SCENARIOS FOR POLITICAL CHANGE IN CHAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 001134 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, H, INR, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS; NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR COURVILLE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2014 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL CD SU SUBJECT: SCENARIOS FOR POLITICAL CHANGE IN CHAD REF: A. NDJAMENA 04 1992 ¶B. NDJAMENA 909 Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso ns 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Chad is currently experiencing another period of heightened uncertainty. Deby has been able to navigate through them in the past. (Reftels) Nonetheless, the removal of presidential term limits through a less-than-transparent public referendum has many observers wondering what the next power transition might look like in Chad. This cable looks at possible scenarios for regime change over the near and long term. End Summary. - - - - - - - NO CONFIDENCE - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) It came as no surprise that the Government manipulated the results to demonstrate a large turn-out and an overwhelming "yes" vote in favor of removing presidential term limits. However, no one is fooled by the announced numbers. Despite "victory", the regime was shaken by the low turn-out, not that unpopularity will likely deter the President and his Zaghawa clansmen from doing as they please. Nonetheless, the referendum's announced outcome has sparked speculation over President Deby's health and his next moves. His family continues to weigh their political future as well. The political opposition feels vindicated by the low voter turn-out for the referendum, but their ability to mobilize the Chadian public remains weak. Chadian rebels continue to make noises from the east. The next key event is the nomination of the ruling Movement for Patriotic Salvation's (MPS) candidate at its party congress later this year. There also may be changes within the cabinet and the leadership of the ruling party, though not likely until the President returns to Chad from his recent extended stay in France for medical treatment. - - - - - - - - - - - SCENARIOS FOR CHANGE - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (SBU) The announced results of the public referendum means that Chadian leaders can rule without legal limits on their "mandates". Now that this possibility has materialized through the referendum, many observers are wondering whether or not there can ever be a peaceful transition of power in the country. Chad's post-independence history provides no precedence for such a handover. We thought it prudent to outline some of the possible political scenarios in Chad's near and distant future and our opportunities to influence the outcomes. - - - - - - - - - - PRESIDENT-FOR-LIFE - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) In this scenario, President Deby returns from Paris after his medical treatment, likely reshuffles his cabinet, and takes steps to make changes within the ruling MPS. Later this year, he is nominated for another presidential term. Security forces step up their efforts to maintain Deby in power, press harassment continues, and government opponents are harassed and jailed. The current political and economic malaise grows as do ethnic tensions, particularly in the east. President Deby proceeds with the communal elections in October, the MPS party congress in November, and the presidential and legislative elections from March to May ¶2006. He is re-elected in a less-than-transparent election. ¶5. (C) Most of the signs point in this direction, beginning with the faulty electoral census and the rigging of the vote count for the referendum to the continuing harassment of the press over its sources of open letters criticizing the regime. This path, like the others, is fraught with the potential for instability. Deby's refusal to transfer power will galvanize his opponents. We would need to decide on whether or not to participate in the electoral process and, if so, how to avoid appearing to bless the outcome of a process that can be expected to be marred by irregularities. The actions of other key external actors, such as the positions of the French and the African Union, will have significant influence over how this scenario progresses. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - PRESIDENT DIES WITH NO HEIR APPARENT - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) Deby's health is a never-ending source of speculation. Some insiders say that the has been told not to drink or smoke, but continues to do so, aggravating his condition. As a result, the possibility that Deby dies or is incapacitated without having adequately groomed an acceptable successor or prepared the ruling party for such an eventuality creates a power vacuum. In this scenario, the potential for violence is high, most likely among the Zaghawa themselves, but some fear that an interethnic fight could emerge. The independent media and some other observers believe that Deby's son Ibrahim is being groomed to succeed his father. However, a member of the Deby family tells us that Ibrahim is unacceptable and would be prevented from assuming power by others. ¶7. (C) No one seems to have yet identified a player with national stature behind whom others might coalesce. There are some indications that the political opposition, the Army, and even possibly, the French are concerned enough about this scenario that they may be in the beginning stages of devising a plan to manage a transition devoid of violence. The most important internal actors remain Deby's immediate family, and the Army's leadership. External actors, such as France, the United States, and other AU leaders, will need to be ready to push together for a constitutional transition. The groundwork, however, including sending signals to ambitious army officers or family members will need to be started in advance. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - PRESIDENT DIES, CONSTITUTION CHANGED BY DECREE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) During Deby's last medical vacation in Paris, he is rumored to have issued a decree changing the presidential succession, according to members of the security services. The current Constitutional succession allows the President of the National Assembly, a southerner, to oversee elections within 45 to 90 days of the vacancy. This makes many Zaghawa nervous, and indeed, it makes the current National Assembly President even more nervous. He reportedly fears that if Deby dies, he will be killed to make way for the National Assembly's Vice President, a northerner, to manage the transition. This scenario also invites violence between northerners and southerners as some view the NASS VP to be pushing an Islamic agenda. In addition, the decree could designate someone outside the current succession plan, creating a potential for conflict. The key players in this scenario are Deby and those closest to him. Deby also would have had to coopt the security services into respecting the decreed successor. Outside actors, with the exception of France, would likely be informed too late to make an impact. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - PRESIDENT DIES, CONSTITUTIONAL SUCCESSION FOLLOWED - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) In this scenario, the legal mechanisms for a Constitutional transition are respected. However, key groups maneuver to rig the election of the new President. It is entirely possibly that a deal could be forged between ethnic powerbrokers to ensure that no violence erupts, but it could also degenerate into trouble if one group is given the opportunity to manipulate the transition while excluding others. ¶10. (C) In a second, but less likely scenario, opposition parties and other ethnic groups are allowed to compete freely. However, whether or not they would call for prosecution of the Zaghawa for crimes committed during their tenure in power or offer amnesty could be an important factor in the level of competition allowed. The opposition must back a single candidate to have a chance of winning the election and/or the MPS must produce a strong candidate. The acceptance of this outcome by others will be critical to the transitions sustainability. Key players include the NASS President, the MPS, the Zaghawa, and the opposition. The emergence of this scenario could mean that the international community must be prepared to react quickly to bolster a positive outcome and support a free and fair electoral process should one emerge. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - PRESIDENT OVERTHROWN OR DIES IN A COUP D'ETAT - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (C) The issues underlying last year's May 16 coup attempt remain. Some have been exacerbated. First, it is even more clear to others that Deby may want to be President-for-life, which will make it difficult for another Zaghawa to come to power. In addition, a deep rift between Deby and his half-brother Daoussa has developed over management of the Darfur crisis which includes other members of the family. Deby and his son Ibrahim are working closely with a marabou called Sheik Badradine to destroy the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and bring a Zaghawa, Mini Minawi, the current Secretary General, to the top of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM). Daoussa, General Mahamat Ali Abdullah, and Timan Deby, the President's younger brother, reportedly oppose this strategy and are trying to strengthen the movement by helping it organize itself better to overcome its leadership problems. ¶12. (C) Daoussa and the Erdimi brothers, according to a family member, allegedly viewed the referendum as a vote of no-confidence in Deby and may be looking for ways out of the current situation. One assumption in this scenario, is that the President has lost sufficient respect from within the family and the Army to be vulnerable to a take-over. ¶13. (C) A putsch could be limited to the confines of the palace and/or family, as was last year's attempt. However, who leads the coup could be an important factor as to whether or not it would stand or there would be counter-coup attempts. Another question is whether or not a coup leader would remain in power or hand it over to the National Assembly President. Another variation of this scenario would be if the President is overthrown but survives. He is either arrested or escapes into exile. If Deby survives, the international community may have to consider supporting Deby's return to office. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - PRESIDENT DOES NOT RUN, MANAGES A PEACEFUL TRANSITION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶14. (C) This is a best case scenario for Chad's immediate and long-term future. Deby decides because of his health or for other reasons not to seek a third term. He could come under other pressure, perhaps from the family, or the Army, to cut a deal before being forced out of power. In a scenario in which Deby decides not to run, the key factor for whether or not there would be violence, is how he manages it. He would most likely work within his immediate family, his extended Zaghawa clan, and the Army to find an acceptable candidate. He could even make overtures to the political opposition, armed rebel groups, and other ethnic groups in an effort to forge a consensus on Chad's new leadership, which could include some opposition members of government. ¶15. (C) For this scenario to emerge, internal and external actors would need to present Deby with an acceptable exit strategy. A coordinated effort beginning now would have the most likelihood of success. Options for his retirement could include working for the United Nations or African Union in some capacity. The French, the United States, and other members of the international community would need to work together to persuade Deby that by leaving power he can build a strong legacy and not put Chad on the path to civil war. In this scenario, we might have to accept a less-than-democratic change of government (i.e. back someone Deby's choice) or accept less-than-perfect election results to ensure that a change in power occurs. - - - - - - - - - KEY CALCULATIONS - - - - - - - - - ¶15. (C) There are probably many permutations of these scenarios. We acknowledge that the Chadian military and security forces. have an important, if not essential, role to play in how a transition emerges because they will likely determine the level of violence and instability that would accompany a change of power. ¶16. (C) The role of public apathy, another important factor, is difficult to measure. The level of public hatred for the Zaghawa is reportedly very high. Chadians expressed their disaffection with the current regime by not voting, but the opposition has yet to produce a candidate attractive enough for Chadians to rally behind. Our assessment is that the Chadian public wants peaceful change through legal means, but lacks the mechanism to produce it. The general mood seems to be one of acquiescence to Deby's plan if the alternative means forcing a change and provoking instability. We often hear that Chadians look to the U.S. to push for political change. - - - - COMMENT - - - - ¶17. (C) Any of the above scenarios could emerge. We are constantly looking for ways to play a positive role in managing outcomes here. We have a great deal at stake in what happens next in Chad. U.S. programs such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSTCI), Anti-Terrorism Training (ATA),assistance for Sudanese refugees, and support for the oil revenue management plan could all be put at risk with an irregular change of power. A disruptive transition could also hamper Darfur diplomacy and have an adverse impact on other neighbors. To be effective, however, we need to work closely with key internal players and our international partners to maximize the likelihood of a peaceful transition. ¶18. (C) Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered. WALL NNNN