GWOT ASSESSMENT: MISSION INDIA INPUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002608

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/RA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2015
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV IN
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: MISSION INDIA INPUT

REF: A. STATE 60749

B. STATE 60710

C. CAMP-ZELIKOW MARCH 18 MEMO

D. NEW DELHI 2089

E. 04 NEW DELHI 6445

Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr., for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: Mission welcomes the opportunity to share
its views on ways to expand our GWOT efforts and cooperation
with New Delhi as solicited in Refs A and B. We agree with
the overall thrust of the Bureau's approach (Ref C),but
suggest additional focus on:

-- Continued pressing of Islamabad to dismantle its
Kashmir-oriented terrorist infrastructure;

-- Continued engagement with New Delhi on developments in
Bangladesh and Nepal;

-- Adding terrorist groups active in the Northeast to the OTO
List;

-- Anti-terrorist finance initiatives; and

-- Generating the resources to support this strategy. End
Summary.

Keep Focus on Kashmir
--------------


2. (C) Although cross-LOC infiltration fell considerably in
2004 and Indo-Pak rapprochement continues, eliminating
Kashmir-oriented terrorism remains integral to our CT
strategy in India because it is the area of operations (AOR)
for two FTOs with Al-Qaeda affiliations, LeT and JeM, which
continue to operate in India with safe havens and support by
Pakistan. Our engagement on this issue is critical to US
leverage over New Delhi in the event of any future
spectacular terrorist attack and resulting military crisis.
While Kashmiri support for terrorist groups has fallen
sharply, anti-India sentiment and continuing human rights
abuses by Indian security forces keep the region a potential
breeding ground for terrorist sympathizers and requires more
attention, as the "cause" that the small population of
Islamic extremists in India seeks to exploit. The potential
for terrorist attacks will remain until the GOP uproots
terrorist infrastructure (finances, training facilities,
material support) located on Pakistani territory.

Expand Dialogue on Bangladesh/Northeast India CT Nexus
-------------- --------------


3. (C) The terror threat in Northeast India primarily
emanates from the ethnic insurgencies in Assam, Nagaland,
etc., of which the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) --
which we recommended this year to be added to the US OTO list
-- is the most active. Although the GOI has been leery of US
offers of CT assistance in this region (Ref E),we urge
increased attention to the cross-border dimension involving
Bangladesh-based extremists. The GOI has been more willing
to engage us on the Bangladeshi dimensions of terrorism in
its Northeast, such as cross-border infiltration, external
funding, and arms transfers, which opens a door for us, and
has implications for CT issues with Bangladesh more broadly.
It is also important to continue adding indigenous groups
such as ULFA and others to the US terrorism lists. In
addition to increasing our understanding of terrorist issues
in the border regions of the Northeast/West Bengal and
Bangladesh, heightened focus there will demonstrate that
Washington has the will to act against terrorism even when US
interests are not directly or immediately threatened.

Anti-Terrorist Finance Assistance
--------------


4. (C) The Mission is pressing the GOI to ramp up its
anti-terrorist finance efforts. The USG also needs an
integrated approach to helping the GOI assess its anti-money
laundering training and commodity needs, as well as funding
training, commodity procurement, and professional exchanges
between US Treasury Department's Financial Crimes
Intelligence Network (FinCen) and India's nascent Financial
Intelligence Unit (FIU). The Mission's DHS Office of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has already
established contacts with the FIU,s investigative staffers.
In April, ICE will sponsor a visit to Washington for two of
India,s FIU staffers to meet with relevant US law
enforcement officers.


5. (C) On a related issue, the GOI has requested USG
cooperation to deal with high-quality counterfeit rupees.
The next step is a visit to Washington this spring by a team
of GOI experts for in-depth discussions, for which the US
Treasury Department's Office of South Asia and Southeast Asia
has the action (Ref D). Building cooperation on
anti-counterfeiting would be added dimension in bilateral
cooperation in anti-terrorist financing.

Recommendations
--------------


6. (C) We would offer the following additional suggestions
with resource implications:

-- Increased travel funding to increase our "on the ground"
outreach and information collection, especially in the
northeast;

-- Increased staffing, to include two new Information
Officers to allow Consulates Mumbai and Chennai to increase
their media outreach and programming, as well as a full-time
Calcutta POL/ECON Officer to reach out more effectively to
local law enforcement.

-- Dramatically increased funding for the International
Visitor program to allow the Mission to send more madrassah
educators, Muslim journalists and politicians, and other key
opinion shapers to the US to give them a broader and deeper
understanding of US policy on terrorism, regional security,
and related issues.

-- Support for the INL/New Delhi funding request for the FY
2007 counternarcotics budget proposal to finance a joint
DEA/FBI/DHS money laundering assessment and cooperation
development project.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) The GOI is strongly committed to prosecuting the
GWOT, although Mission needs to ratchet up our bilateral
interaction to overcome pockets of lingering suspicions of US
intentions and to prod slow GOI bureaucracies to make our
cooperation more effective. The proposals outlined here,
coupled with those outlined in Ref C, should significantly
advance our CT goals in India. For the Indian government,
the priority target in the GWOT will continue to be the
Pakistani support for terrorism in J&K, and to retain
credibility here the US must be perceived as engaged in
meeting this threat.
MULFORD