SRINAGAR CAR BOMB: NEW KASHMIR TERRORIST M.O.?

C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 003587

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2015
TAGS: PTER PREL PK IN
SUBJECT: SRINAGAR CAR BOMB: NEW KASHMIR TERRORIST M.O.?


Classified By: Polcouns Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (U) A car bomb exploded in the summer capital of J&K on
May 11, killing two persons, injuring more than 50, and
damaging more than one dozen vehicles and some 40 shops and
other buildings. J&K police sources have confirmed the
casualty figures, and report that the blast was an improvised
explosive device (IED) packed in a small car that went off in
a crowded market area in Srinagar, just as the work day was
getting underway.


2. (U) The attack appears to have been aimed at a Central
Reserve Police Force (CRPF) unit, but all deaths and most
injuries were of civilians. The blast tore a 2-foot deep
crater in the road, uprooted electic poles, and tore through
chain fencing, affecting an area estimated at 1000 square
yards.


3. (C) J&K Police sources tell us they are not certain who
was behind it. The shadowy al-Nasireen group has taken
responsibility, but J&K police tell us Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)
and the J&K Islamic Front also claimed credit. Al-Nasireen
is one of the four terrorist groups linked to
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) that has come out strongly in
opposition to the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus in recent months,
and which carried out the April 6 attack on the State
Transport Company complex on the eve of the first bus journey
April 7. Javed Makhdoomi, Inspector General of Police in
Srinagar, told us May 12 that he had not seen proof that
al-Nasireen was behind it, and speculated that HM may have
been the culprit, as the group has claimed responsibility for
the occasional car bomb in J&K in the past. Makhdoomi also
did not confirm press reports that al-Nasireen is a front for
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM).

Comment
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4. (C) This was not a suicide bombing. Car bombs in J&K
have been very rare during the 16 year Kashmir insurgency.
Aside from fidayeen attacks, the terrorists' preferred modus
operandi in recent years has been to lob grenades or to
activate remote-controlled IEDs buried along roads, not to
pack cars with IEDs and set them off remotely, as was the
case here. Our research reveals some seven car bombs since

1997.


5. (C) Should we see more cases like this, it would
represent a serious turn for the worse in the insurgency, the
beginning of a new kind of terrorism in J&K. It could cast a
shadow over vibrant street life in Srinagar and other towns
in the Valley, where (except for continued heavy security
force presence) the sense of normalcy has increased markedly
during the past two years. It could also affect the tourist
season, which many observers expect to be the busiest in the
Valley since before the insurgency began in 1989.


6. (C) A terrorist strategy relying more on car bombs,
however, could also easily backfire, because Kashmiri
civilians would likely bear the brunt of such blasts, as they
have with the widespread terrorist use of grenades in recent
years, which with disturbing regularity miss their intended
targets (the security forces). A greater use of car bombs
would exacerbate Kashmiri yearning for an end to violence,
which remains indiscriminate and affects civilians as much as
(if not more than) the institutions of the Indian state which
the terrorists purport to be targetting.
BLAKE