INDIA RIDING HIGH ON POST-TSUNAMI WAVE OF GOOD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 001224

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2015
TAGS: PREL EAID ETRD CE IN
SUBJECT: INDIA RIDING HIGH ON POST-TSUNAMI WAVE OF GOOD
WILL; BIG PLANS FOR SRI LANKA


Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt. Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: As a concrete demonstration of India's
magnanimity and competence, New Delhi's recent large-scale
assistance to its tsunami-stricken neighbors had illustrated
the country's standing as a regional and emerging world
power, according to observers here. India is particularly
proud of its efforts in Sri Lanka, which it views as a sign
of the strong bilateral relationship that Prime Minister
Singh will play up during his planned March visit to Sri
Lanka. One MEA contact described the GOI goal as "an EU kind
of relationship" with Sri Lanka. From the Indian
perspective, the tsunami has proved an overwhelming
diplomatic success -- within South Asia, outside the region,
and bilaterally with the US. End Summary.

Tsunami Public Diplomacy

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2. (C) Without a hint of bashfulness, six weeks after the
disaster, the MEA published a polished, glossy review of
India's relief efforts at home and abroad titled "Bridging
the Ocean: India Leads Relief Measures in Tsunami-hit Areas."
In a country-by-country overview of India's external aid,
punctuated with photographs of Indian military personnel and
hardware delivering assistance, the MEA explained that
because of "a natural sense of affinity and...confidence in
its capabilities," India was the first country to come to Sri
Lanka's aid. The booklet, clearly intended for foreign
audiences (one well-informed MEA interlocutor did not even
know it existed),concluded that India's "management" of the
tsunami has led to "a changed perception of the country in

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the eyes of the international community."

"Elephant Underground"
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3. (C) South Asia expert Professor SD Muni commented to
Poloff recently that India's aid for Sri Lanka further
strengthens that relationship, as it was part of "a trend
that was building all along." Muni did not attach much
significance to the fact that India's relief in Sri Lanka was
the country's first large-scale military deployment there
since the unsuccessful 1989 Indian Peace Keeping Force
action. The Indian armed forces were the logical choice
because of their capabilities to accomplish such a mission,
he countered, adding that in 2003 the Indian military also
provided flood relief to its island neighbor. Institute for
Peace and Conflict Studies researcher N. Manoharan offered a
similar assessment, remarking that the military response was
a "natural" one.


4. (C) Manoharan observed that although there was an
"inherent power projection" in India's relief effort in Sri
Lanka, Colombo was very appreciative. On the long term
prognosis for India-Sri Lanka relations, he predicted that
there will always be a view in Sri Lanka that India is the
"elephant" in the neighborhood, and while that feeling is
"underground" now, it may return. Following the tsunami, the
sense in Sri Lanka was overwhelmingly positive, he concluded.

In Step With Colombo
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5. (C) As evidence of the positive momentum between New
Delhi and Colombo, MEA Joint Secretary (SAARC) V. Ashok
highlighted to PolCouns and Poloff on February 16 the
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) that he
expects the Prime Minister will sign during his March trip to
Sri Lanka. The CEPA, he explained, builds on the existing
free trade agreement (FTA) between the two countries. It
will include a reduction in the outstanding negative lists on
both sides, the addition of trade in services, and harmonized
standards and customs procedures. Describing this as phase
two of the India-Sri Lankan partnership (with phase one
having been the FTA) Ashok animatedly mapped out next stages
after the CEPA, which would include national treatment for
each other's investors, and the movement of professionals
between the two countries, as well as the integration of
electric and transportation grids. Describing the end point
as "an EU kind of relationship," Ashok praised Colombo's
ability to consider economic development on a separate plane
from the GOSL's political difficulties.

Tiger Watching
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6. (C) While MEA Director (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka) TS Sandhu,
in a January 7 conversation with PolCouns, had hoped for
cooperation between the GOSL and LTTE in countering the
tsunami, a month later he expressed concern that Sri Lankan

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President Kumaratunga may miss an opportunity to engage with
the Tigers. Although he thought the February 7 attack on
LTTE political leader E. Kausalyan did not bode well, Sandhu
ventured that both the Tigers and government may be too
exhausted to fight, possibly creating an opening for talks.
Prominent foreign affairs commentator Maj. Gen. (retd) Ashok
Mehta echoed Sandhu's dimming optimism on the
tsunami-prompted prospects for peace in Sri Lanka. On

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February 10, he told Poloff that Kausalyan's death supported
his belief that the common tragedy would not bring the GOSL
and LTTE closer together. Gloomier still, the IPCS'
Manoharan predicted that amidst claims of ethnic
discrimination from Sri Lankan Tamils whom aid was not
reaching, the tsunami had resulted in further division,
rather than been an opportunity.

Regional Power
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7. (C) Local strategists have also looked to capitalize on
the perception that India "stood its ground" with the US, and
asserted its own primacy in South Asia. In its tsunami
relief publication, the MEA took care to point out that the
Indian Navy arrived within hours of the disaster "at least a
week before the US Marines reached there." Professor Muni
argued to Poloff that despite the MEA's reassurances that the
US and India coordinated successfully in Sri Lanka "eyebrows
were raised" at the US' involvement in what the GOI considers
"its soft belly." Muni paternalistically asserted that the
GOI's position that New Delhi did not need foreign tsunami
assistance, but would request it if that assessment changed,
applied to Sri Lanka as well.


8. (C) Despite these barbs from some in the strategic
community, the MEA, publicly stressed its close coordination
with the US, highlighting New Delhi's selection for the Core
Group as evidence of the country's equivalence with Japan and
Australia: "recognizing the key role that India can play in
the region, it was invited to be a part of the Tsunami Core
Group put together by the United States." One senior MEA
official complained to us in this context that academics like
Muni will never believe the new reality of Indo-US
partnership. Likewise, in a February 15 meeting with USAID
Assistant Administrator Douglas Menarchik, MEA Joint
Secretary (Americas) S. Jaishankar made the point that the

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"real test of US-India partnership will be our ability to
coordinate in third countries."

Comment
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9. (C) From the Indian perspective, the tsunami has been
both a terrible tragedy and a diplomatic success -- within
South Asia, outside the region, and bilaterally with the US.
The Indians proved themselves to be effective at managing
their relief efforts abroad, as well as their coordination
with foreign governments. At the working level, MEA
officials were cooperative and surprisingly forthcoming with
information. New Delhi's strong performance during the
disaster is the kind of evidence India has been looking for
to support its claim that it is an international power and a
benevolent neighbor. This role is particularly welcomed here
with reference to Sri Lanka -- a country that India views as
a model neighbor, with trade and other ties accelerating
rapidly. In this context, the Indian Navy's exemplary
performance in Sri Lanka is evidence that the ghosts of
India's unsuccessful 1989 military intervention have now been
laid to rest.
MULFORD