INDIA WAITING FOR NEW IRAQI GOVERNMENT BEFORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002992

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2015
TAGS: PREL EAID ENRG IZ IN
SUBJECT: INDIA WAITING FOR NEW IRAQI GOVERNMENT BEFORE
COMMITTING TO ACTION

REF: NEW DELHI 2933

Classified By: Charge Robert O. Blake, Jr., for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: Incoming MEA Joint Secretary (Gulf
Division) Sanjay Singh reiterated GOI willingness to support
Iraq's democratic transition, but is waiting for the new
government in Baghdad to take its seat before committing to
action. In a conversation with PolCouns and PolMilOff on
April 19, Singh said the GOI hopes to use its multi-sectoral
engagement in Afghanistan as a model for Iraq, but is still
stymied by lack of communication with Baghdad and poor
security in the country. Despite these obstacles, Indo-Iraqi
trade continues to grow, and will be boosted by a contract
for oil exploration by an Indian state-owned oil company.
End Summary.


2. (SBU) Following on high-level discussions about GOI
engagement in Iraq during Dr. Rice's visit to New Delhi in
March and, more recently, during Indian Foreign Minister
Natwar Singh's visit to Washington, and A/S Rocca's meetings
in New Delhi on April 18, PolCouns queried the new Gulf J/S
about GOI plans in Iraq. Noting that Natwar had suggested
that India might be most helpful in assisting Iraq draft a
new Constitution and that the GOI has continued to express
interest in police training (Reftel),PolCouns asked how the
GOI will put these ideas into effect. Singh responded that a
recent UN Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) meeting in
Baghdad had established a Parliamentary committee to oversee
framing the constitution. India will await the committee's
plan for drafting the constitution before deciding what
action to take.


3. (C) Singh went on to lament the lack of communication
with the Iraqi government, both via the Iraqi Embassy in New
Delhi and the Indian Embassy in Baghdad. The J/S asked
whether the current Baghdad government is still considered an
interim authority. He expressed hope that once the new Iraqi
government was formally installed, communication between New
Delhi and Baghdad would become more regular, but opined that
with tight deadlines to draft the constitution and elect a
permanent government later this year, Baghdad's focus will
continue to be inward.


4. (C) Responding to PolCouns' question about the status of
the Agrement for the Iraqi ambassador to India, which has
been pending since September, Singh stated that it was still
being processed. He did not have an update on the selection
of an Indian Ambassador to Iraq, but implied that the GOI
would proceed in parallel with their diplomatic normalization
(which press here have focused on as implicit GOI endorsement
of the post-Saddam dispensation). PolCouns noted that the
Head of the Australasia Division in the Iraqi Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Ambassador al-Jawadi, may visit New Delhi
before or after the Bandung Summit in Jakarta, April 20-22,
and asked about MEA's meetings with him. Admitting he had
not been in contact with the Iraqi Embassy in New Delhi since
becoming Gulf J/S, Singh said he had not heard about the
visit. PolCouns encouraged the J/S to make and maintain
contact with the Iraqi Charge and approve the pending
Agrement for the Iraqi Ambassador. (Note: Mission contacted
Iraqi Charge to encourage a meeting between the Iraqi MFA
visitor and MEA. Iraqi Charge informed PolMilOff on April 20
that Ambassador al-Jawadi would like to visit India as part
of an "unofficial familiarization tour" of Asia after the
Bandung Summit, including stops in several other countries,
e.g., Vietnam. The purpose of his visit to New Delhi would
be "internal," i.e., to meet and brief Iraqi Embassy staff,
but he may also seek meetings with MEA Secretary (East) Rajiv
Sikri, Indian journalists, and US Embassy New Delhi,
according to Iraqi Charge. End Note.)


5. (C) Singh then turned the conversation to the security
situation in the country and the recent kidnapping of a
Pakistani diplomat in Baghdad. Acknowledging that the
insurgents were still an organized and lethal force, PolCouns
highlighted that the January 30 elections undermined them
politically. Further, the Indian Shia community in Lucknow,
Hyderabad and elsewhere seemed to buttress the stabilizing
influence of Ayatollah SISTANI, as evidenced during past
crises in Karbala and during the January polls. According to
Singh, Indian Shias continue to go to Iraq on pilgrimages
despite the travel ban, and many do not return.


6. (SBU) Asked about the status of India-Iraq economic
relations, Singh responded that trade continues to grow. He
was hopeful that the reactivation of a pre-2001 contract for
India's state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation's (ONGC)
to develop oil blocks in Iraq would help address India's
growing energy needs and lessen its $20 million trade
deficit, largely due to the rise in oil prices. The GOI
would like to use India's large-scale, multi-sectoral
involvement in Afghanistan as a model for its engagement in
Iraq, but Singh admitted that the only program the GOI has
tried to replicate thus far is Indian assistance to produce
high-energy biscuits for the World Food Program in Iraq.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) Comment: The GOI remains hamstrung about engaging in
Iraq, paralyzed by bureaucratic inertia, competing
priorities, and an exaggerated fear of the domestically
influential Left parties in the UPA coalition. Natwar's
public remarks with Dr. Rice about the formational government
may have opened space for real GOI movement on this issue.
Key to seeing action will be to encourage contacts between
the GOI and the new Iraqi government as quickly as possible.
End Comment.


8. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
BLAKE