Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05MUSCAT670
2005-04-24 12:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Muscat
Cable title:  

EXBS: PORT SALALAH RIPE TARGET FOR PROGRAMMING

Tags:  EWWT PARM ETRD PREL PTER ASEC MU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 000670 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARPI (TROBERTS),NP/ECC (TGROEN)
AMMAN FOR JIRVINE
STATE PASS USTR FOR J.BUNTIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2015
TAGS: EWWT PARM ETRD PREL PTER ASEC MU
SUBJECT: EXBS: PORT SALALAH RIPE TARGET FOR PROGRAMMING

REF: A. MUSCAT 506


B. MUSCAT 569

Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III.
Reason: 1.4 (d)

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Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 000670 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/ARPI (TROBERTS),NP/ECC (TGROEN) AMMAN FOR JIRVINE STATE PASS USTR FOR J.BUNTIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2015 TAGS: EWWT PARM ETRD PREL PTER ASEC MU SUBJECT: EXBS: PORT SALALAH RIPE TARGET FOR PROGRAMMING REF: A. MUSCAT 506 ¶B. MUSCAT 569 Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III. Reason: 1.4 (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) With over 30,000 containers on site at any given time and scant screening capabilities, Port Salalah could conceivably be a vulnerable spot in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) import/export or transshipment. Including the port in the Container Security Initiative and expanding our EXBS programming there could be an effective use of USG resources. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) During a regional trip to southern Oman April 15-17, PolOff met with Salalah Port Services (SPS) to discuss customs procedures and operations at the port in light of Oman's bid for participation in the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and prospective FTA-related export growth. -------------- In Need of Help Now... -------------- ¶3. (C) Officials at SPS appear to maintain a detached relationship with the local customs officials, unaware both of customs' ability to detect weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their ability to respond to potential threats. Moreover, although Royal Oman Police Customs is responsible for container search and clearance, it appears evident that they lack the manpower, equipment, and training to adequately screen for potential threats to the substantial cargo traffic that moves daily through the port (ref B). SPS, as the port authority and WMD first-responder, should be targeted for future Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) programming. -------------- ...And More So In Future -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Some senior officials at SPS suggest that container screening would be better suited at the container's port of origin rather than a transit point such as Salalah. That is not practical, however, given Oman's proximity to countries lacking such capability, as well as to countries of proliferation concern that may abet illicit cargo trafficking. As Port Salalah evolves with the expected signing of a U.S. free trade agreement, and growth from the nascent Salalah Free Zone (SFZ) and the nearby Raysut Industrial Estate, it will become increasingly an import/export center as well as transshipment point. Strengthening Oman's border and maritime security by including Port Salalah in the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and expanding our EXBS programming there would therefore have a significant impact both locally and regionally. ¶5. (SBU) On a positive note, SPS welcomed April 16 the arrival of a new state-of-the art tugboat from the Philippines. The new tug, costing over USD 5 million, provides enhanced safety with its additional firefighting capabilities. BALTIMORE

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