OMAN NOT READY TO COMMIT TO PSI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000232 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, NP/RA, PM, NEA/RA, NEA/ARPI SECDEF FOR OUSD(P) E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2015 TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP EWWT MU SUBJECT: OMAN NOT READY TO COMMIT TO PSI REF: A. 04 MUSCAT 1331 ¶B. 04 MUSCAT 603 ¶C. 04 MUSCAT 522 Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III. Reason: 1.4 (b, d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Embassy by note verbale February 9 that while Oman seeks to comply with international laws, agreements and norms, "the government of the Sultanate welcomes the idea of the Proliferation Security Initiative without joining it or being committed to it." The Ministry's disappointing decision comes despite Oman's active participation in a range of port and border security activities with the USG and international organizations. End summary. -------------- Noncommittal on PSI -------------- ¶2. (S) The Embassy received February 9 a note verbale from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). While indicating strong support for nonproliferation regimes, the note indicates that Oman will not formally join the growing list of states committing themselves to PSI activities. The complete text, stamped "secret" by the MFA, is as follows: BEGIN TEXT: Reference is made to the request by the United States government that the government of the Sultanate of Oman supports the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Security Initiative. The Ministry would like to state that, based on its conviction on the danger posed by weapons of mass destruction, and being aware of the threat if such weapons fall in the hands of irresponsible terrorist entities or groups, the Sultanate Government has joined international agreements and treaties relevant to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and is seeking to implement the principles of these agreements and treaties within its national laws. In this framework, and while stressing the necessity to comply with international laws, agreements and norms, the Government of the Sultanate welcomes the idea of the Initiative without joining it or being committed to it. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Sultanate of Oman avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy the assurance of its highest consideration. END TEXT. -------------- Action, If Not Words -------------- ¶3. (C) This untimely declaration comes on the heels of active bilateral dialogue on Oman's request to be included in the U.S. Customs Service's Container Security Initiative (CSI). The Embassy has told interlocutors at the Ministries of Transportation, Commerce and Foreign Affairs that Oman could buttress its case for participating in the highly competitive CSI program by showing its resolve on a broad range of nonproliferation, export control and border security programs. ¶4. (C) Oman has made strides in the past year on a number of these fronts. Oman achieved compliance with the International Ship and Port Facility Code (ISPS Code),and by hosting in the near future several Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) training programs, including an upcoming seminar on WMD Awareness as well as an Export Control Legal-Regulatory Workshop. There will even be a PSI-related event among the planned activities during a U.S.-led air interdiction exercise later this month. Despite this cooperation, the MFA is dragging its feet on ratifying the IAEA safeguards agreement and agreeing to the additional protocols. Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin Alawi has mentioned previously, as recently as February 8 in a chat with the Ambassador, that Oman's involvement with the IAEA is circumscribed by its unwillingness/inability to make financial commitments to that body. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶5. (C) It is difficult to speculate at this juncture the reasons for MFA's keeping PSI at arm's length. There may be concerns about incurring expenses; about getting too far in front of other Arab allies; or possibly worry at causing offense to powerful neighbor Iran. Without minimizing the symbolic importance of publicly committing to the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, we should likewise not devalue Oman's noteworthy deeds in the realm of export control and border security. By continuing and broadening our engagement with Oman in this field, we may eventually succeed in winning the MFA's public support for PSI. BALTIMORE