CHAD PUBLICLY ACCUSES SUDAN OF AIDING CHADIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000565 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF CD SU SUBJECT: CHAD PUBLICLY ACCUSES SUDAN OF AIDING CHADIAN REBELS REF: A. NDJAMENA 04 962 ¶B. NDJAMENA 405 ¶C. NDJAMENA 441 ¶D. NDJAMENA 543 Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso ns 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: On April 8, the Chadian Government convoked the diplomatic corps to accuse Khartoum publicly of "maintaining, arming, and financing" Chadian rebel groups inside Sudan. There are 3,000 Chadian rebels near El Geneina, Sudan, according to the Minister of Justice. Chad has long suspected Sudanese support for its opponents. This public accusation is an indication of President Deby's frustration with the Government of Sudan over the Darfur peace process and what he believes is its assistance to his enemies. It also comes at a time when Deby is considering possible ways to assist the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM). End Summary. - - - - - - - STRONG WORDS - - - - - - - ¶2. (U) On April 8, Minister of Justice Kalzeube Payimi Deubet, in his capacity as acting Foreign Minister, convoked the diplomatic corps to convey the Government of Chad's concerns about Sudanese support for Chadian rebels. Kalzeube stated that subject of the Council of Ministers meeting on April 7 was the security and stability of Chad. Specifically, the presence of 3,000 Chadian rebels concentrated in Sudan near Makjar, Sudan not far from El Geneina. Kalzeube noted that Chad has made multiple bilateral demarches to bring an end to GOS support for the Chadian rebels. Despite its assurances and promises, the communique states that the GOS's "special services have continued to maintain, arm, and finance the Chadian opponents that have established themselves in Sudanese territory." The Chadians convoked the Sudanese Ambassador on April 7 to discuss Chad's preoccupation with the situation and to lodge a formal protest. In addition, the Chadian Government demanded an explanation. ¶3. (U) The communique also states that given "the indifference of the Sudanese Government", the Chadian Government "felt it is important to inform friendly countries and international organizations accredited to Chad of this grave situation on our borders and of legitimate counter-measures that may need to be taken." The communique also noted that Chad continues to host 300,000 refugees with only limited means. Despite the GOS's "hostile attitude", the Chadian Government continues with its Darfur mediation efforts and uses all of its influence with the rebel movements to negotiate in good faith and to accept a peaceful solution to the crisis. The communique notes that "Chad does not allow the Sudanese rebel movements to use Chadian territory as a rear base." ¶4. (U) The Government of Chad also reiterated its friendly policy relations, cooperation, and good neighborliness with Sudan. The communique notes President Deby's personal involvement with bringing an end to the Darfur crisis and Chad's continuing availability to pursue a POLITICAL solution, which depends upon the good will of the GOS. - - - - - - BACKGROUND - - - - - - ¶5. (C) On June 17, 2004, Presidential Advisor Allam-mi Ahmad publicly alleged that Chadian Arabs were being recruited into the jandjaweed. (Ref A) At that time, he noted the existence of Chadian rebels associated with the Renewed National Front of Chad (FNTR) inside Sudan, but stopped short of accusing the GOS of supporting them. The Chadian Government has long been concerned about potential linkages between jandjaweed and Chadian rebels and the potential for spillover into Chad. Over the past year, we have received reports from Chadian Government ministers, Sudanese rebel groups, and African Union observers about the presence of Chadian rebels inside Sudan. The Chadian rebel groups are allegedly of Tama and Arab ethnic origin and may include disgruntled Chadian military officers that lost out in various military reshufflings. The group reportedly has weapons and plans to overthrow President Deby and to prevent his son, Brahim, from coming to power, according to one of its members. In In February, Minister of Defense Emmanuel Nadingar asked the Defense Attache if the U.S. could assist in providing information on the Chadian rebel groups. Chadian military officials are unclear about the numbers and intentions of the Chadian rebels. ¶6. (C) The Chadian Government strongly suspects that Chadian rebels are associated with former Chadian Ambassador to Washington Ahmat Hassabalah Soubiane. One group, the Front for the Defense of the Democracy and Constitution (FDDC),according to press reports, is headed by a relative of Soubiane and is trying to unify a number of Chadian rebel movements. There reportedly was a meeting in Paris in May 2004 where the FDDC met with a number of other rebel leaders to form an alliance against President Deby. (Comment: This group may be the FNTR referred to by Allam-mi and/or the military arm of the Coalition to Defend Democratic and Constitutional Rights (CDDC) led by Soubiane. End Comment.) Press reports indicate that no agreement was reached at that time. The Chadian press also has reported the existence of other Chadian rebel groups, such as the Democratic and Revolutionary Council (CDR),the Popular Resistance Convention (CPR),and the Council of National Resistance (CNR). None of these appear to be a threat to the regime. ¶7. (C) Some of the Chadian Government's security jitters are being triggered by Deby's fears of a coalescing of opposition forces in the run-up to the public referendum to remove presidential term limits on June 6 and the presidential elections in 2006. For example, two weeks ago, prominent opposition leader Jean Alingue's passport was seized, and he was prevented from attending a meeting of Chadian opposition leaders in Paris. There were reports that Ahmat Hassabalah Soubiane was allegedly traveling to Paris at the same time. On the ground, humanitarian workers note an increase in the number of Chadian forces on the border with Sudan and an increase in the number of incursions by cattle thieves. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - A CHADIAN REAR BASE FOR SUDANESE REBELS? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) Recent developments in President Deby's relationship with the SLM may also be linked to the Chadian protest over Sudanese support for the Chadian rebels. (See Refs B, C, D) Deby's consultations with SLM may have been motivated by his desire to use SLM as a counterweight against Sudanese Government support for Chadian rebels. Deby may also be discussing this issue this week with two of SLM Chairman Abdelwahid Nur's advisors who reportedly are en route to N'Djamena at Deby's invitation. ¶9. (C) The topics for discussion may be the inclusion of Eritrea as a facilitator in the Darfur peace process, according to Adam Shogar and two of Abdelwahid's field commanders. The rebel movements and Chadian officials contend that Libya and Egypt were brought into the process because of their ability to influence key actors. If there is to be a solution to the crisis, Eritrea must be included because of its support for rebel leaders. The SLM leaders may be attempting to broker a better relationship between Chad and Eritrea. Deby may view Eritrea's involvement in the peace process as a counterweight to that of Egypt and Libya on the GOS's side, according to SLM members. Secondly, the meeting is intended to improve the relationship between Deby and Abdelwahid. Another final agenda item, according to SLM members, is a discussion of the possible use of Chadian territory for SLM's resupply or as a rear base, which would be a new and potentially destabilizing development. - - - - COMMENT - - - - ¶10. (C) This is the first time that the Chadian Government has officially delivered such a blunt and confrontational charge against Sudan. Deby has complained before about Khartoum's unwillingness to get serious about stopping violence in Darfur, but he has tried to keep good RELATIONS with Sudan. Nonetheless, Deby and his advisors' concerns about potential destabilization in eastern Chad are long-standing and well-founded. Deby himself staged two campaigns to change Chad's leadership in N'Djamena from Sudanese territory. Deby will likely weigh his options carefully, because allowing SLM activity on Chadian soil would be an invitation for reprisals from Sudan. ¶11. (U) Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered. WALL NNNN