GWOT ASSESSMENT: MISSION INDIA INPUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002608 SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/RA E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2015 TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV IN SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: MISSION INDIA INPUT REF: A. STATE 60749 ¶B. STATE 60710 ¶C. CAMP-ZELIKOW MARCH 18 MEMO ¶D. NEW DELHI 2089 ¶E. 04 NEW DELHI 6445 Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr., for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Mission welcomes the opportunity to share its views on ways to expand our GWOT efforts and cooperation with New Delhi as solicited in Refs A and B. We agree with the overall thrust of the Bureau's approach (Ref C),but suggest additional focus on: -- Continued pressing of Islamabad to dismantle its Kashmir-oriented terrorist infrastructure; -- Continued engagement with New Delhi on developments in Bangladesh and Nepal; -- Adding terrorist groups active in the Northeast to the OTO List; -- Anti-terrorist finance initiatives; and -- Generating the resources to support this strategy. End Summary. Keep Focus on Kashmir -------------- ¶2. (C) Although cross-LOC infiltration fell considerably in 2004 and Indo-Pak rapprochement continues, eliminating Kashmir-oriented terrorism remains integral to our CT strategy in India because it is the area of operations (AOR) for two FTOs with Al-Qaeda affiliations, LeT and JeM, which continue to operate in India with safe havens and support by Pakistan. Our engagement on this issue is critical to US leverage over New Delhi in the event of any future spectacular terrorist attack and resulting military crisis. While Kashmiri support for terrorist groups has fallen sharply, anti-India sentiment and continuing human rights abuses by Indian security forces keep the region a potential breeding ground for terrorist sympathizers and requires more attention, as the "cause" that the small population of Islamic extremists in India seeks to exploit. The potential for terrorist attacks will remain until the GOP uproots terrorist infrastructure (finances, training facilities, material support) located on Pakistani territory. Expand Dialogue on Bangladesh/Northeast India CT Nexus -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) The terror threat in Northeast India primarily emanates from the ethnic insurgencies in Assam, Nagaland, etc., of which the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) -- which we recommended this year to be added to the US OTO list -- is the most active. Although the GOI has been leery of US offers of CT assistance in this region (Ref E),we urge increased attention to the cross-border dimension involving Bangladesh-based extremists. The GOI has been more willing to engage us on the Bangladeshi dimensions of terrorism in its Northeast, such as cross-border infiltration, external funding, and arms transfers, which opens a door for us, and has implications for CT issues with Bangladesh more broadly. It is also important to continue adding indigenous groups such as ULFA and others to the US terrorism lists. In addition to increasing our understanding of terrorist issues in the border regions of the Northeast/West Bengal and Bangladesh, heightened focus there will demonstrate that Washington has the will to act against terrorism even when US interests are not directly or immediately threatened. Anti-Terrorist Finance Assistance -------------- ¶4. (C) The Mission is pressing the GOI to ramp up its anti-terrorist finance efforts. The USG also needs an integrated approach to helping the GOI assess its anti-money laundering training and commodity needs, as well as funding training, commodity procurement, and professional exchanges between US Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Intelligence Network (FinCen) and India's nascent Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). The Mission's DHS Office of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has already established contacts with the FIU,s investigative staffers. In April, ICE will sponsor a visit to Washington for two of India,s FIU staffers to meet with relevant US law enforcement officers. ¶5. (C) On a related issue, the GOI has requested USG cooperation to deal with high-quality counterfeit rupees. The next step is a visit to Washington this spring by a team of GOI experts for in-depth discussions, for which the US Treasury Department's Office of South Asia and Southeast Asia has the action (Ref D). Building cooperation on anti-counterfeiting would be added dimension in bilateral cooperation in anti-terrorist financing. Recommendations -------------- ¶6. (C) We would offer the following additional suggestions with resource implications: -- Increased travel funding to increase our "on the ground" outreach and information collection, especially in the northeast; -- Increased staffing, to include two new Information Officers to allow Consulates Mumbai and Chennai to increase their media outreach and programming, as well as a full-time Calcutta POL/ECON Officer to reach out more effectively to local law enforcement. -- Dramatically increased funding for the International Visitor program to allow the Mission to send more madrassah educators, Muslim journalists and politicians, and other key opinion shapers to the US to give them a broader and deeper understanding of US policy on terrorism, regional security, and related issues. -- Support for the INL/New Delhi funding request for the FY 2007 counternarcotics budget proposal to finance a joint DEA/FBI/DHS money laundering assessment and cooperation development project. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) The GOI is strongly committed to prosecuting the GWOT, although Mission needs to ratchet up our bilateral interaction to overcome pockets of lingering suspicions of US intentions and to prod slow GOI bureaucracies to make our cooperation more effective. The proposals outlined here, coupled with those outlined in Ref C, should significantly advance our CT goals in India. For the Indian government, the priority target in the GWOT will continue to be the Pakistani support for terrorism in J&K, and to retain credibility here the US must be perceived as engaged in meeting this threat. MULFORD