WEN VISIT: UNSC, SIKKIM, ECONOMY STEAL THE SHOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 002758 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2015 TAGS: PREL ETRD CN IN SUBJECT: WEN VISIT: UNSC, SIKKIM, ECONOMY STEAL THE SHOW REF: A. CHENNAI 695 ¶B. NEW DELHI 2677 Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's April 9-12 visit to India produced a dozen documents, and plenty of positive commentary, but the highlights were confusion over China's position on India in the UNSC and agreement on a roadmap to resolution of the border dispute. New Delhi-based China-watchers, declaring the trip a resounding success, initially seized on an April 11 Chinese statement and MEA descriptions of Beijing's support for India in the UNSC, only to be disappointed by Wen's April 12 reiteration of the more ambiguous language of the Joint Statement. Of the many agreements and MOUs, the highlights were the border roadmap, a joint statement in which China acknowledged Sikkim as an Indian state, a protocol for military presence along the Line of Actual Control (LAC),and the release of the India-China Joint Study Group's report on Trade and Economic Cooperation. This message reports the highlights of the bilateral documents. A detailed assessment of the visit will follow septel. End Summary. ¶2. (U) The MEA announced on April 11 that during Wen's visit, India and China signed or released a dozen documents. Among them were the: --Joint Statement of the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China; --Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question; --Report of the India-China Joint Study Group on Comprehensive Trade and Economic Cooperation; --Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of CBMs in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas; --Agreement on Mutual Administrative Assistance and Cooperation in Customs Matters; --MOU on the Launch of the India-China Financial Dialogue; --MOU on Civil Aviation; and --MOU on Provision of Hydrological Information of the Sutlej/Langqen Zangbo River in Flood Season by China to India. Upgrade to Strategic Partner -------------- ¶3. (U) During his April 9-12 visit to New Delhi and Bangalore, Wen met with PM Manmohan Singh, President APJ Abdul Kalam, UPA Chairperson Sonia Gandhi, and Leader of the Opposition LK Advani. The Joint Statement, signed on April 11, declared India and China's intention to establish a "Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity." The statement spoke of the "incremental progress" that Wen and Singh made, in contrast to more ecstatic initial commentary in the media. Lost in Translation? -------------- ¶4. (U) While these dozen agreements broke almost no new ground, the Guiding Principles, the LAC Military Protocol, the Economic Cooperation report (septel),and Wen's comments on India and the UNSC are more significant. In the seven-page joint statement, India noted its aspirations for permanent UNSC membership, and China acknowledged that "India is an important developing country." Stopping short of offering Beijing's support, the document said that China "understands and supports India's aspirations to play an active role in the UN." ¶5. (SBU) Despite the non-committal language in the official statement, Indians, including Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, on April 11 seized upon a comment Wen reportedly made that China would be "happy" to see India as a permanent member of the UNSC. Highlighting the Premier's remarks, Saran told the media that this was a major step forward. The reports that followed reflexively pointed out that the US was now the "significant holdout" among the P-5 that had not come out to support India's UNSC candidacy. Prior to his departure on April 12, however, Wen dashed these hopes when, in response to an AP reporter's question, he spoke of India and the UNSC in the ambiguous terms of the Joint Statement. He also reportedly stated that Japan should "face up to history" and reconsider its UNSC bid, highlighting an issue that may resurface when PM Koizumi follows Wen to New Delhi at the end of April. Our media contacts, speaking on April 12, were bitterly critical of the perceived Chinese flip-flop on the UNSC. Border Roadmap -------------- ¶6. (U) Laying a long-term plan for future resolution of their border dispute, Singh and Wen signed off on an eleven article agreement on the "Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question" and a paragraph in the joint statement acknowledging the "Sikkim State of the Republic of India." The document called for China and India to find a peaceful solution, make "mutually acceptable adjustments," continue the Joint Working Group and Special Representatives meetings, and observe the LAC in reaching a settlement that follows "easily definable natural geographic features," and takes into account the interests of the settled populations. ¶7. (U) Some observers hailed the principles, along with the new Chinese map that Foreign Secretary Saran waved at a press conference showing Sikkim as part of India, as "melting" the border. Others, such as the "Hindustan Times" commentator and National Security Advisory Board member Manoj Joshi, concluded that there was "still a long way to go," and called attention to the lack of understanding on where the LAC, on which the Guiding Principles are based, actually is located. In the Meantime -------------- ¶8. (U) Pending resolution of the border dispute, Wen and PM Singh signed a Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control. Based on "strict observance" of the LAC, the agreement: --prohibits "large-scale military exercises" of more than 15,000 troops in "close proximity" to the line; --requests notification for activities in excess of 5,000 troops 15 days in advance; --provides for a meeting and investigation by the offended party of any alleged air intrusion by military aircraft; --establishes two border meetings annually at each of three locations on the border; and --outlines procedures for the treatment of personnel who may cross the border. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) While generally light on immediate results, Wen's stay in Bangalore (ref A) and New Delhi produced much-needed momentum on the border dispute and highlighted the potential for, and interest in, economic cooperation (septel). The MEA, which spun Wen's remarks into a solid thumbs-up for India at the UNSC, may find itself countering the initial enthusiasm following Wen's pre-departure step back. With this deflationary move we can expect a more sober assessment of the visit which we will report septel. The other notable aspect of this visit was the obvious effort that the Chinese are putting into the cultivation of their India relationship, after years in which the PRC regarded New Delhi with thinly disguised disdain. MULFORD