INDIA LOOKING TO "SUBSTANTIATE" RELATIONS DURING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003132 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2015 TAGS: PREL ETRD ENRG KNNP IN UNSC SUBJECT: INDIA LOOKING TO "SUBSTANTIATE" RELATIONS DURING KOIZUMI VISIT REF: A. NEW DELHI 3087 ¶B. SINGAPORE 1114 Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt. Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary: For Japanese PM Junichiro Koizumi's April 28-30 visit to New Delhi, the GOI will be focused on giving the relationship greater strategic and multilateral breadth, and solidifying Japan's support for India's UNSC campaign, according to our senior MEA interlocutors. Following Chinese Premier Wen's pointed advice to India to rethink its UNSC partnership with Japan, that aspect of the visit will be a strength test for the G-4 pact. The GOI also plans to discuss boosting economic relations, to include high-tech trade, but is looking for signals that Japan has put aside its resentment over India's 1998 nuclear tests, a sentiment the MEA would like us to encourage in Tokyo. Asian regional architecture will be on the agenda as well, including India's bid to attend the East Asia Summit. In view of the tacit recognition in New Delhi that China has not backed India unconditionally for the UNSC, the PM is unlikely to break up the G-4, as Wen had advised. End Summary. The Agenda -------------- ¶2. (C) In an April 22 conversation with PolCouns and Poloff, MEA Joint Secretary Ashok Kantha (China, Japan) summed up India's broad approach to the Koizumi visit as an attempt to inject "greater strategic focus" into a bilateral agenda that is by far the least substantial of any Indian P-5 relationship. To "substantiate" their ties, the GOI will seek to add a "strategic dimension," moving beyond bilateral relations to cooperate on "regional and multilateral issues," Kantha explained, suggesting naval maritime security exercises in the Indian Ocean as a potential area of expansion. Boosting economic interaction, particularly in the area of science and technology, will be another priority. Kantha commented that two-way trade had stagnated at a very low level (a paltry USD 4 billion per year since the mid-1990s),elaborating that the root problem was Indian lack of understanding of the Japanese, and vice versa. UNSC Drama -------------- ¶3. (C) A major part of India's agenda will be the UNSC and UN reform more generally. As members of the G-4 club of Security Council aspirants, India and Japan have previously offered each other their mutual endorsement. This visit, however, comes in the aftermath of the April 9-12 Wen visit (ref A) during which, Kantha told us, the Chinese leader warned PM Manmohan Singh that "India's interests (with respect to the UNSC) are not well served," by throwing in its lot with Japan. While Wen offered "fairly categorical support" for India's bid (according to Kantha),New Delhi joining Japan "complicates this," he had said. The J/S recounted that the PM stiff-armed Wen's advice, noting that New Delhi stood by its commitment to Tokyo. He added that perhaps the GOJ is under the impression that because the US supports its bid, that Japan's permanent membership is a foregone conclusion. Kantha cautioned, however, that Wen had told the PM that it would not be possible for China to support Japan. A Little Help From Our Friends -------------- ¶4. (C) India is also eyeing Japanese high technology, but recalling Japanese condemnation of the GOI's 1998 nuclear test, Kantha remarked that some "prodding" from the US would help Tokyo to overcome its "psychological barrier" against high-tech trade with India. Referring to Japanese "proselytizing," he complained that the GOJ "Foreign Office fundamentalists" still regularly raise NPT and CTBT signature with New Delhi. Kantha hoped that the US-India example might inspire Japan to be able to disagree with India on some issues, such as the NPT, but still develop other areas of the strategic relationship. Suggesting that Tokyo may need less prodding than the MEA thinks, the Japanese Embassy recently told us that they were interested in exploring civil nuclear cooperation with New Delhi, along the lines of the US Energy Dialogue with India. The EAS and Beyond -------------- ¶5. (C) Despite the apparent decision to include India (ref B) in the first East Asia Summit (EAS),the MEA does not consider its lobbying work done. Kantha observed that although it looks like India will be included, this invitation has not been "formalized" yet, and that the GOI will press the matter with Koizumi. Noting that India and Japan shared a similar perspective, Kantha remarked that both countries did not want the EAS to be "China dominated." PolCouns highlighted our view that the new grouping should not be exclusive, to which the J/S responded that the GOI was comfortable with the US as "an active player." Because of the US role in Asia, he asserted, there should be an institutional arrangement whereby Washington is part of the process, adding that Secretary Rice's remarks at Sofia University had resonated well with the GOI. ¶6. (C) Playing down India's likely invitation to the Summit, Kantha asserted that New Delhi sees the EAS as "part of a larger, long term architecture in Asia," adding that the GOI would like to work with Tokyo in shaping it. India will explore with Koizumi a "new Asian era," which may not be operational immediately, but would have future possibilities. New Delhi's goal, he stated, was to be part of the "core" shaping the process. Parenthetically, Kantha also wondered aloud how India could continue to be excluded from APEC, calling it a "misnomer" without GOI participation. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) New Delhi expects from the Koizumi trip the same kind of perspective shift that came out of the Wen visit during which the PRC for the first time recognized India as globally significant. In view of the tacit recognition in New Delhi that China has not exactly backed India for the UNSC, the PM is not likely to break up the G-4, as Wen had advised. The GOI recognizes that the India-Japan relationship is vastly underdeveloped, especially compared to New Delhi's rapidly expanding agenda with the other P-5 members. As with other aspects of the GOI's thrust into East Asia, the encounter between India and Japan advances the US interest in building networks of market-oriented democracies that share a common view of challenges like terrorism, proliferation, and strategic stability in Asia. BLAKE