the Glacier. He confirmed other reports that the PM would like to see a deal on this long festering issue. On the Baglihar dam, New Delhi will respect the neutral expert's decision, although New Delhi insists Islamabad was premature in invoking the Indus Waters Treaty dispute resolution process. Planning for the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline may move forward, with Petroleum Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar meeting Pakistani and Iranian counterparts over the next several weeks. MEA sees terrorist attacks in Kashmir as an expected seasonal uptick as the infiltration passes start to clear. Alluding to NSA Narayanan's concern (expressed to the Charge May 17) about the need to insulate the peace process from an upsurge in terrorism, Polcouns pressed for more US-India information sharing on Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET). Sinha agreed in principle to renew former J/S AK Singh's practice of arranging Indian intelligence briefings on cross-border terrorism. End Summary. ¶2. (C) In response to PolCouns' remark about Indian media and NSA Narayanan's upbeat perspective on the trajectory of Indo-Pak relations (Ref A),Sinha replied that he was keeping his fingers crossed, and hailed the continued success of the LoC cease-fire (now in its nineteenth month). He underlined the importance of keeping the dialogue open, and of the need "to avoid panic if it takes more than one or two rounds to resolve some of these issues." He said that only two sets of Composite Dialogue talks are currently scheduled, with the rest of the agenda yet to be determined: -- May 25-26 (Islamabad): Defense Secretaries discuss demilitarizing Siachen Glacier; and -- May 27-28 (Islamabad): The two Surveyors-General meet to discuss the delineation of the border at Sir Creek. MEA Firm: Signed Map Before Demilitarizing Siachen -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) On Polcouns' question of whether a Siachen deal was "ripe fruit to be picked" during the upcoming May 25-26 meeting between Defense Secretaries, as recently characterized by strategists C Raja Mohan and AG Noorani, Sinha explained why the MEA wants a signed map showing current troop positions before pulling forces back from the Glacier. Despite tacit agreement on demilitarization and where the troops would re-deploy, New Delhi needed Islamabad to publicly accept the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) because there was no trust regarding Siachen "post-Kargil." If Islamabad did not publicly and explicitly accept the AGPL with a delineated map signed by the two Defense Secretaries, he said, it could dispute the demarcation at a later date. A signed map would be harder to refute and would give the GOI political cover for a diplomatic or military response should Pakistani troops later occupy the territory on the Saltoro ridge line that Indian troops now hold. Sinha cautioned that "1989 and 1992 are in the past," referring to two prior occasions when a deal on Siachen appeared imminent. Likewise, on Sir Creek he indicated that a deal was achievable, but only if Islamabad agrees to clear demarcation. Respecting Baglihar Process -------------- ¶4. (C) Sinha reiterated that India would abide by whatever decision emerged from the neutral expert appointed under the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) dispute resolution process (Ref B), although he maintained that Islamabad was premature to initiate it and he believed that the GOI would be vindicated. Sinha agreed with PolCouns' assertion that India and Pakistan would be likely to exercise more caution on the water issue in J&K in the future, with Indian hydroelectric engineers more careful about their designs, and Islamabad less likely to refer disputes to arbitration, depending on the outcome. Echoing what we have heard from the Pakistani Charge, Sinha was confident that Baglihar was now on the right track and could be managed through technical talks. Ministerial Pipeline Talks Coming Up -------------- ¶5. (C) Pointing out that Petroleum Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar would visit Pakistan around May 25 and Iran in early June (dates not finalized),Sinha said that India's main interest in Iran is energy. The Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline was an important CBM that was also critical for India's energy needs. Sinha ticked off "numerous" problems the project faces aside from ILSA -- finance, security, "Pakistan's intransigence" -- but the three governments would work to overcome them because the project was important for all three economies and would promote regional cooperation and prosperity. Polcouns briefed on ILSA's provisions, but Sinha appeared only broadly aware of the law and accepted our offer of a detailed paper on ILSA. ¶6. (C) Sinha conveyed GOI openness to pursuing other energy options, including the proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline. He cautioned, however, that he knew of no independent assessment of how much gas Turkmenistan has, or how much was already obligated to Russia, which makes this venture less compelling for India than the pipeline originating in Iran. Acknowledging that actual construction could take as long as ten years on either of these projects, Sinha underscored the importance India attaches to lining up resources to meet its current and future energy requirements. Too Soon to Assess Pak Support for Terrorism -------------- ¶7. (C) After receiving PolCouns' condolences for recent terrorist attacks against civilian targets in J&K, including the May 12 grenade attack at the Tyndale-Briscoe school in Srinagar, Sinha observed that the seasonal uptick in violence in the Valley had begun. Stressing that the GOI had seen no movement by the GOP to uproot terrorist infrastructure (Ref C and previous),despite the US-led UN designation of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba as an Al-Qaida affiliate, Sinha declared that New Delhi wanted an end to Islamabad's "double game" of fighting Al-Qaida in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan while supporting Kashmir-oriented terrorism. "We want to see the same level of commitment in (Pakistan's) east as you see in the west," he stated. ¶8. (C) Alluding to NSA Narayanan's concern (Ref A), expressed to the Charge on May 17 about the need to insulate the peace process from an upsurge in terrorism, Polcouns pressed for more US-India information sharing on Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). Sinha agreed in principle to renew his predecessor J/S AK Singh's practice of arranging intelligence-based briefings on cross-border terrorism trends. Polcouns underlined Washington's abiding interest in LeT, including for its activities in Iraq and the United States. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Sinha's statement that a signed map of the AGPL is a political requirement for New Delhi is the most definitive language we have heard on what it needs to make a deal on Siachen. His upbeat opinion of the Composite Dialogue process and his caution against impatience are usual for the MEA, which prefers to dampen speculation of "low-hanging fruit," even when the political level is looking for ways to move forward. ¶10. (C) We are encouraged that MEA may be willing to explore more detailed information sharing. This may be due, in part, to our leadership in adding LeT to the UNSC 1267 Sanctions List (Ref C),and to the growing appreciation of the problem that LeT poses for both countries. We will report any briefings in detail septel. BLAKE