UN SUMMIT OUTCOME DOCUMENT, DEVELOPMENT ISSUES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 001350 SIPDIS DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/EDA, AND NEA/ARPI E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2015 TAGS: PREL ECIN EAID EFIN MU SUBJECT: UN SUMMIT OUTCOME DOCUMENT, DEVELOPMENT ISSUES REF: A. STATE 163224 ¶B. STATE 160880 ¶C. STATE 162146 ¶D. STATE 162169 Classified By: DCM William R. Stewart. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On September 5, Pol/Econ Chief delivered ref demarches to MFA International Organization Department Chief Ambassador Talib Miran al-Raisi. Ambassador al-Raisi acknowledged USG desires for flexibility in negotiations, and agreed that a separate declaration on innovative sources of financing was an unwelcome distraction. He sympathized with USG opposition to calls for developed states to earmark a percentage of GDP for official development assistance, and agreed that trade and good governance carried more weight than ODA in promoting economic growth. While receptive to USG concerns, the Omani mission may nevertheless remain low-key during the deliberations on the Outcome Document. End summary. ¶2. (U) Pol/Econ Chief delivered demarches (refs A-C) regarding the UN Summit Outcome Document on September 5 to MFA IO Department Chief (A/S-equivalent) Ambassador Talib bin Miran al-Raisi. (Note: Ambassador al-Raisi departs September 8 for New York, where he will be part of the Omani delegation to the Summit and will remain for the general debates until early October. End note.) -------------- Concurrence with Broad Principles -------------- ¶3. (C) Ambassador al-Raisi took on board our request that all missions take a flexible approach to the deliberations on the outcome document, acknowledging that by its nature it will be broad and full of compromises. He expressed interest in USG red-lines. He agreed that the Outcome Document is not a binding resolution and that the parties should modify the text accordingly. He likewise agreed that the effort of six nations in circulating a "Declaration of Innovative Sources of Financing for Development" was counterproductive at a time when energies should be concentrated on the Outcome Document. Ambassador al-Raisi noted the significant reduction in aid effectiveness that would result from the UK proposal for an international finance facility (IFF). He supported the idea that the development chapter of the Outcome Document should focus more on marking progress toward meeting the goals of the Millennium Declaration than on setting ambitious new targets. He added that the Doha G-77 meeting on June 12 possessed just such a spirit, in preparation for the UN Summit. -------------- ODA and Persistent Crises -------------- ¶4. (C) Ambassador al-Raisi specifically inquired about the proposed call to raise ODA levels to 0.7% of developed states' GDP. P/E Chief went through the numerous facets of USG opposition. Given the fact that Oman has limited financial resources, Ambassador al-Raisi understood USG concerns about the arbitrary nature of the ODA targets, and on the need to focus more on trade and good governance. He wondered, however, whether the 0.7% goal might have merit if not attached to any set timetable. He expressed impatience with various developing countries that seem to face crisis year after year. P/E Chief noted the potential of the New Partnerships for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in making a lasting impact in the fight against poverty, and drew upon talking points in ref D to highlight pressing needs in certain African countries (apart from that of the USG) has been lacking. ¶5. (U) Though Ambassador al-Raisi had heard that a revised version of the Outcome Document would soon be circulated in New York, he was not aware of the "Dear Colleague" letters on the various chapters that USUN had shared with other missions. P/E Chief provided copies of those "Dear Colleague" letters posted on the USUN website, and encouraged Ambassador al-Raisi to look for future position papers that we might circulate in New York and to share with us any views Oman may have on them. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) Ambassador al-Raisi tends to be both open and positively inclined toward USG positions, particularly concerning UN reform; he is also fully aware that Omani policy often adopts a more wait-and-see attitude. While the views he expressed above may track with Oman's overall judgment on the issues, it will not necessarily translate into Oman's active lobbying in support of those viewpoints during deliberations on the Outcome Document. BALTIMORE