OMAN SEEKS MORE INFORMATION ON NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 001208 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARPI AND PM E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2015 TAGS: PREL MARR XF MU SUBJECT: OMAN SEEKS MORE INFORMATION ON NATO REF: A. USNATO 471 ¶B. USNATO 211 Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III. Reason: 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (U) This is an action request - see para 7. ¶2. (C) Summary: A senior Omani diplomat says Oman's unwillingness to engage in NATO's Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) stems from the impression that NATO members lack a common conception of what ICI should be, and the fear that its aims are too aggressively political and/or military. Although the Foreign Minister has reportedly decided against ICI participation, our contact hopes to reverse that decision using detailed information on what NATO could offer. We urge the Department and USNATO to provide full details on the "Menu of Practical Activities" for forwarding to our contact. End summary. -------------- Off On The Wrong Foot -------------- ¶3. (U) In a July 27 meeting on a range of issues, MFA Chief of International Organizations Department (and Oman's representative to the March NATO-GCC ICI forum in Rome) Ambassador Talib Miran al-Raisi discussed with Pol Chief Oman's thinking on NATO's Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). A top-ranking diplomat as well as former chief of the Royal Oman Air Force, Ambassador Talib was well aware of the fact that four GCC states had already signed on to the ICI, leaving only Oman and Saudi Arabia outside the program. One reason for this, according to Ambassador Talib, is the Sultan's standing decree not to join any foreign military alliances (beyond the GCC). Nevertheless, Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin Alawi dispatched Ambassador Talib to the Rome forum to get a better assessment of NATO's intentions. ¶4. (C) Ambassador Talib came away from Rome disturbed by the lack of a coherent, uniform NATO vision of what the ICI should become. One NATO official at the forum (NFI) seemed to indicate that "spreading democracy" was a key component. The fervor of some of the GCC states was also disturbing, one of which openly stated that it was embracing ICI as a defensive bulwark against Iran, while another sought NATO's shield against Iraq. Ambassador Talib noted that Oman, on the other hand, does not perceive itself as requiring any such NATO "protection," and in fact would worry about doing anything that would put its neighbors on edge. According to Ambassador Talib, when Bin Alawi was informed of the NATO "democracy" agenda, he closed the door on Oman's inclusion in the ICI. -------------- The Dutch Assessment -------------- ¶5. (C) Dutch Ambassador to Oman Annalies Boogaerdt described to Pol Chief on July 30 her government's efforts to engage Oman on NATO. She noted that when ICI had been discussed on March 20 during the annual Dutch-Omani political consultations, the Omanis were "still digesting" what they had heard and could not offer a substantive response. She had called on Ambassador Talib on May 16, when he told her about Oman's reluctance to engage with NATO, but asked for more detailed information on the ICI. During the visit of a Dutch special envoy on July 24, the Dutch brought the subject up again with MFA Under Secretary Sayyid Badr al-Busaidi. Ambassador Boogaerdt was hopeful that the upcoming September 26 NATO forum in Dubai would answer many of the Omanis' questions. -------------- A Chance to Turn the Tide -------------- ¶6. (C) Ambassador Talib expressed to Pol Chief that he still sees merit in the ICI. If armed with better information about the various options for cooperative activities NATO might offer (such as the Menu of Practical Activities approved by NATO in March),he intends to write a briefing paper for Bin Alawi in the hopes of reversing his opposition to the ICI. If given enough choices, he is confident Oman will find something of value; but without greater detail, he sees little likelihood the Sultanate will change its current view. -------------- Action Request -------------- ¶7. (C) We request the Department and USNATO's assistance in providing us a detailed "menu" of information to share with Ambassador Talib. He appears to be our best hope for winning Oman's engagement with NATO, and it is vital that he have options for Bin Alawi that will both address his concerns and demonstrate the value of ICI to Oman. BALTIMORE