Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NEWDELHI1551
2005-03-01 12:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:
TERRORIST THREATS MARR SUCCESSFUL KASHMIR POLLS
how-toThis record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 001551
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM KDEM IN PK
SUBJECT: TERRORIST THREATS MARR SUCCESSFUL KASHMIR POLLS
REF: NEW DELHI 749
Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 001551
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM KDEM IN PK
SUBJECT: TERRORIST THREATS MARR SUCCESSFUL KASHMIR POLLS
REF: NEW DELHI 749
Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) Summary: The February J&K municipal elections produced largely positive results. Participation, among the most important criteria for defining a ""successful"" election in the state, greatly exceeded expectations (even in areas with a history of alienation from New Delhi),proving again that Kashmiris will defy terrorist threats and separatist boycott calls to shape how they are governed, even if they do not consider their votes necessarily as ""a vote for India."" Compared with other J&K polls since 2002, there were few casualties. There were also few reports of irregularities.
However, during the campaign, many candidates withdrew, and many newly-elected councillors from the Valley have since resigned, gone into hiding, or fled to Jammu following insurgents' threats, depriving the exercise of some of its shine. How these local bodies will function remains unclear.
End Summary.
Another Solid Electoral Exercise
--------------
2. (C) Observers continue to watch elections in J&K more closely than in many other Indian states for a number of reasons, including: to gauge the credibility of an electoral process that has often been flawed in the past; to take stock of voter enthusiasm and participation as indications of Kashmiri alienation and attitudes towards India; to monitor popular attitudes towards the separatists; and to assess insurgent behavior. While budgetary restrictions prevented us from observing the three week February municipal polls firsthand, we have spoken with many who did. These were the first elections at this level in 27 years, and as such represented the best barometer of grassroots voter behavior in the Valley since the insurgency began in 1989. Among the more significant observations from this exercise:
-- In the third major electoral exercise since the Legislative Assembly elections in 2002, the voting process was again credible. There were few reports of irregularities, and those that were noted paralleled those present elsewhere in India (such as names missing on voters' lists, while some ""mobile voters"" voted early and often). Even National Conference (NC) President Omar Abdullah, who had complained to the press of ""rigging,"" recently played these allegations down to D/Polcouns. We have also seen no further support for JKLF leader Yasin Malik's allegations that coercion by the security forces was behind high turnout rates.
-- Voter participation was higher than at any time since 1989. This was not a result of greatly increased pro-India sentiment in the Valley, although there is much anecdotal evidence that Kashmiris increasingly yearn for normalcy.
With each successful election, Kashmiris have fewer reasons to reject the electoral process as illegitimate, as they see their influence over who governs them. As a journalist from the ""Daily Excelsior"" put it to us, Kashmiris for the most part treated the elections not as a political exercise related to the status of Kashmir, but as a developmental issue, which ""provided the silent majority the justification it needed to take part,"" and put those who opposed it on the wrong side of democracy. After seeing the size of the turnout in the first round, All-Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) hardliner SAS Geelani adopted a variant of this view, maintaining that the elections were about ""developing civic amenities.""
-- Polling ranged from the low teens to mid-20 percent even in separatist bastions such as Shopian, ""Srinagar's ""Gaza"" (Maisuma),and the areas around the Hazratbal shrine and the APHC HQ, where turnout has been in the low single digits since 1989. One Srinagar-based correspondent called these turnout rates ""a vote against the separatist leadership,"" which had tried to make the election into a ""plebiscite on attitudes towards India, and the people did not buy it.""
-- Journalists in the Valley tell us that threats and intimidation from insurgents were much more responsible for keeping Kashmiri voters away from polling stations than the calls by Hurriyat leaders for a boycott, although only Geelani, the two JKLF factions, and Shabir Shah really were active in urging a boycott (the moderate Hurriyat issued several calls, but little more). As ""Pioneer"" Srinagar correspondent Kurshid Wani put it, ""whatever boycott there was was not under the influence of the APHC but rather due to the insurgents."" Hurriyat leader Prof AG Bhat conceded that the 2003 split in the APHC contributed to the high turnout, as voters would not listen to a divided leadership.
-- The governing PDP did fairly well in South Kashmir, while the NC did well in Srinagar and parts of Central and North Kashmir, but neither party emerged from the fray much stronger vis-a-vis the other. As usual, Congress did poorly in the Valley. PDP and Congress together did very well in Poonch/Rajouri (where turnout was 79 percent). The BJP did well in the Jammu region.
-- Large numbers of women (30 percent of total turnout was female) and young people participated, both as candidates and voters.
Security Dominates the Aftermath
--------------
3. (C) Terrorist intimidation, however, has taken some of the shine from the results:
-- During the campaign, large numbers of candidates withdrew their names from consideration, and many newly-elected councillors from the Valley have reportedly resigned, gone into hiding, or fled to Jammu as a result of threats from insurgents. Reliable data are difficult to obtain, but a well-connected journalist in Jammu told us that ""scores"" of candidates resigned during the campaign, resulting in unopposed contests, particularly in terrorist-infested areas in South Kashmir, that 91 persons were elected unopposed, and that there were no candidates at all in 35 wards (of 890 total statewide). Many of these resignations took the form of advertisements in the vernacular press, in which candidates apologized for running for office. Since the results were declared, 10-15 more councillors have resigned, but initial reports of mass resignations appear to have been overblown.
-- Terrorists killed relatively few (five) candidates, political workers (five),and their relatives and friends, and few injuries were reported. However, the assassination of a 75-year old councillor expected to be elected the Mayor of Srinagar cast a pall over the relatively high (by post-1989 standards) turnout in Srinagar (some 20 percent)
and led to an uptick in resignations from successful candidates. Many unsuccessful candidates are reportedly also lying low or have gone into hiding.
-- The J&K government has gone to some lengths to address these security concerns after Omar Abdullah threatened to withdraw all NC representatives from municipal bodies to protest their vulnerability. Since then, at least one Personal Security Officer (PSO) has reportedly been assigned to each elected councillor. Many observers predict that security will be a major factor in how well the local councils function, because so many councillors (444 in the Valley alone) will potentially be exposed. Fears are reportedly most pronounced in Srinagar, Anantnag, and Pulwama, but are present elsewhere as well. PDP General Secretary Sadiq Ali told us the assignment of PSOs has
SIPDIS assuaged concerns somewhat, while unusually harsh winter conditions in the state have diverted attention. He expected concerns to resurface with warmer weather.
-- Journalists speculate that councillors from the Valley who have fled to Jammu are likely to trickle back by the end of the Winter Session of the Legislative Assembly when the Durbar moves to Srinagar in May. Press reports of 400 departures for Jammu have not been corroborated.
Comment
--------------
4. (C) These elections are another important success for the J&K government. Although likely to try to reduce the effectiveness of these elected bodies, the terrorists cannot be unaware of the strong popular support Kashmiris in particular showed for these polls. The relatively small number of casualties during the process is very positive, but it is unclear what this means. The optimistic reading is that jihadi commanders in the Valley received and heeded instructions from Pakistan not to disrupt the polls, but it is also possible that the terrorists merely altered their strategy -- and seek to disrupt the democratic process in an ex post facto manner via intimidation, rather than widespread and indiscriminate murder as was the case in the fall 2002 state elections, during which some 800 politicians, election workers, and civilians were killed.
5. (C) It will not be clear until later in the year whether councillors' security will be as much of an issue as appears to be the case at present, and whether these civic bodies will be as successful in practice as was the process that constituted them. Mufti (and the GOI) now must ensure that they have the funds and the authority to act on issues voters entrusted to them, lest an opportunity to demonstrate the positive results of the democratic process for Kashmiris is lost. Given the rhetorical emphasis Mufti and the GOI are now placing on economic development in J&K (while leaving dialogue with the separatists for another time),it would be a major mistake for the state and central government not to put their money where their mouth is.
MULFORD
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM KDEM IN PK
SUBJECT: TERRORIST THREATS MARR SUCCESSFUL KASHMIR POLLS
REF: NEW DELHI 749
Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) Summary: The February J&K municipal elections produced largely positive results. Participation, among the most important criteria for defining a ""successful"" election in the state, greatly exceeded expectations (even in areas with a history of alienation from New Delhi),proving again that Kashmiris will defy terrorist threats and separatist boycott calls to shape how they are governed, even if they do not consider their votes necessarily as ""a vote for India."" Compared with other J&K polls since 2002, there were few casualties. There were also few reports of irregularities.
However, during the campaign, many candidates withdrew, and many newly-elected councillors from the Valley have since resigned, gone into hiding, or fled to Jammu following insurgents' threats, depriving the exercise of some of its shine. How these local bodies will function remains unclear.
End Summary.
Another Solid Electoral Exercise
--------------
2. (C) Observers continue to watch elections in J&K more closely than in many other Indian states for a number of reasons, including: to gauge the credibility of an electoral process that has often been flawed in the past; to take stock of voter enthusiasm and participation as indications of Kashmiri alienation and attitudes towards India; to monitor popular attitudes towards the separatists; and to assess insurgent behavior. While budgetary restrictions prevented us from observing the three week February municipal polls firsthand, we have spoken with many who did. These were the first elections at this level in 27 years, and as such represented the best barometer of grassroots voter behavior in the Valley since the insurgency began in 1989. Among the more significant observations from this exercise:
-- In the third major electoral exercise since the Legislative Assembly elections in 2002, the voting process was again credible. There were few reports of irregularities, and those that were noted paralleled those present elsewhere in India (such as names missing on voters' lists, while some ""mobile voters"" voted early and often). Even National Conference (NC) President Omar Abdullah, who had complained to the press of ""rigging,"" recently played these allegations down to D/Polcouns. We have also seen no further support for JKLF leader Yasin Malik's allegations that coercion by the security forces was behind high turnout rates.
-- Voter participation was higher than at any time since 1989. This was not a result of greatly increased pro-India sentiment in the Valley, although there is much anecdotal evidence that Kashmiris increasingly yearn for normalcy.
With each successful election, Kashmiris have fewer reasons to reject the electoral process as illegitimate, as they see their influence over who governs them. As a journalist from the ""Daily Excelsior"" put it to us, Kashmiris for the most part treated the elections not as a political exercise related to the status of Kashmir, but as a developmental issue, which ""provided the silent majority the justification it needed to take part,"" and put those who opposed it on the wrong side of democracy. After seeing the size of the turnout in the first round, All-Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) hardliner SAS Geelani adopted a variant of this view, maintaining that the elections were about ""developing civic amenities.""
-- Polling ranged from the low teens to mid-20 percent even in separatist bastions such as Shopian, ""Srinagar's ""Gaza"" (Maisuma),and the areas around the Hazratbal shrine and the APHC HQ, where turnout has been in the low single digits since 1989. One Srinagar-based correspondent called these turnout rates ""a vote against the separatist leadership,"" which had tried to make the election into a ""plebiscite on attitudes towards India, and the people did not buy it.""
-- Journalists in the Valley tell us that threats and intimidation from insurgents were much more responsible for keeping Kashmiri voters away from polling stations than the calls by Hurriyat leaders for a boycott, although only Geelani, the two JKLF factions, and Shabir Shah really were active in urging a boycott (the moderate Hurriyat issued several calls, but little more). As ""Pioneer"" Srinagar correspondent Kurshid Wani put it, ""whatever boycott there was was not under the influence of the APHC but rather due to the insurgents."" Hurriyat leader Prof AG Bhat conceded that the 2003 split in the APHC contributed to the high turnout, as voters would not listen to a divided leadership.
-- The governing PDP did fairly well in South Kashmir, while the NC did well in Srinagar and parts of Central and North Kashmir, but neither party emerged from the fray much stronger vis-a-vis the other. As usual, Congress did poorly in the Valley. PDP and Congress together did very well in Poonch/Rajouri (where turnout was 79 percent). The BJP did well in the Jammu region.
-- Large numbers of women (30 percent of total turnout was female) and young people participated, both as candidates and voters.
Security Dominates the Aftermath
--------------
3. (C) Terrorist intimidation, however, has taken some of the shine from the results:
-- During the campaign, large numbers of candidates withdrew their names from consideration, and many newly-elected councillors from the Valley have reportedly resigned, gone into hiding, or fled to Jammu as a result of threats from insurgents. Reliable data are difficult to obtain, but a well-connected journalist in Jammu told us that ""scores"" of candidates resigned during the campaign, resulting in unopposed contests, particularly in terrorist-infested areas in South Kashmir, that 91 persons were elected unopposed, and that there were no candidates at all in 35 wards (of 890 total statewide). Many of these resignations took the form of advertisements in the vernacular press, in which candidates apologized for running for office. Since the results were declared, 10-15 more councillors have resigned, but initial reports of mass resignations appear to have been overblown.
-- Terrorists killed relatively few (five) candidates, political workers (five),and their relatives and friends, and few injuries were reported. However, the assassination of a 75-year old councillor expected to be elected the Mayor of Srinagar cast a pall over the relatively high (by post-1989 standards) turnout in Srinagar (some 20 percent)
and led to an uptick in resignations from successful candidates. Many unsuccessful candidates are reportedly also lying low or have gone into hiding.
-- The J&K government has gone to some lengths to address these security concerns after Omar Abdullah threatened to withdraw all NC representatives from municipal bodies to protest their vulnerability. Since then, at least one Personal Security Officer (PSO) has reportedly been assigned to each elected councillor. Many observers predict that security will be a major factor in how well the local councils function, because so many councillors (444 in the Valley alone) will potentially be exposed. Fears are reportedly most pronounced in Srinagar, Anantnag, and Pulwama, but are present elsewhere as well. PDP General Secretary Sadiq Ali told us the assignment of PSOs has
SIPDIS assuaged concerns somewhat, while unusually harsh winter conditions in the state have diverted attention. He expected concerns to resurface with warmer weather.
-- Journalists speculate that councillors from the Valley who have fled to Jammu are likely to trickle back by the end of the Winter Session of the Legislative Assembly when the Durbar moves to Srinagar in May. Press reports of 400 departures for Jammu have not been corroborated.
Comment
--------------
4. (C) These elections are another important success for the J&K government. Although likely to try to reduce the effectiveness of these elected bodies, the terrorists cannot be unaware of the strong popular support Kashmiris in particular showed for these polls. The relatively small number of casualties during the process is very positive, but it is unclear what this means. The optimistic reading is that jihadi commanders in the Valley received and heeded instructions from Pakistan not to disrupt the polls, but it is also possible that the terrorists merely altered their strategy -- and seek to disrupt the democratic process in an ex post facto manner via intimidation, rather than widespread and indiscriminate murder as was the case in the fall 2002 state elections, during which some 800 politicians, election workers, and civilians were killed.
5. (C) It will not be clear until later in the year whether councillors' security will be as much of an issue as appears to be the case at present, and whether these civic bodies will be as successful in practice as was the process that constituted them. Mufti (and the GOI) now must ensure that they have the funds and the authority to act on issues voters entrusted to them, lest an opportunity to demonstrate the positive results of the democratic process for Kashmiris is lost. Given the rhetorical emphasis Mufti and the GOI are now placing on economic development in J&K (while leaving dialogue with the separatists for another time),it would be a major mistake for the state and central government not to put their money where their mouth is.
MULFORD