MILINKEVICH TEAM OUTLINES CAMPAIGN STRATEGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 001342 SIPDIS KIEV FOR USAID SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/15 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR BO SUBJECT: MILINKEVICH TEAM OUTLINES CAMPAIGN STRATEGY Ref: A) Minsk 1205 B) Minsk 1227 C) Minsk 1284 Classified by Ambassador George Krol for Reasons 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador and Pol/Econ Chief recently met with 10+ presidential nominee Aleksandr Milinkevich and several leaders of his team to discuss their plans to bring about democratic change around the time of the 2006 presidential elections. The strategy, though still in its elementary stage, aims to increase Milinkevich's popularity rating to 30 percent by March 2006, mobilize 30,000 to 50,000 street demonstrators in the event the 10+ candidate is disqualified during the candidate registration process or on election day, and launch a negative PR campaign against President Lukashenko and his policies. However, Milinkevich's team thus far has placed more emphasis on strategy than message. They know what they want to accomplish (change),and they believe they know how to accomplish it (street demonstrations),but they have yet to develop the campaign message that will motivate enough Belarusians to seek change. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On October 26, Aleksandr Milinkevich provided a general overview of his activities since his October 2 presidential nomination at the 10+ coalition democratic congress (ref A). The focus of his meeting with Ambassador, however, was on the need for quicker disbursement of foreign assistance to the coalition. (Note: A report on Ambassador's meeting with Milinkevich will be sent septel.) In separate meetings, several senior members of Milinkevich's team discussed with Ambassador and Pol/Econ Chief the details of the organizational structure and strategy of the campaign. Milinkevich Offers Up The Crown Jewels To Maintain Unity -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Milinkevich told Ambassador he needed to act quickly following the democratic congress to keep the coalition from splintering. Apparently, the two main contenders for the 10+ presidential nomination, pro- democracy Belarusian Party of Communists (BPC) leader Sergey Kalyakin and United Civic Party (UCP) leader Anatoly Lebedko, were seriously disappointed with the results of the congress and considered walking away from the coalition. Thus, Milinkevich picked Kalaykin to be his campaign manager, even though he would have preferred his close associate Victor Karnyenko for the position. Milinkevich gave Lebedko, the 10+ leader who was facing the most pressure from his party to withdraw from the coalition, any position he wanted (except campaign manager) to keep him on board. Lebedko chose the position of head of the national committee, which is the team responsible for formulating political, economic, social policy for the campaign. Milinkevich assured Ambassador the coalition is now a cohesive organization. Kalyakin's Team -------------- ¶4. (C) Valery Ukhnalyov, a deputy in the BPC and a ranking member of the Milinkevich campaign team, confirmed for Pol/Econ Chief on October 19 the key players in Kalyakin's campaign staff: -- Victor Karnyenko Q responsible for forming campaign teams at the regional and local levels; information dissemination; Milinkevich's campaign trips around the country; and the collection of the 100,000 signatures needed to register Milinkevich as a presidential candidate (see ref B for an explanation of the electoral process). Karnyenko was the head of the NGO Civil Initiatives before joining Milinkevich in the lead up to the democratic congress. -- Aleksandr Dobrovolsky Q responsible for developing campaign strategy; public relations. Dobrovolsky is a deputy in the UCP. -- Vintsuk Vyachorka Q responsible for international relations, including attracting financial support (Vyachorka de facto shares this responsibility with Lebedko); Milinkevich's international trips. Vyachorka is the head of the Belarusian Popular Front (BNF). -- Valery Ukhnyalov Q responsible for the administration of the team's financial resources, including money received from abroad. The National Committee -------------- ¶5. (C) Milinkevich offered Lebedko, the runner-up in the congress, the position of head of the "national committee," or policy team. On October 20, Lebedko told Ambassador the national committee would be separate from the daily operations of the presidential campaign but would provide the campaign with policies. While the leaders of the expert groups would not have titles, such as shadow economic minister, the idea would be to develop the policy platforms the single candidate can use to engage with the public. Lebedko stressed he works closely with Milinkevich and Kalyakin. ¶6. (C) Comment: Putting Lebedko in charge of policy guarantees the opposition will adopt a libertarian free market platform. UCP deputy Yaroslav Romanchuk, who also heads the Mises Center economic think tank, told Econoff on October 26 that he has already written several libertarian economic policy proposals for Milinkevich. Surprisingly, Kalyakin and his Communist party support these proposals. However, Vyachorka and his nationalist BNF party have complained loudly about the papers, and are pushing Milinkevich to adopt a more socialist economic policy. End Comment. Despite Competition, Milinkevich Is Not Bowing Out -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Milinkevich told Ambassador that Kozulin has already made up his mind that he will run alone. However, Ales Yanukovich, deputy chairman of the BNF and member of Milinkevich's national campaign team, told Pol/Econ Chief on October 20 Kozulin is still in the "wait and see" mode. Kozulin's supporters have informed several 10+ leaders the former BGU rector will reexamine his presidential aspirations in February 2006, after all democratic presidential contenders have had an opportunity to determine each other's prospects for attracting the most amount of money, campaign volunteers, and popular support to run a successful campaign during the official campaign season. ¶8. (C) Despite attempts by Kozulin, former Parliament Speaker Aleksandr Voitovich, and others to convince Milinkevich to withdraw his candidacy (ref C),Yanukovich told Pol/Econ Chief Milinkevich has made it clear to his team that he intends to stay in the race until the end. Milinkevich is the only opposition candidate who can claim he was nominated in an open democratic process and that he has the backing of an entire network of NGOs and parties. Yanukovich pointed out the other opposition candidates nominated themselves and their support extends to a few dozen volunteers at best. ¶9. (C) Lebedko told Ambassador he hoped to include several presidential aspirants in the national committee he heads as a way of further consolidating democratic forces prior to the candidate registration process. Specifically, he planned to reach out to Voitovich on science policy, former MP Vladimir Parfenovich on sports, and former Agriculture Minister Vasily Leonov on agriculture. (Note: Milinkevich apparently has different plans for Leonov. He told Ambassador he wants Leonov to take charge of the "Eastern Front," drawing on his contacts in Russia to build support in Russian public and private sectors for a Milinkevich presidency.) QCampaign Strategy Based On Three Pillars -------------- ¶10. (C) Dobrovolsky and Ukhnalyov acknowledged to Pol/Econ Chief the campaign's strategy for fomenting democratic change around the upcoming presidential elections is still in the elementary stage. However, they were able to describe the strategy's three basic tenets: significantly increased voter support for Milinkevich, large-scale street mobilization, and a negative PR campaign against President Lukashenko. Pillar #1: Popular Support For Milinkevich -------------- ¶11. (C) The 10+ coalition's number one priority is to increase Milinkevich's popular approval ratings from around one percent to 25-30 percent by March 2006. Reaching such a level would put Milinkevich in a close race with President Lukashenko. (Note: The campaign team is working off the assumption Lukashenko's true popularity is 35%.) Ukhnalyov stressed if they failed in significantly boosting the 10+ nominee's ratings by March, the battle is already lost. ¶12. (C) Milinkevich said his target group were those Belarusians who support democratic change but are either unfamiliar with or unsure about the 10+ candidate. Milinkevich firmly believes Belarusians in many different demographic groups fall into the pro-democracy category, but he acknowledged Lukashenko enjoys considerable support and said it would be "pointless" to go after those voters who strongly back the President. Dobrovolsky told Pol/Econ Chief the two key ingredients for building voter support in the target group in a relatively short time period are a massive informational campaign (flyers and bulletins in voter's mailboxes) and a door-to-door voter outreach campaign. ¶13. (C) Ukhnaylov also noted the Milinkevich team plans to gather one million signatures during the candidate registration process (probably in April 2006). The electoral law requires candidates to gather 100,000 signatures, but the campaign team intends to bombard the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) with so many signatures that it would appear ludicrous to deny Milinkevich's registration application. To achieve that goal, deputy campaign manager Karnyenko will try to gather 10,000 volunteers who will serve as signature collectors by February 2006. Ukhnalyov noted that the successful gathering of one million signatures also means they have secured a potentially large number of people willing to participate in street demonstrations in the event the CEC disqualifies Milinkevich during the registration process. Pillar #2: Street Demonstrations -------------- ¶14. (C) The second priority for the Milinkevich campaign team is to mobilize a critical mass of voters to engage in street demonstrations in the likely event Lukasenko will either disqualify Milinkevich during the candidate registration process or the vote counting. Milinkevich stressed to Ambassador the street protests would be peaceful in nature. Dobrovolsky said he aimed to organize approximately 30,000 to 50,000 volunteers who are so committed to democratic change they are willing to form massive street demonstrations on a moment's notice to defend Milinkevich's candidacy. The same group of people would also be responsible for disseminating information on the need for Belarusian citizens to protect their right to vote. This particular aspect of the information campaign would not be tied directly to Milinkevich's candidacy; it is focused on voter awareness. Dobrovolsky recognizes his goal of attracting 30,000 die-hard volunteers to engage in such risky activities is lofty, but says he is committed to making it happen. Pillar #3: Smear Campaign Against Lukashenko -------------- ¶15. (C) The goal of the negative PR campaign would be to juxtapose Belarusian life with Lukashenko remaining in power ("bad") with Belarusian life with a democratic candidate like Milinkevich in power ("good"). The anti- Lukashenko PR team would focus on gathering and disseminating information on specific cases of human rights abuse and political repression, the unsustainability of the economy, the increased isolation of the Lukashenko regime by the international community, and the corrupt dealings of Lukashenko and his family. Dobrovolsky noted the team in charge of the negative PR campaign would maintain no direct ties to the Milinkevich team, although Dobrovolsky acknowledged he is responsible for creating the team and overseeing its general operations. Comment -------------- ¶16. (C) The Milinkevich campaign strategy is in its rudimentary stage, but his team clearly envisions a bold plan for encouraging democratic change around the time of the 2006 presidential elections. The 10+ leaders, including Milinkevich, sense the next elections may be their last best opportunity to awaken voters from their political apathy and seek a change. But they also recognize their main difficulty lies in being able to reach out to voters and encourage the voters to confront the regime. The campaign team so far has concentrated its energy on discussing strategy and not on developing an attractive message that will motivate enough Belarusians to seek change. It is also worth noting the 10+ coalition has yet to launch its campaign almost a month after the congress. The campaign leaders are quick to point out their financial constraints, but voter outreach is fundamentally a labor-intensive Q not a capital-intensive Q endeavor. Milinkevich and his team still do not seem ready to take the plunge in commencing outreach in Belarus to develop a domestic momentum after the Congress. The clock is ticking. KROL