GEN ABIZAID'S DECEMBER 26 MEETING WITH SULTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MUSCAT 001934 SIPDIS SIPDIS USCENTCOM FOR POLAD, CCJ2 AND CCJ5-E SECDEF FOR OSD STATE FOR NEA, PM, NEA/ARPI, NEA/RA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2015 TAGS: PREL MARR PTER PGOV XF IR IZ MU SUBJECT: GEN ABIZAID'S DECEMBER 26 MEETING WITH SULTAN QABOOS REF: A. MUSCAT 1917 ¶B. MUSCAT 547 Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III. Reason: 1.4 (b, d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In a convivial 80-minute exchange on December 26, Sultan Qaboos shared with USCENTCOM CDR Gen Abizaid his thoughts on Iraq, Iran, the war on terror and the state of bilateral relations. Agreeing with Gen Abizaid on many points, the Sultan argued for a less intrusive Arab role in Iraq's transition, saying too many Arab states are not "neutral," and that in any case Iraqis must resolve their own problems. On Iran, the Sultan expressed concern over President Ahmadinejad's erratic behavior while remaining optimistic that cooler heads there would eventually prevail. The Sultan assessed Al Qaeda as being in a weaker position now than two years ago, in part thanks to counter-terrorism successes by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, but warned that governments must remain vigilant. He voiced concern about the difficulty of maintaining Oman's maritime security, and gratitude for the friendship of the U.S. Gen Abizaid's invitations for Oman to post a liaison officer in Tampa, and suggestions for more Omani assistance to Iraq, were acknowledged without response. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) On December 26, USCENTCOM CDR General Abizaid paid a call on Sultan Qaboos at the Bait Bahjat al-Andhar royal farm near Sohar. The Sultan was joined in the 80-minute meeting by Chief of Staff of the Sultan's Armed Forces, LTG Ahmed al-Nabhani. General Abizaid was accompanied by the Ambassador and senior CENTCOM and Embassy staff members. The party was flown to Sohar aboard two of the Sultan's helicopters. -------------- Iran -------------- ¶3. (C) Recalling points he made recently to Vice President Cheney (ref A),the Sultan reiterated that Iranian politics is passing through a "gray area" as new President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad continues to shape his own team and political identity. Repeatedly expressing his hope that "wisdom" will prevail and that "wise men" around the erratic Iranian leader will prevent the country from "sailing into deep water," the Sultan predicted that the political picture in Tehran will come into greater focus in 3-4 months. Though the Iranian Revolution took place over 25 years ago, the Sultan said it appears the revolutionary spirit has been resuscitated - at least in the person of Ahmadinejad. When Gen Abizaid remarked that Iranian meddling in Southern Iraq served an unclear purpose, and that Ahmadinejad appealed to base populism, the Sultan said the art of hiding one's intentions has long been practiced in Iran. As for populism, the Sultan sees signs that even working class Iranians are growing frustrated with unfulfilled electoral promises. Ahmadinejad's campaign rhetoric about redistributing oil wealth to the people was folly from the start. The Sultan noted that government's true role is to provide services, not dole out cash, for without money a government cannot govern. -------------- Iraq - The Qaboos Doctrine -------------- ¶4. (C) Responding to Gen Abizaid's point about the 11 million Iraqis who voted in December for a new future, the Sultan wondered what kind of future the voters had in mind. While Gen Abizaid observed that there were more Iraqis seeking to hold the country together then tear it apart, the Sultan worried about those for whom that statement did not apply. He recognized Iraq's manifest best interest in preserving its territorial integrity, but warned that selfishness is a pernicious human trait that grows quickly out of control once it takes hold. He hoped the Iraqi Kurds, for instance, who have long harbored nationalist aspirations, would defer the goal of statehood to a distant future. The Sultan sought Gen Abizaid's views on how Iraq might descend into a civil war that could draw in neighbors, responding that he could see Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia getting involved, but not Syria or Jordan. He fretted over sectarian divides in Iraq, noting that India has far greater diversity yet somehow manages to work. Though Iran has a long history of involvement in southern Iraq, the Iraqi Shia have no allegiance to Iran. ¶5. (C) The Sultan solicited Gen Abizaid's ideas on how the region could help Iraq. The General replied that the Arab states must fully support Iraq's unity and territorial integrity, and wield their influence with domestic Iraqi groups toward this end. The Sultan responded that the Arab League did dispatch a delegation to Iraq prior to the election, and found that its presence was far from universally welcomed. Moreover, he said not all Arab states are "neutral parties." Without naming names, he said some Arab rulers find it outrageous that a Kurd could become Iraq's president. He also doubted that all Arab League members were as desirous as Oman to see Iraq strong and prosperous again. Dubious that many Arab states could in fact play a truly helpful role in Iraq, the Sultan counseled against Arabs "rushing in" for fear of being seen as interfering. He argued instead for a much more subtle involvement that will give Iraqis space to sort through their own issues without a lot of unsolicited advice from neighbors. Arab states, he said, should respond to specific Iraqi requests; otherwise, they should butt out. "Patience is key." ¶6. (C) The Sultan traded questions about Iraqi government stability, its corruption problems, and how to build up Iraqi security and military forces. In reply to Gen Abizaid's description of the U.S. force reductions envisioned for 2006 and plans to put Iraqi forces more in a leading role, the Sultan inquired about the quality of those Iraqi forces. He acknowledged that building their sheer numbers right now must be the priority, as upgrading quality and instilling a proper culture is a more long-term venture. He sees the Iraqi police forces as being more critical to law and order--and fighting corruption--than the Iraqi army. Gen Abizaid replied that any assistance Arab police academies could offer in terms of training and exchanges would be most appreciated. -------------- GWOT, Al Qaeda and Maritime Security -------------- ¶7. (C) Gen Abizaid and the Sultan agreed that Al Qaeda's (AQ) presence and popularity in the region appeared to be on the wane. The Sultan attributed this to the public's increasing awareness that AQ targets civilians in contravention to Islam, to Saudi Arabia's success in bringing AQ violence there "under control," and to Pakistan's ability to extend government influence into the tribal areas. He nevertheless warned against underestimating those elements that remain. Though AQ is much reduced from a few years ago, the Sultan said it must be closely monitored for as long as it has "a voice." The two agreed that stanching financial flows to AQ was key, particularly as the network can function with even minimal funding. The Sultan surmised that many young Arabs volunteer as suicide bombers as a means to redeem themselves of sin - a desire ruthlessly exploited by AQ brainwashers. He noted the parallels to how Ayatollah Khomeini had distributed "keys to paradise" to induce Army volunteers to clear minefields with their bodies during Iran's war with Iraq. Gen Abizaid described how AQ's network in Syria was most effective in channeling volunteers for Iraq, though he noted that both Baghdad and Damascus were doing a better job of interdicting that flow. ¶8. (C) The Sultan expressed his partnership with the West in fighting the war on terror, while voicing concern over Oman's maritime security. He revealed that a boatload of smuggled illegal immigrants came ashore astride one of his residences very recently in the middle of the night. They were quickly rounded up and consisted of nothing more sinister than economic migrants, but the Sultan said one never knows when more nefarious individuals might seek entry by similar means. Oman's maritime boundaries, the Sultan lamented, are very difficult to defend. Gen Abizaid noted that success on other fronts in the GWOT may spur AQ elements increasingly to seek refuge in Yemen and the Horn of Africa. The Sultan retorted that the Yemeni government doesn't "govern" all of its territories but rather, at most, only "manages" its regions. He does not envy the Yemeni government's formidable task, and said the GCC states try to do what they can to assist their neighbor. As for Somalia, the Sultan agreed that it cannot be allowed to simply fester, but rejected with gusto any notion of sending Omani peacekeepers to that land. -------------- Bilateral Relations -------------- ¶9. (C) Gen Abizaid echoed Vice President Cheney's deep appreciation for the close U.S.-Omani relationship. The Sultan said he has had the pleasure of many meetings with Mr. Cheney over the years and considers him a good friend. He recounted the visit of his father, Sultan Said, to the U.S. in 1938, and periodic calls on his father in the 1950's by the U.S. Consul in Aden, but that otherwise, the bilateral relationship only began to truly blossom after the U.S. established its Embassy in Muscat in the 1970's. Gen Abizaid thanked the Sultan for his recent generous land grant to The American International School in Muscat, which the Sultan modestly accepted. Gen Abizaid invited the Sultan to send an Omani Liaison Officer to Coalition Headquarters in Tampa, which would give Oman the benefit of valuable information sharing. The Sultan thanked the General for the offer, but did not volunteer a response. ¶10. (C) The Sultan praised Gen Abizaid for his balanced approach to strategic concerns in the region, expressing satisfaction that Oman's shared interests are being properly weighed. A heavy hand, especially in these times, he warned, could backfire for the U.S. Oman, he recalled, had come under criticism from GCC neighbors when it sought Western help to defeat the Communist-supported Dhofar rebellion in the 1970's. The Sultan argued at the time that, "if the rebels could have friends, then why can't we?" Though the Cold War is over, Oman still faces challenges for which it is grateful to have a friend such as the United States. The Sultan said he shared Gen Abizaid's positive outlook for the region, agreeing that there is no question that life is better now than it was two years ago. He said Oman would never hesitate to speak openly to its friend if it felt things were off track. ¶11. (U) CENTCOM has cleared this message. BALTIMORE