BELARUS: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 MINSK 001232

SIPDIS

KIEV FOR USAID

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR G, DRL, S/P, INL, EUR/SCE, EUR/ACE, EUR/PGI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/15
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR EAID PREL BO

SUBJECT: BELARUS: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGIES

Refs: A) Minsk 1206 B) Minsk 1162

MINSK 00001232 001.2 OF 006


Classified by Ambassador George Krol for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) The Lukashenko regime is engaged in a clear and
comprehensive effort to continue and deepen Lukashenko's
dictatorial rule over Belarus. The regime has created a
climate of fear in the country and is attempting to
eliminate any possibility for democratic change through an
aggressive anti-opposition, anti- U.S., pro-Lukashenko
propaganda campaign and employment of its comprehensive
levers of control and intimidation over all elements of
Belarusian society. The regime's relentless use of fear
and intimidation may, however, be undermining its support
in society. In response to the worsening situation in
Belarus but cognizant of possible regime brittleness, the
Deputies Committee recently agreed on a long-term
democratization strategy for Belarus. The strategy focuses
on highlighting regime abuses, robustly promoting
democratic values and the democratic process and
strengthening international pressure on the regime. The
strategy calls for active engagement with allies and
possibly Russia in a joint effort toward promoting
democratic change in Belarus while focusing on the 2006
presidential elections as a near-term opportunity to
catalyze Belarusian society against Europe's last
dictatorship. End Summary.


Context
--------------


2. (C) Since coming to power in 1994 Aleksandr Lukashenko
has relentlessly endeavored to establish total control over
Belarusian society and restore Soviet era values and
institutions antithetical to democratic values and
institutions. Through force and fear and inducements he
has marginalized his political opposition and isolated
Belarus from international influence and leverage. The
command economy he has promoted has brought a veneer of
economic stability to the country, but that stability rests
on a shaky financial foundation and heavy energy subsidies
from Russia.


3. (C) Presidential elections are scheduled to take place
in 2006. In October 2004, the regime conducted a rigged
referendum to allow Lukashenko to run again. Since then,
Lukashenko is making every effort to ensure he will remain
in power. The regime has ratcheted up its pressure and
inducements on all elements of society to support the
dictatorship while increasing repression on all independent
and opposition elements. It is waging a virulently anti-
U.S. and anti-opposition propaganda campaign to frighten
people into opposing democracy and the opposition as
threats to their economic and social well-being. The
regime has created a climate of fear throughout society.
These policies have strengthened Lukashenko's control over
society but may be undermining his support as more
Belarusians, especially among the ruling elite, may be
becoming less comfortable with Lukashenko's harsh tactics
and policies. Most Belarusians, however, remain politically
apathetic especially as economic conditions remain stable.


4. (C) On October 2, a congress of the largest registered
(and de-registered) political parties and pro-democracy
NGOs voted for NGO leader Alexander Milinkevich to run
against President Lukashenko in the upcoming 2006 elections
(ref A). The selection process culminating in the
nomination congress served as a positive, unifying
development in the opposition movement. Nevertheless, the
opposition as a whole remains internally weak, starved of
resources, deprived of domestic media access and continues
to be unpopular among many Belarusians. Other contenders
within the opposition may also emerge during the
presidential race, especially if Milinkevich fails to build
up support.


Democracy Deficits/Desired Outcomes
--------------


MINSK 00001232 002.2 OF 006



5. (C) Extremely Limited Access to Independent
Information. The government is committed to maintaining
control of all forms of information, including the media
and education, to control the populace's thoughts and
choices. Regime propaganda has had a profound impact on
many Belarusians' attitude towards the West and towards
universal values of democracy and human rights, as well as
convinced most Belarusians that their current dictatorial
form of government is both effective and desired.

-- Desired outcome: independent national and regional
newspapers have enough resources to continue their work;
national and regional newspapers increase their
circulation; an increasing number of Belarusians listen to
and/or watch programs created by Belarusians and broadcast
from neighboring countries. More Belarusians, particularly
students and opinion shapers, are able to travel to the
West and see a clear alternative to dictatorship and a
command economy.


6. (C) Flawed Political Process. The Lukashenko regime
has carefully crafted a series of laws and executive
decrees that severely restrict the influence of pro-
democracy political parties, human rights and democracy
activists, independent media, and independent trade unions.
The GOB has marginalized civil society almost to the extent
that their activities are generally ignored or frowned upon
by the general public.

-- Desired Outcome: NGOs, independent media, and political
parties are able to operate effectively and shape opinions
despite GOB repression.


7. (C) Fraudulent Electoral Process. Since the
presidential elections in 1994, the OSCE has judged all
presidential, parliamentary and local elections as
systematically flawed. In October 2004, President
Lukashenko fraudulently changed the constitution to remove
presidential term limits.

-- Desired Outcome: The GOB is keenly aware of U.S., EU,
OSCE, and perhaps Russian interest in a fair and free
electoral process. The GOB responds to some of the major
concerns of the international community, such as the
registration of all the democratic candidates, elimination
of problematic early voting, and complete access to the
voting centers by national and international observers.


8. (C) Lack of exposure to the outside world. The regime
has taken drastic measures to limit the contact of the
country's opinion leaders, such as key GOB personnel,
journalists, and students, with the West. The government
has made it difficult Q and in some cases impossible Q to
continue professional and student exchange programs, as
well as democracy-oriented seminars held in the country.
The government has portrayed American policy as something
against the people of Belarus, rather than against the
Lukashenko regime.

-- Desired Outcome: The GOB agrees to be more flexible on
the Future Leaders Exchange (FLEX) program. The government
does not shut down exchange programs. The GOB allows more
government officials to participate in various seminars at
the George C. Marshall European Center for Security
Studies.


9. (C) Poor Human Rights Record. The climate of fear and
repression in Belarus has considerably intensified this
year. The number of harassed activists in civil society,
including pro-democratic cartoonists, has increased.
Public demonstrations are severely restricted and
occasionally violently dispersed. The government has also
cracked down on a number of Evangelical churches.

-- Desired Outcome: The GOB exercises more restraint
towards civil society organizations and leaders.


Six-Month Strategy
--------------


10. (C) Post's short-term strategy can be divided into
four fundamental activities: 1) empower Belarusians with
independent, objective information; 2) pressure the regime

MINSK 00001232 003.2 OF 006


to conduct a more open and fair electoral process; 3)
coordinate policy and actions with important countries and
institutions, such as Belarus' neighbors, the EU and the
OSCE; and 4) speak out against a growing number of gross
human rights violations.


11. (C) An Empowered Belarusian Society

-- Continue to support the activities of local pro-
democracy and human rights NGOs through Democracy
Commission funds (approximately USD 800,000 annually),
USAID's new Civil Society program and its small grants
component, and through grants to NGO implementing partners
(such as NED, IRI, NDI, and through e-PINE). (PAS,
POL/ECON, USAID, EXEC)

-- Increase financial support to independent newspapers
through the new independent media fund ($250,000),which we
expect to receive in December 2005, and through existing
Democracy Commission channels.

-- Continue to host a series of events and receptions for
key groups in society, including teachers, historians,
foreign policy professors at the state universities, and
athletes. (PAS, POL/ECON, EXEC)

-- Open up more American Corners around the country. Within
one month, we will have 11 such corners in libraries.
(PAS, EXEC)

-- Enhance Embassy's direct contact with society by
increasing the number of visits to large and small cities
throughout the country. Officers will speak at schools and
universities, hold interviews with local newspapers, and
engage local GOB officials, political parties, NGOs,
business leaders. (POL/ECON, PAS, EXEC)

-- Continue to prepare the America newsletter, a quarterly
product designed to offer the Belarusian public information
on Embassy educational and cultural programs as well as on
important developments in the United States. The newsletter
is uploaded to the Embassy's website, and we will also
distribute it via the American Corners located throughout
the country. (PAS, EXEC)

-- Engage officials within GOB structures on a selective
basis to expose them to democratic and professional values
as a means of building up internal support for democratic
change Work with the GOB to allow more GOB officials, from
a greater variety of ministries, to participate in George

C. Marshall Center courses and conferences. In FY2005, 16
Belarusians attended various Marshall Center programs. We
plan on successfully recruiting eight to nine Belarusians
officials, and perhaps local journalists, over the next six
months to attend Marshall Center programs. (DAO, EXEC)

-- Continue and expand humanitarian assistance program,
which includes the renovation of hospitals and the donating
of medical equipment to hospitals, particularly in the
Chernobyl-affected regions. As 2006 is the twentieth
anniversary of the Chernobyl tragedy, organize a highly
visible and significant delivery of humanitarian aid from
the U.S. and other activities to counter the regime's anti-
U.S. propaganda. (DAO, PAS, EXEC)

-- Organize several DVCs to broaden contact between local
and Western opinion leaders. DVCs currently being planned
include an exchange of views between Western and Belarusian
academics and between U.S. and Belarusian university
students. We will post the transcripts of the DVCs on the
Embassy website, and we are exploring the possibility of
loading the DVC transcripts and videos onto DVDs and
distributing them to the American Corners. (PAS, POL/ECON,
EXEC)

-- Continue to engage the GOB to allow students to
participate in the Future Leaders Exchange (FLEX) program,
including making direct appeals to the Ministers of
Education and Foreign Affairs. Closely monitor possible
GOB attempts to shut down existing academic and
professional exchange programs. (PAS, EXEC)

-- Build the capacity of local NGOs to provide social
services to those segments of the population most likely to

MINSK 00001232 004.2 OF 006


contract HIV/AIDS. (USAID)

-- Continue to support orphans and vulnerable children
(USAID)

-- Increase our visits to U.S. NGO offices located in
Vilnius and Kiev to ensure planned projects, such as
bolstering external broadcasting into Belarus, are in line
with realities on the ground. (USAID, POL/ECON, PAS, EXEC)


12. (C) A More Legitimate Electoral Process

-- Continue to encourage the government to make lasting,
positive changes to their Electoral Code (POL/ECON, EXEC)

-- Monitor and sharply denounce egregious attempts by the
GOB to rig the elections (such as by arbitrarily
eliminating candidates during the registration process, or
by preventing the opposition candidates from holding
rallies). Try to increase contacts with GOB officials that
may be able to influence positively the way elections are
run. Observe elections. (POL/ECON, PAS, EXEC)

-- Maintain international spotlight on Belarus' electoral
process by holding DVCs with opposition leaders, GOB
officials, Belarusian journalists, and Foreign Press Center
in Washington. (PAS, POL/ECON, EXEC)

-- Increase financial and technical support for democratic
political process, including strengthening democratic
political parties, voter education, exit polling,
international/domestic observers (USAID, PAS)


13. (C) A United Stance on Belarus

-- Take a leadership role in coordinating the activities of
the EU embassies. We will, among other things, hold
monthly meetings with our EU colleagues at the
ambassadorial and working levels to share information on
assistance projects and present a united front to the
Lukashenko regime. (POL/ECON, USAID, EXEC)

-- Encourage the OSCE mission in Minsk to take an active
role in democracy promotion in the country. (POL/ECON,
EXEC)

-- Encourage the Ukrainian embassy to work more closely
with the EU and U.S. embassies on our democracy promotion
efforts meeting more regularly with Ukrainian diplomats in
one-on-one and group meetings. (POL/ECON, EXEC)

-- Build stronger relations with Russian embassy in an
effort to influence Russian perception of the political
situation in Belarus. (POL/ECON, EXEC)


14. (C) Spotlight on GOB Human Rights Record

-- Monitor government actions against political party
leaders, independent newspapers, independent trade unions,
churches, and human rights groups. (POL/ECON, EXEC)

-- Attend the court trials of politically persecuted
activists. (POL/ECON, EXEC)

-- Raise the cases of political prisoners in bilateral
exchanges and embassy and department statements and in
joint statements with the EU. (POL/ECON, EXEC)

-- Continue to hold the government publicly accountable for
repressing civil society and political parties; selectively
impose travel restrictions on violators; publicize and
commend positive steps by the government. (PAS, POL/ECON,
EXEC)


Major Needs from the Department
--------------


15. (SBU) The Embassy sent in a cable requesting EUR
assistance in receiving funding for two new positions in
the Public Affairs Section (ref B). These two positions
will help ensure that Post's public diplomacy initiatives
and overall mission objects are realized in fiscal year
2006 and into the future.

MINSK 00001232 005.2 OF 006




16. (C) Post encourages CODELs and ranking Administration
officials traveling in the region to meet with Belarusian
democrats and to highlight U.S. interest in credible
electoral process. Visitors to neighboring countries
should raise Belarus with host official and speak out on
abuses in Belarus. In light of the existing selective
engagement policy, we also encourage appropriate USG visits
to Belarus to reinforce the democracy message in the
country.


17. (C) Encourage Department press spokesman and
principals to make statements shining light on Belarusian
abuses and use every opportunity to raise Belarus and
promote the democratization strategy in meetings with
European and Russian officials.


18. (C) A fast, cheap, and effective approach to breaking
the GOB monopoly on information in the next six months in
the run up to the 2006 presidential would be to bolster
support for traditional print media (including newspapers,
flyers to be placed in mailboxes, internet sites, etc.).
The new media fund ($250,000 annually) for independent
newspapers is a step in the right direction, but more
resources should be devoted to the print media project.
Efforts to develop radio and television broadcasts into
Belarus are important elements of the strategy to provide
Belarusian society with independent information and need to
be started ASAP. However, such efforts may take time and
considerable resources and refinements before they can
affect much of the Belarusian population.


Major Impediments
--------------


19. (C) The Belarusian Government. Clearly, the
Belarusian government serves as the biggest obstacle to
implementing our democracy strategy. Although the regime
would like a better relationship with the West, it remains
fundamentally at odds with the universal values of
democracy and respect for human rights. Thus, our policy of
engagement is likely to be met with skepticism and, worse,
open hostility. Post efforts to pressure or "shame" the
regime into taking the right course of action could
adversely affect our ability to connect with society.


20. (C) Critical Counter-Intelligence Environment. Due to
the tense relationship between the USG and GOB, the
Belarusian regime goes to great length to keep track of our
activities, including tapping Embassy and home phone lines
and surveilling our movements in the country.
Occasionally, the regime has resorted to blatant forms of
interference, such as marked police following Emboffs on
trips to the countryside, interrupting meetings with local
civil society leaders, and filming and broadcasting Emboffs
leaving meetings with civil society groups.


Key Areas of Democracy Promotion Supported by GOB
-------------- --------------


21. (C) Post can safely assert that the government has
done nothing to promote democracy in recent years. The GOB
has only moved backwards on its bilateral and international
democracy and human rights commitments. The government has
yet to eliminate completely the opposition, but Post
believes this approach allows the GOB to argue it is a
member of the community of democracies.


Consequences of Pursuing Reform Agenda In Belarus
-------------- --------------


22. (C) Post's six month and longer term strategy for
building democracy in Belarus is focused on a concerted
effort to expose the hearts and minds of Belarusians to
democratic values and supporting embattled civil society,
the democratic opposition, independent media and the
democratic process during the elections while shining a
constant light on regime abuses. Post will work to build a
strong alliance with EU partners and neighbors to make
democracy building strategy in Belarus a truly joint trans-
Atlantic effort. Increased U.S. and international pressure,

MINSK 00001232 006.2 OF 006


criticism of the regime and our constant activism among the
population and support for the opposition may result in a
regime crackdown on Embassy activities, contacts and staff.
But no active democracy program is without risk in a
dictatorship. Time and history is ultimately on the side
of democratic change. Active engagement and reaching out
to Belarusian society will build long-term domestic support
for democratic change while focusing attention on the
upcoming elections may induce democratic progress in the
short-term.

KROL