INDIAN EXPERTS CONTEMPLATE NEPAL WITHOUT A KING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001556

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2015
TAGS: PREL MASS KDEM IN NP
SUBJECT: INDIAN EXPERTS CONTEMPLATE NEPAL WITHOUT A KING

REF: NEW DELHI 1482

Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: During a February 25 lunch that the
Ambassador hosted for visiting Ambassador to Nepal Moriarty,
Indian experts on Nepal agreed that:

-- The RNA was unlikely to collapse as a result of the
suspension of military assistance;

-- A Maoist takeover is more likely to result from political
failure from the King and political parties than from
military victory;

-- The monarchy must make democratic changes or collapse as
an institution; and

-- The King's actions have strengthened the Maoists'
position. End Summary.


2. (C) The lunch, hosted on February 25 by the Ambassador in
honor of Ambassador to Nepal Moriarty, gathered several of
India's most prominent non-government Nepal experts including
retired Ambassadors, academics, and retired military
officers. Discussion focused on the crisis and the US and
Indian responses.

Implications of Assistance Cutoff
--------------


3. (C) There was broad agreement that India's suspension of
military aid would not impact the RNA so severely that it
would be unable to withstand the Maoists. Therefore, the
experts advised, India, the US, and the UK should continue
their current approach to maintain pressure on the King.
Participants concurred that neither the Maoists nor the RNA
had the military strength to defeat the other. MG (Ret)
Ashok Mehta disputed the notion that the RNA would soon face
shortages of weapons or ammunition due to suspension of
military aid, but conceded that the GOI and USG should
investigate the question of RNA supplies more closely.


4. (C) Considering potential scenarios proposed by
Ambassador Moriarty, participants identified two paths that
could lead to a Maoist victory: a poorly-negotiated
compromise (forced upon Nepal by other countries) that would
hand too much power to the Maoists, or a campaign of targeted
violence or assassinations that saps the will of the GON to
resist the Maoists.


5. (C) Participants were skeptical that the supply of
explosives for the Maoists' IEDs could be cut off. Although
these illegal explosives come largely from commercial sources
in India, participants doubted that India could stop the
smuggling or implement a chemical tagging system. Terrorism
expert Ajai Sahni reported that India had studied this option
in the past, but that the Maoists constructed their
explosives from common chemicals that were not amenable to
tagging.

Nepal's Political Future
--------------


6. (C) The Indian experts came to no agreement on a solution
to the present crisis, although they agreed broadly that:

-- A constituent assembly could provide a political solution
to the King's problem of legitimacy. However, the Maoists
would only support such a step if they are certain of
dominating the process.

-- In contrast to most Nepal residents, who reportedly are
not considering radical changes to the monarchy, as they are
widely supportive of the institution, many Indian Nepal
experts are beginning to contemplate the future of the
Kingdom without a monarch.

-- The King has severely damaged the institution of monarchy
with his absolutist tendencies. The Palace would not survive
Crown Prince Paras as King. Former Indian Ambassador to
Nepal AR Deo, who heads the Nepal Center at the prominent New
Delhi-based think tank Observer Research Foundation (ORF),
stated that Nepal appears to be no exception to the
international trend of monarchies ending around the globe.
The question for policy makers is how to ensure a soft
landing.


7. (C) Interlocutors agreed that India has relatively little
leverage on the King. Retired Ambassador G Parthasarthy, one
of the architects of India's 1989 economic blockade of the
Kingdom, noted that any attempt to squeeze the King
economically would hurt primarily the people of Nepal, thus
"repeating the mistakes of 1989." Similarly, India has few
levers to pressure the Maoists into concessions.
Participants supported the Ambassador's observation that time
favors the Maoists in the present crisis, and that the
Maoists recognize this. Because they were under relatively
little pressure to negotiate, Parthasarthy and Deo warned
that "other countries'" efforts to craft a compromise would
favor the Maoists and might enable them to take over the
government.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Aside from the opportunity to hear comments from
several of India's most prominent Nepal experts on whom the
GOI draws for outside expertise, the exchange also was useful
for its insights into the pulse of Indian specialists'
thinking on the crisis. The discussion was equally
beneficial for clarifying misconceptions regarding USG policy
(particularly military assistance),as a number of guests
were unaware of important nuances in the USG position. The
guests were pleased at the opportunity to interact with
Ambassador Moriarty on his stop in New Delhi before returning
to Kathmandu.
MULFORD