Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05MUSCAT196
2005-02-02 13:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Muscat
Cable title:  

IRAQ ELECTIONS - OMAN KEEPS MUM

Tags:  PREL KDEM SOCI IZ MU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000196 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2015
TAGS: PREL KDEM SOCI IZ MU
SUBJECT: IRAQ ELECTIONS - OMAN KEEPS MUM

REF: A. MUSCAT 148


B. SECSTATE 12757

Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III.
Reason: 1.4 (b, d).

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Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000196 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2015 TAGS: PREL KDEM SOCI IZ MU SUBJECT: IRAQ ELECTIONS - OMAN KEEPS MUM REF: A. MUSCAT 148 ¶B. SECSTATE 12757 Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III. Reason: 1.4 (b, d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Omani Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs, currently on travel in Asia, has rebuffed admonitions for the Omani government to make a public statement welcoming the January 30 elections in Iraq. Despite headline-grabbing news of arrests in the Sultanate (ref A),press attention to the Iraqi elections was generally favorable in the Omani print press. Every daily newspaper save one printed the Ambassador's op-ed piece extolling the courage of the Iraqi people in casting ballots. Reactions from private Omanis have generally been mixed, with some focusing on the positive aspects of the elections, and other questioning their legitimacy or worrying about it unleashing further sectarian division in Iraq. End summary. -------------- Foreign Minister Digs in His Heels -------------- ¶2. (C) The Omani government has remained officially silent on the dramatic January 30 elections in Iraq. Iraqi Ambassador to Oman Abdul Rasoul al-Wash expressed his frustration with Oman's silence in a February 1 call on the Ambassador, noting that he was seeking a meeting with Foreign Ministry Under Secretary Sayyid Badr al-Busaidi to urge the Sultanate to SIPDIS join the countless other states in the region and beyond who had publicly hailed the historic event. Al-Wash said he was asking his American and British counterparts to put similar pressure on the MFA to make a statement, notwithstanding US and UK pre-election demarches to the Omani government urging public statements of support. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador spoke to MFA U/S Sayyid Badr on February 2 to encourage a public statement. Sayyid Badr acknowledged the point that a statement was merited, admitting that he had drafted one and submitted it for the Minister's approval. Unfortunately, he reported that Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin Alawi had ruled against issuing a statement. ¶4. (C) On the margins of a UK-hosted February 2 meeting of G-8 chiefs of mission, the Ambassador conferred with UK Ambassador Stuart Laing on the Minister's unfortunate decision. Amb. Laing succeeded in contacting the Minister by phone and argued the need for a pu
blic Omani statement. Bin Alawi, however, insisted that the Iraqi elections were a "normal" matter and "internal affair" of Iraq, and therefore saw no need to say anything. He said the Sultanate would send a congratulatory message when the new Iraqi government gets sworn in. -------------- Positive Press, Ambassador's Piece Published -------------- ¶5. (U) Reporting on the elections in the Omani press, in both English and Arabic, has been generally favorable. The headlines on January 31, however, were overshadowed by a government announcement about the arrest of numerous extremists (ref A). Though the elections received considerable attention, most Iraq-related headlines appeared below the fold. While some of the headlines featured statistics on election day attacks and casualties, most of the texts focused on the high turnout and the lengths to which many Iraqis went in order to cast their ballots. The Ambassador's op-ed piece, based on ref B material, was prominently placed in every Omani daily newspaper (both Arabic and English) save one. It was printed in the Arabic language "Oman," "Al Watan," and "Al Shabiba," and in the English language "Times of Oman" and "Oman Tribune." -------------- Man On The Street Views -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Embassy employees canvassed views from a range of ordinary citizens on the elections. Once again, most dinner-table conversations were focused on the string of security arrests in the Sultanate and less so on events in Iraq. In general, opinions were mixed and reflected some uncertainty as to what may unfold in Iraq once the results are announced. A couple of interlocutors saw the balloting in a positive light, either as a historic opportunity for the entire region, as a worthwhile experiment, or at least as a means to end the U.S. military presence in Iraq. Others questioned the legitimacy of the elections since it came "under the oppression of occupation" and did not meet "international norms." Some concern was expressed over the possibility of the elections unleashing sectarian and ethnic divisions. -------------- Rooting for Secularists, More Trade -------------- ¶7. (C) Higher level contacts were more measured in their assessments. Prominent Omani businesswoman Asilah al-Harthy expressed some concern that every image of Iraqi women candidates she saw showed them dressed religiously conservatively, raising worries in her mind that the new female deputies will not be secular-minded. Shia businessman and parliamentarian Murtadha Hassan Ali dined with EmbOffs on January 30 and was constantly interrupted to receive updates on the elections. He said he had contributed 20,000 UK pounds in London to Prime Minister Allawi's campaign, and was optimistic that Allawi's party would do well. Even the Sistani-backed list, he noted, had a large number of secularists. As an avowed secularist himself with ongoing commercial interests in Iraq, Murtadha was hopeful that even the Iraqi Communists would receive a fair number of votes, further solidifying a secular bulwark against the Islamists. ¶8. (SBU) The President of the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry (OCCI) and the Under Secretary of National Economy told a visiting State Department official on February 1 that they hoped the elections would further the process of stabilization in Iraq, opening the door for more vibrant future trade relations between Muscat and Baghdad. OCCI President Salim al-Ghattami recalled that an Omani trade delegation that traveled to Syria in 2004 to meet with Iraqi businessmen had overwhelming interest on both sides, and produced the most trade deals of any such delegation he had seen. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) We ascribe no deep political significance to Yusuf bin Alawi's decision not to make a public statement, viewing it rather as just another example of his sometimes fickle, often stubborn personality. It is likewise difficult to draw much inference from public reactions to the elections. Many Omanis are waiting to hear the official outcome before assessing their impact. Moreover, the Omani public remains fixated on the news of arrests of domestic Islamists and therefore have little attention at the moment for matters beyond their own borders. BALTIMORE

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