SOMALIA -- NEED TO RALLY BEHIND THE SRSG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NAIROBI 002738 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF STATE PASS AID LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER USUN FOR D'ELIA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2025 TAGS: PGOV PREL SO KE SUBJECT: SOMALIA -- NEED TO RALLY BEHIND THE SRSG REF: AF/E N.GAREY - SOMALIA WATCHER M.ZORICK EMAILS OF 28-30 JUNE 05 Classified By: LISA J. PETERSON, ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR, REASONS 1. 4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. This is an action request -- see para 19. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY: Divisions among members of the Somali Transitional Federal Institutions are now being mirrored by schisms in the international community. Moves to finance projects in district-level reconciliation, pushed by specific EU member states, raise the specter of international financial support fueling the very conflicts that we seek to help mediate. A divided international community cannot hope to promote stability and security in Somalia. Needed now is a return to the principles set down in Stockholm, and a rapid move to strongly support the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) as the only person mandated to speak SIPDIS on behalf of the international community. Positioning the international community behind the SRSG, and assisting him in developing proposals for compromise for the members of the Somali Transitional Federal Institutions, could be the last best way to help bring governance back to Somalia. If the international community continues to show itself to be fragmented, and dominated by one former colonial power, we will quickly become a big part of the Somali problem. END SUMMARY. -------------- US-EU COORDINATION -- OR NOT -------------- ¶3. (C) Per ref emails, post awaits instructions to proceed with a demarche, either alone or jointly with the EU, to Somali Transitional Federal President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as soon as possible in Nairobi, and the Mogadishu-based warlord Ministers / MPs in Somalia. The impetus behind this initiative is recent reporting that Yusuf plans to take military action against Mogadishu-based members of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG),and that these Ministers / MPs may be preparing pre-emptive offensive or defensive actions, giving rise to concern for the survival of the Somali Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs). Post is aware that the Department's Office of East African Affairs held on June 29 a digital video conference with European Commission representatives to discuss (a) the possibility of �0A;such a joint demarche, (b) donor coordination for engagement with TFIs, and (c) the prospect of EC funding for a reconciliation project, at the level of the Somali districts, that elements of the TFG allied with President Yusuf have proposed to the international community (IC). ¶4. (C) Somalia Watcher met July 1 with officials of the UK's Department for International Development (DFID),at their request, visiting Nairobi from London to consult with IC representatives at this critical juncture. The officials -- Mr. Desmond Curran, Head of the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa Department, and Ms. Anna Lake, Head of the Horn of Africa Unit -- wanted to discuss exactly the same points as those set out for the June 29 DVC described above. Curran began by stressing that the two officials participating in the Brussels-Washington DVC did not have the authority to approve or initiate a demarche, this being the prerogative of the EU Presidency -- a position the UK had just taken on July ¶1. Curran noted that the content and target of the proposed demarche points were completely in line with the UK's positions, a fact of little import since such diplomatic actions had to receive approval from all 25 EU members. (NOTE: Proposed demarche points are: (a) supporting the process of establishing governance in Somalia; (b) opposing all actions taken outside the ongoing peaceful reconciliation process or the framework of the TFIs; (c) calling for respect of the will of the Somali people; (d) urging all parties to seek consensus of a broad quorum of the Somali MPs on contentious issues; and (e) making clear that violence or military action by any members of the TFG or other individuals is unacceptable. END NOTE.) ¶5. (C) Curran stated that, in fact, the proposed points for demarche had run into immediate trouble with a single EU member state -- Italy. He stressed that, within member state councils, the demarche initiative and the message to be delivered had been directly tied to any future decision to provide financial support to the TFG's district-level reconciliation plan. -------------- - ATTEMPTS TO PUT EC MONEY BEHIND ITALIAN FUNDS FOR DISTRICT-LEVEL RECONCILIATION -------------- - ¶6. (C) Curran and Lake confirmed what Somalia Watcher has learned from other sources: that EC representatives at the Mission of the European Commission in Nairobi are fighting a rear-guard action to resist pressure from Brussels to release funds into the TFG's district-level reconciliation project. They noted that Italy's Special Envoy for Somalia in Nairobi, former Senator Mario Raffaelli, is in charge of releasing EUROS 2.7 million to the UNOPS agency for disbursement to the project, channeled through the UNDP's Emergency Budgetary Support Project (EBSP). (NOTE: According to Raffaelli, speaking to the IC in the last meeting of the international members of the Somalia Coordination and Monitoring Committee (I-CMC),Italy has made "a political commitment" to disburse these funds "immediately".) ¶7. (C) Somalia Watcher noted that, according to EC representatives in Nairobi, Raffaelli is pushing very hard to get EC money into the pipeline as well, apparently to avoid the image that the district-level reconciliation project is an Italy-only financed affair. In private conversations with Somalia Watcher, these EC officials, as well as Somalia experts in several EU member state missions (especially Denmark, Sweden, UK, Netherlands),have expressed strong displeasure at this pressure coming down on them from Brussels, saying that they see the district-level reconciliation project as fatally flawed in several respects. Perhaps the most glaring of these flaws is that the project includes TFG reconciliation engagement in the northern Somalia districts of Sool and Sanaag. Such activities would inevitably trigger a violent reaction in the otherwise largely peaceful breakaway Republic of Somaliland, particularly now when the Somaliland public is focused on parliamentary elections. -------------- NO DEMARCHE THAT TARGETS YUSUF, OR BLOCKS FUNDING -------------- ¶8. (C) DFID's Curran opined that the idea of a joint US-EU demarche would never get past the Italians, irrespective of any attempts to ensure that, although the action would be in part directed to President Yusuf, it would not indicate support for individual leaders or faction. Curran thought that at this point in time, Senator Raffaelli seems convinced that recent USG actions and statements indicated USG support for the Mogadishu-based warlords and their civil society backers -- an opinion Curran and his UK colleagues did not share. This idea aside, Curran felt it would be impossible to move the demarche idea forward as long as it was tied in Italy's mind to disbursement of support for district-level reconciliation. He said there was to be a DVC among key EU member states Italy, Sweden, the UK, and the Commission on July 5 to discuss the issue, but doubted if it would move much further. "It may be that you (the USG) will have to do this on your own," he said. -------------- ATTEMPTS TO CIRCUMVENT UN AS LEAD FOR THE IC -------------- ¶9. (C) DFID officials Curran and Lake next inquired as to what we thought could be an appropriate way to break the logjams before us -- both within the IC, and within the TFIs. Somalia Watcher stressed that there seemed to be significant pitfalls in the approach that we have been taking so far, dominated as it has been by bilateral interaction with individuals in the various factions of the TFIs. We noted that, in the discussions that the IC had undertaken in Stockholm in October 2004, we had established that the Stockholm Declaration of Principles would form the basis for discussions with the TFG, and welcomed the readiness of the UN to play a leading role in the proposed Somali Coordination and Monitoring Committee. We stressed that, in the new UN SRSG's courtesy call on Ambassador, we had strongly welcomed his arrival as the concretization of these discussions, and expressed the hope that he would be quickly ready to engage in the tough negotiations and mediation efforts needed to help close the rifts in the TFIs. ¶10. (C) Curran wondered if the UN SRSG, Ambassador Francois Fall, was up to the task of uniting the IC behind him. He repeated concerns we had heard from EC representatives in Nairobi and from representatives of EC member states in bilateral missions, that the increasing concerns expressed in the EC's Brussels offices as to Fall's abilities were in fact part of the personal agenda of Italy's Senator Raffaelli. He agreed with the contention that Raffaelli had already on at least four occasions attempted to put himself or an ally in jobs at a nexus of interaction between the IC and the TFIs, in an apparent attempt to dominate the agenda in dealings with the Somalis. Curran echoed EC representatives here in saying that other member states, with the possible exception of UK as the EU President, were largely powerless to confront in Brussels Raffaelli's tactics inside the commission, given the limited expertise or interest other member states have in Brussels on Somalia questions. -------------- SRSG WINS SUPPORT -- FOR A STATEMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) The SRSG came to the regularly scheduled Tuesday meeting of the I-CMC (July 5) armed with a strong statement hitting the same points as the proposed U.S./EU demarche. He had met with the UK's Curran and Lake on July 1, and had clearly taken on board their ideas on the need for a clear reminder from the international community that armed conflict among members of the TFIs would be a "Game Over" event. The UK and Italian representatives reported on their 30 June-2 July trip to Jowhar and North Mogadishu, wherein they noted that PM Ghedi had struck a very reconciliatory tone in his speech for Somali Independence Day (July 1 for the former Italian Somalia). Also notable: that a rump parliament meeting on July 1 in Mogadishu, finding itself without a quorum, decided to confine their actions to choosing a 5-member committee from among themselves to seek a dialogue with the PM. ¶12. (C) A short editing session among the gathered I-CMC members produced the following statement for the SRSG's release, which occurred the afternoon of July 5: BEGIN SRSG STATEMENT TEXT -- The international community welcomes the completion of the relocation of the Transitional Federal Institutions into Somalia and the reconciliatory tone of the Prime Minister's speech on the Somali national day as well as the leadership shown by Somali leaders in opening dialogue among themselves. We urge Somali leaders to continue to work towards dialogue and reconciliation within the framework of the TFIs. -- However, the international community has been concerned over certain developments inside Somalia including the reported inflow of weapons and an increase in the general level of tension both in terms of media rhetoric and reported movements of militia. -- The international community calls attention of all Somali leaders as well as regional countries to the 1992 United Nations arms embargo on Somalia and recalls the declaration by all the Somali leaders in Kenya to avoid arms as solution to differences. The international community demands a halt to the delivery and reception of arms and calls for the respect of the arms embargo. -- We call on all leaders in Somalia to exercise maximum restraint and take effective steps to reduce tension. Any resort to military force either in offence or pre-emptive defense will be unacceptable to the international community as the way out for dealing with the current differences within the Transitional Federal Institutions. END SRSG STATEMENT TEXT -------------- WHAT IS THE WAY FORWARD? COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS -------------- ¶13. (C) The concerns the DFID officials expressed to us are in lock-step with our own regarding the current splits in not only the TFIs, but also in the international community. It appears to us that we may be best served by trying to steer a course back toward re-invigorating the IC in its commitments, as set out in the Stockholm Declaration of Principles, to pursue unity of action, support for an inclusive Somali transitional government of reconciliation, and avoidance of undermining existing areas of tranquility. ¶14. (C) At this point in time several external interventions, whether through funding or public statement, are generating controversy and perceptions of bias towards one wing or the other of the divided TFIs. These include the Italian /EC financing for the district-level reconciliation project, which is creating fear of distortions to local processes, aggravations of political divisions, and financing of conflict. The June 21 USG public statement -- although carefully crafted, and warmly welcomed by the Mogadishu public as the only visible support for civil society engaged in Mogadishu stabilization, has also been characterized by President Yusuf's wing as USG support for Mogadishu warlords. ¶15. (C) At the same time, there are clearly factors that would support additional USG efforts to push for the continued survival of the Somali TFIs. Among them: (a) Somali civil society has gained strength over two years of warlord absence from Mogadishu; (b) Somalis throughout the country have expressed a profound desire for a functioning government; (c) Tough mediation efforts of the "informal core group" in April-May left a clear message that division of the TFIs would result in a lose-lose ending: The IC could support only an inclusive transitional process; and (d) Somalis on both wings of the TFIs fear sanction by the international community (IC) against 'spoilers'; some even seem to think that there is a threat of future indictment for war crimes. ¶16. (C) We believe that, in keeping with the decisions the IC took in Stockholm, it is critical at this time to bring the UN SRSG, Ambassador Fall, to the fore as the honest and neutral broker representing a united IC. This is especially important as a way of countering the impression that the IC is itself divided. We can reduce such impressions if the IC can again unite behind basic principles. In order for the elements of the TFIs to have any hope for IC assistance in establishing governance in Somalia: (a) Bellicose language, military maneuvering, attempts at military solutions, must cease; (b) The litmus test for TFI actions will be conformity with the Transitional Federal Charter and the Declaration of Principles; (c) The IC will only support an inclusive reconciliation process; (d) The IC itself must unite behind the SRSG, and not tolerate any further "slippage" in the commitment to unity of action; and (e) A return to the principle of "Do No Harm" is an absolute necessity -- the release of financial resources to projects highly likely to ignite conflict must be avoided or stopped. ¶17. (C) The idea of a joint EC/US demarche is perhaps a non-starter, given Italy's reported strong objections. The question may now be overtaken by events, with the SRSG receiving approval to issue a statement, in the name of the IC, setting down many of the same markers first mooted for the U.S./EU demarche. Those were: -- The IC supports the process of establishing governance in Somalia. We will not support anyone or any part of the TFG that acts outside the ongoing peaceful reconciliation process or outside the framework of the TFIs; -- You must respect the will of the Somali people and work within the framework of the TFIs to find agreement on all issues based on the consensus of a broad quorum of the Somali MPs; and -- Violence or military action by any members of the TFG or other individuals is unacceptable. You must reach out to the other members of the TFIs to find a peaceful solution to any current disagreements. Once the SRSG's message becomes public, we would recommend following with a firm public statement on the part of the USG, expressing our strong support for the SRSG and the points he has made. ¶18. (C) Lastly, once the message of "What the IC does not like" has been delivered, it would be constructive to indicate what it is we believe the Somalis must do to ensure the survival of the TFIs. The SRSG has proposed a plan of action over the next weeks to September, to push forward with a mediation initiative among all relevant leaders in the TFIs. His initial broad-brush ideas received guarded support from the I-CMC on July 5. He is tasked with fleshing out his ideas, based on the critiques he heard, before he leaves July 8 for New York to attend the UNSC's discussions on Somalia. As his proposals come together, he will need strong support from the IC to develop the necessary consensus behind a compromise for the two wings of the TFIs -- perhaps through inclusion of specific language in any Statement of the Security Council President emanating from the UNSC's July 14 discussion of Somalia. END COMMENTS. -------------- ACTION REQUEST -------------- ¶19. (C) Unless Department instructs otherwise, Post will issue a short public statement, in the spirit of that released June 21, acknowledging the SRSG's statement. Text proposed as follows: BEGIN PROPOSED U.S. STATEMENT TEXT: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE For Immediate Release July X, 2005 The United States welcomes the recent statement, issued in the name of the international community by Ambassador Francois L. Fall, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, calling the attention of all Somali leaders as well as regional countries to the 1992 United Nations arms embargo on Somalia, and recalling the declaration by all the Somali leaders to avoid arms as solution to their differences. The United States strongly supports the SRSG's call on all leaders in Somalia to exercise maximum restraint and take effective steps to reduce tension. In particular, we stress that we will not support anyone or any part of the Transitional Federal Institutions that acts outside ongoing peaceful reconciliation processes. The United States calls on all leaders in Somalia to respect the will of the Somali people and work within the framework of the Transitional Federal Institutions to find agreement on all issues based on the consensus of a broad quorum of the Somali MPs. Violence or military action by any members of the Transitional Federal Institutions or other individuals is unacceptable. END PROPOSED U.S. STATEMENT TEXT BELLAMY