SARAN URGES CONTINUED PRESSURE ON NEPAL, WILL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001114 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2015 TAGS: PREL MASS IN NP SUBJECT: SARAN URGES CONTINUED PRESSURE ON NEPAL, WILL RECALL AMBASSADOR REF: A. STATE 25168 ¶B. STATE 24949 Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford. Reasons 1.5. (B,D) ¶1. (U) This is an action request. See para 9. ¶2. (C) Summary: As instructed reftels, the Ambassador advised Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran on February 11 of the USG position on assistance to Nepal and our intention to withdraw our Ambassador as early as February 14. Arguing that the RNA had enough supplies for some time, Saran pressed for a postponement of US military assistance. Following the meeting, MEA Joint Secretary (Americas) S Jaishankar called Polcouns requesting a formal reassurance from Washington that the US would not fill the gap created by the GOI and UK suspension of military supplies, given the "centrality of this issue." Saran said India would also recall its Ambassador, but the timing and duration might not be identical with ours. The GOI had been thinking along similar lines, and the MEA will revert to us on exact timing. Saran reported that sources in Kathmandu have told the GOI that the King is looking for a way out of the crisis and has sent an intermediary to New Delhi for discussions. The Foreign Secretary offered to provide more specificity after he meets SIPDIS that person on February 12. End Summary. ¶3. (C) In a late afternoon meeting on February 11, the Ambassador underlined to Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran our desire to remain in close consultation with India over the crisis in Nepal, but drew attention to slight differences in our positions on military assistance (Ref B). Saran was aware that the USG intends to review its assistance programs, but pressed for a postponement of military assistance. He understood our desire not to embolden the Maoists, but emphasized that India also did "not wish to give satisfaction to the other side." The UK had also drawn this line, he noted, and the next few weeks would be crucial. He did not agree with the argument that the RNA could collapse as a result, observing that they had enough arms to carry them over for some time. We need to build on the pressure, he said. The King is feeling the heat, and "if we let up it will disappear." ¶4. (C) The Ambassador responded by pointing out that the differences between our positions seemed mostly semantic: India has a major arms supply relationship that it has suspended, but does not wish to announce that it has done so. In contrast, the US does not have such a relationship, and the USG does not wish to make a public statement, because there is nothing to stop right now. ¶5. (C) Saran replied that "the King should know that we will not open the floodgates, and will not send masses of equipment. He should not get that satisfaction from us," and urged the US to be "clear about what we say." Following the meeting, MEA J/S (Americas) S. Jaishankar called Polcouns requesting a formal reassurance from Washington that the US will not attempt to fill the military supply gap created by the Indian (and UK) suspension of military supplies. That is "the key signal at this point," Jaishankar emphasized, adding that he "hopes we understand the centrality of this issue" for the GOI. ¶6. (C) As instructed Ref A, the Ambassador then informed Saran that the United States may recall its Ambassador as early as February 14, and urged India to join with us and the UK in order to send the strongest possible message to the King. The Foreign Secretary responded that India was also planning to recall its Ambassador for consultations, but that the timing and duration might not be identical with ours. The step would follow in the next several days, he stated. Jaishankar told Polcouns after the meeting that India shares our view on the withdrawal of Ambassadors, and was thinking along the same lines even before our approach. MEA J/S (Nepal) Ranjit Rae will revert on the specific timing, but it will be "sooner rather than later." Saran would be happy to meet with Ambassador Moriarty if he comes through Delhi on his way out of Kathmandu. King Looking for a Way Out? -------------- ¶7. (C) Saran then reported that highly reliable sources in Kathmandu have told the GOI that the King is looking for a way out of the crisis. The King is aware that India did not agree with his recent actions, and has sent an intermediary to New Delhi for discussions. The Foreign Secretary said he would meet that person on February 12, and could provide more specificity after they meet. ¶8. (C) During the last several days, very reliable sources had also told the GOI that the King had timed his takeover to coincide with the SAARC Summit, in the hope that he would present the grouping with a fait accompli. He thought he had a foolproof plan, but has now realized he miscalculated, and that his scenario was unravelling. The King is not suicidal, Saran observed, which makes it all the more important for us to keep up the pressure. ¶9. (C) Action Request: Given the importance of remaining as close as possible to India and the UK on Nepal, Mission requests a formal Washington reassurance that the US will not attempt to fill the military supply gap created by the US and UK suspension of military supplies, as well as guidance regarding the exact state of the US military supply pipeline to Nepal. A reply by OOB February 12 before the expected February 13 encounter between NSA Narayanan and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld at Wehrkunde would be appreciated. MULFORD